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ABSTRACT

This study covers the period of conflict in the Deep
South from 1850-1852 between radical and moderate forces over
whether to accept the Compromise of 1850.

Previous interpretations

of this struggle, including excellent state studies, tend to
emphasize political or economic forces as the primary causes of
the conflict in this period.

Although these older works give

adequate coverage to the political-economic situation, they do
not provide an adequate analysis of the values which dominated
the Southern mind:

white supremacy versus love for the Union.

The present work provides a synthesis of the political history
along with a recvaluation of the motivating forces which
dominated the Lower South.
Political elites in the conservative states appealed to
the mass's love of the Union.

Fixcellent conservative politicians

like Howell Cobb of Georgia were able to effectively convince
the electorate of the Empire state that the Compromise measures
did not actually threaten white supremacy.

In the conservative

state of Louisiana the Whig press and Unionist politicians so
dominated the modes of public opinion that the masses were
constantly reminded of the practical and emotional value of the
Union.

Moderate forces in Alabama and Florida also emphasized

that the Compromise had brought sectional peace and had not
threatened white supremacy.
Fire-eaters in each of the six states attempted to
exploit the racial fears of the white population.

Racism, which

was common among all social classes in the South, was carefully
appealed to by extremists who wanted to take their states out
of the Union.

Their arguments ranged from the need to protect

the purity of the white race to rhetoric stressing the
catastrophic future in which an emancipated black man would
have social and political equality with the white man in the South.
This vision of a post abolition society in which white and black
Southerners were equal was the main tactic utilized by the
radicals.

It was especially used in Mississippi and South

Carolina.
Love of the Union and political skill by moderate
politicians were the determining factors in the South's
acquiescence in the Compromise of 1850.

The Unionist faction

in most states were able to convince the white electorate that
slavery was not really threatened.

Their leaders, including

William R. King and Robert Toombs, were able to conduct
rigorous canvasses which enabled them to stop the drive for
secession in all of the states.

The Fire-eatersy outside of

South Carolina, were unable to commit their states to disunion,

and South Carolinians had to wait another decade before
precipitating the break up of the United States.

viii

CHAPTER I

THE LOWER SOUTH AND SECTIONALISM
In the decade prior to secession the Lower South began a two
year debate on whether to accept the Compromise of 1850.

Fire-eaters '

in South Carolina openly advocated secession while even conservative
Unionists in Louisiana could not support all the Adjustment bills.
National political ties were abandoned by radicals, and the moderates'
love of the Uninn was seriously strained before decisions about Southern
rights and national loyalties were reached.

The Deep South had begun

the process of calculating the value of the Union which ended in
disunion ten years later.
The crisis of 1850 had its origins in the election of 1844.
In that year James K. Polk of Tennessee was elected President of the
United States on the Democratic ticket.

Polk, a former Speaker of the

House of Representatives and Governor of the Volunteer State, would be
chief executive at the beginning of the first major sectional crisis
since 1820-1821.^

The dangerous issue of slavery was raised again as

a moral issue across geographic lines.

Manifest Destiny, a national

phenomenon helped produce the Mexican War and the crisis over the ex
pansion of slavery in the territories from 1848-1850.

The Democrats

had captured the Presidency from the Whigs but in turn were captured
by the forces of sectionalism.

1 Charles Sellers, James K. Polk: Continentalist 1843-1846
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966),3-487, passim. Herein
after cited as James K. Polk.

1

2

Sectionalism was one of the strongest forces in America during
the 1840's.

American historians have Usually identified it as the

decisive factor which slowly began to erode such national institutions
as the Protestant churches and the two major political parties.

The

decade of the 1840's saw the beginning of the breakdown of the twoparty system and a rise in animosity between the North and South.
Sectional rather than national political loyalties thus became more
important for many Southerners
In the Shrine of Party. Joel Silbey identified a strong twoparty system in the Southern states which retained much of its vitality
despite the slavery question.

Between 1840 and 1852 fifty-three

percent of the popular vote in the South went to the Democrats while
Southern Whigs obtained approximately forty-seven percent of the
electorate's support.

Southerners were part of a two-party system,

and like other Americans, they believed that there were significant
differences between the two parties, especially on economic issues.
Congressional voting behavior, which Silbey examined, was mainly deter
mined by party membership rather than sectional loyalty.^
By the 1840's the Lower South had already developed its socio
economic institutions and thought patterns.

2 Avery 0. Craven, The
Charles Scribner's Sons,
1942),
of Party; Congressional
Voting
University of Pittsburgh
Press,
3

Staple crop agriculture

Coming of the Civil War (NewYork;
175-300; Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine
Behavior. 1841-1852
(Pittsburgh:
1967), 10-109.

Silbey, The Shrine of Party. 19-34.
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was the dominant activity in the Deep South.

Although South Carolin

ians raised rice on the coast, and South Louisianians grew sugar cane,
cotton was the predominant crop in that region.^

Black men and women

labored in the fields, and in some places in the Deep South, outnumbered
the white population.^

Manufacturing and trade were generally deni

grated when compared with agriculture.

The plantation was the Southern

; ideal.6
Slavery had become the institution around which Southerners
hoped to build a utopia.

Eugene Genovese describes the peculiar insti

tution as more than "a system of extra-economic compulsion designed to
sweat a surplus out of black labor. . . .

It supported a plantation

community that must be understood as an integrated social system, and
it made this community the center of Southern life.

It extruded a

class of slaveholders with a special ideology and psychology and the
political and economic power to impose their values on society as a
whole.one

need not agree with Genovese's picture of the South as

a pre-.bourgeoise, non-capitalist society in order to concur with his

York:

4 Clement Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization (New
Harper & Row, 1961), 25-74.

5 The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 (Washington,
1853), 38-39, 447.
6 Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New
York: Random House, 1961), 155-221. Clement Eaton states: "Though
trade did not rank in honor with planting, or the professions, there
is a tendency to underestimate the spirit of business enterprise in
the Old South and to exaggerate the disdain among the upper class for
the pursuit of business." Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization.

122.
7

Genovese, The Politica1 Economy of Slavery. 7-8.

conclusion that the planters dominated the South.

Non-slaveholders

were certainly not white serfs or vassals, but they accepted the
leadership of the planter and hoped to join him at the top of the social
pyramid.

Q

Emancipation or any apparent threat to slavery was a challenge
to the values and social mores of the Deep South.

A slaveholder would

support disunion if the system of black slavery was threatened:
these men slaves were a source of power, pride and prestige.

"To

...

Slavery was the foundation of a special civilization imprinted with
their own character.

The defense of slavery, to them meant the

defense of their honor and dignity.

. . .

They could never agree to

renounce the foundation of their power and moral sensibility.
Planters and the common white folk had a definite stake in the peculiar
institution whether out of overt economic investment, fear of race war,
or the psychological comfort of a permanently inferior race.

Southern

men might disagree on economic and political questions, but by the
1840's they generally defended slavery as a positive good.

Any serious

questioning of the system of Negro slavery was not to be tolerated in
the Lower South.

8

Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 72-97.

9

Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery, 270.

10 Clement Eaton, The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old
South (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), 32-64, 89-118,
144-162, 300-376; George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White
Mind (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 42-71; William S. Jenkins, ProSlavery Thought in the Old South (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1935), 1-381, passim.

5

Slavery had been a moral and political issue in ante-bellum
America since the 1820's.

The first important struggle came in 1820-

1821 over the admission of Missouri, a slave state, to the Union.

In

the most complete work on this crisis, Glover Moore demonstrated that
the later rationales for or against the expansion of slavery were
vigorously aired in Congressional d e b a t e . A

second crisis arose in

the late 1820's when South Carolinians overtly protested against the
tariff of 1828 and covertly protested against the growing abolition
movement and possible emancipation .^

Politicians in the 1830's tried

to keep this terrible issue from becoming a source of sectional con
flict.

Congressional leaders of both parties acquiesced in the

Southern demand that a gag rule be passed to require mandatory tabling
of anti-slavery petitions sent to the House or Senate.^

Andrew

Jackson and Martin Van Buren avoided raising the issue of annexing
the Republic of Texas since it would involve the question of a new
slave state and might precipitate war with Mexico.

14

Despite their

strenuous efforts, slavery as a moral and political issue had blossomed

11 Glover Moore, The Missouri Compromise. 1819-1821 (Lexington;
University of Kentucky Press, 1953), 10-383, passim.
12 William W. Freehling, Prelude to the Civil W a r ; The Nulli
fication Crisis in South Carolina. 1816-1836 (New York; Harper &
Row, 1963), 89-301.

York;

13 Glyndon G. Van Duesen, The Jacksonian Era. 1828-1848 (New
Harper & Row, 1959), 108.

14 Charles Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 321-22; Van
Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 109.

6

fully with the annexation of Texas and the beginning of the war with
Mexico in 1846.

Southerners were determined to protect the right of

slavery to expand into the West while many Northerners wanted to
restrict the boundaries of the peculiar institution.*'*
John Caldwell Calhoun of South Carolina wanted to protect
Southern interests by creating an alliance with the old Northwest which
would tie the two sections politically and economically together.*^
0. Craven concludes:

A.

"These regions had long been tied together both

physically and socially. . . .
South was strictly Western.

In spirit and temper too the Lower

. . .

Even with the building of canals

and railroads, which linked the Northwest with eastern seaboard cities,
trade still flourished with the South."

17

A concrete effort at

sectional unity was made in 1845 at the Memphis Convention on internal
improvements.

Calhoun proposed that a railroad be constructed between

Charleston, South Carolina, and Memphis, Tennessee.

The aging

Carolinian returned to a position, which he had earlier held in his
nationalistic phase, of advocating federally-financed internal improve
ments, for example, on the Mississippi River.

Six hundred delegates

from both the South and Middle West attended but nothing positive came
from the meeting.

And although Calhoun chaired a Senate committee

15 Ray A. Billington, Westward Expansion (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1967), 501-505; Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era.
208-45.
16 Charles Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist 1840-1850
(New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1951), 234. Hereinafter
cited as John C. Calhoun.

Rouge:

17 Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism (Baton
Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 21-25.

7

which considered the Memphis resolutions, the idea of federallyfinanced internal improvements was repudiated by other Southerners
such as Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina.*®
A possible sectional alliance might have been achieved through
the Democratic party.

There were strong branches of the party in the

Northwest and South which could have been the basis for an intraparty
sectional alignment.

The 1844 Democratic platform had attempted to

appeal to the Manifest Destiny spirit in the nation during the 1840's.
The platform called for the "re-annexation" of Texas and the "re
occupation" of Oregon.

Southerners were recompensed with total annexa

tion of Texas, but Northern men felt cheated when Polk compromised on
the Oregon territory.

In Polk's first two years the low Walker Tariff

was passed by Congress, but a rivers and harbors bill wanted by the
Northwest was vetoed.

Northern Democrats began to speak of Southern

control of the party.

They began to believe in an aggressive

slavocracy which endangered their sectional interests.*^

An alliance

was never consummated, however, and Silbey could find no evidence of
sectional cooperation in Congressional voting.

2n

18 Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1966), 310-11; Thelma Jennings, "A Reappraisal
of the Nashville Convention," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Tennessee, 1968), 30-33; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun. 235-46.
19 Avery 0. Craven, "Democracy a Trial? A Failure of Tech
nique," Marvin Myers and T. R. Pole (eds.) The Meanings of American
History: Interpretations of Events, Ideas and Institutions (Glenview:
Scott, Foresman & Company, 1971), 449.
20

Silbey, The Shrine of party. 10-66.

8

After the beginning of the Mexican War in May 1846 sectionalism
and slavery really emerged as potent political issues.

The question

of slavery was raised at the end of the 1846 Congressional session.
James Thompson, a Pennsylvania Democrat, offered an amendment to ex
clude slavery from Oregon.

It was passed in the House, but the Senate

did not act upon it.^l
In early August 1846 the Polk administration made a special
request for an appropriation of two million dollars to use in negotia
tions for a boundary treaty with Mexico.

Four Northern Democrats,

including David Wilmot (who had supported the Walker Tariff which was
unpopular in Pennsylvania) wanted to pass a prohibition similar to
the Thompson amendment but applied to any territory acquired from
Mexico.

99

A debate was taking place on August 6 when Wilmot intro

duced his famous amendment:

"Provided that as an express and funda

mental condition to any acquisition of any territory from the
Republic of Mexico by the United States . . . neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said terri9 ^

tory. .

It was adopted in the House of Representatives by a vote

of 83 to 64 with no slave state Democrat supporting it.

When the two

million dollar appropriation and the Proviso reached the Senate, it

21 Sellers, James K. Polk. 474-84; Elbert B. Smith, The Death
of Slavery: The United States. 1837-1865 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1967), 83-84. Hereinafter cited as. The Death of Slavery.
22

Sellers, James K. Polk. 476-83.

23

Ibid., 481.

was filibustered to death .^
There was little immediate reaction to the Proviso in either
section during the fall of 1846.

Politicians in the South generally

regarded the Wilmot Proviso as a political maneuver rather than a
sectional threat; Northern Democrats wanted to postpone any discussion
of slavery in the West so that the Whig party would not be strength
ened by it.

However, Preston King, a New York Barnburner, reintro

duced the Wilmot Proviso in an amendment to an appropriation bill on
January 4, 1847.

King was answered by a Calhounite, Armistead Burt

of South Carolina, in a debate on Oregon.

Representative Burt pro

posed that the Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30' be extended to
any conquered territory; this proposal was rejected and the House
again passed the Wilmot Proviso on February 15, 1847.^
A direct answer to Northern Free Soilers was provided by
Calhoun in a series of Senate resolutions:

"That Congress as the

joint agent and representative of the States of the Union, has no
right to make any law, or do any act, whatever that shall directly
or by its effects, make any discriminations between the States of the
Union . . . that the enactment of any law, which should directly or by
its effects deprive the citizen of any of the states of this Union
from emigrating with their property into any of the territories of the

24

Ibid., 481-84.

25 Chaplain W. Morison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism:
The Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1967), 21-34. Hereinafter cited as Democratic Politics
and Sectionalism.

10

United States . . . would be a violation of the Constitution . .
Even though these resolutions were not adopted by the Senate, Calhoun's
position eventually became the basis of arguments which Southern
politicians supported in the sectional crisis.^
Calhoun hoped to unite the entire South by using the Wilmot
Proviso as the impetus for destroying national party loyalty.

In

Charleston he made a speech on the growing dangers to Southern civili
zation and institutions.

Political strength in the North was evenly

divided between the two main parties which had to bid for abolitionist
support in order to win elections.

The South must unite and demand

that the national political parties abandon the emancipation program.
There was some Southern support for Calhoun's idea, but the Southern
Whigs would not abandon their party.

A majority of Southern Democrats

did not like the idea either since the disruption of their party would
leave the South politically isolated.

They also suspected that the

Carolina Calvinist was manipulating the slavery question to further his
drive for the Presidency.

And though most Southern newspapers opposed

the Wilmot Proviso, they were also suspicious of Calhoun's ideas of
Southern unity.
On the state level in 1847, the Virginia legislature enacted
a series of resolutions which condemned the Wilmot Proviso and

26

Ibid., 35.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid., 38-42.
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promised resistance to its passage.

These same resolutions were

adopted by South Carolinians in Charleston who had gathered to welcome
Calhoun back from Washington.

Alabama Democrats in their state conven

tion in May 1847 gave full approval to the Virginia resolutions; the
Alabama legislature adopted the Calhoun-Virginia position in December
1847 and decided that Congress had the responsibility to protect a
slave owner's black property in any territories.

If Southern inter

ests were threatened, the people of Alabama would cooperate with other
Southerners to protect slavery.^9
Another issue that caused sectional tensions was the question
of territorial government for Oregon and the former Mexican areas.
The Treaty with Mexico had brought the vast region of the Southwest
and California under American control.-*®

One historian has written:

"There was peace with Mexico but a new conflict in Washington."-**
An anti-slavery Senator, John P. Hale of New Hampshire, proposed a
bill which would prohibit the introduction of slavery into Oregon.-*^
The answer to Hale's bill came from Calhoun who described what this
bill meant to militant Southerners:

"The degradation of nearly one-

half the states of the Union, who claim to be equal here and who

29

Jennings, "A Reappraisal of the Nashville Convention,"

30

Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 239-45.

31

Smith, The Death of Slavery. 94.

32

Ibid.

36-38.

intend never to yield that fully equality."^3

jn a series of violent

debates, Senator Henry S. Foote of Mississippi vigorously attacked
Hale as having violated the constitutional rights of the entire South.
Foote invited Hale to come to Mississippi and said "that he (Hale)
could not go ten miles into the interior before he would grace one of
the tallest trees of the forest, with a rope around his neck, with the
approbation of every virtuous and patriotic citizen; and that if
necessary I should assist in the o p e r a t i o n . H a l e replied that if
Senator Foote came to New Hampshire he would receive the respect due
a member of the United States Senate.35
Most Senators generally agreed that the peculiar institution
had no chance of surviving in Oregon.

Acrimonious debate continued

through July as a Senate committee, chaired by John Clayton of
Delaware, worked on a compromise.

A package of three bills was

presented which would have allowed Oregon to be organized as a terri
tory with its own constitution which outlawed slavery; New Mexico and
California, carved from the Mexican cession, were to be set up as
territories but their legislatures would be prohibited by Congress
from passing any laws regarding slavery.

If any questions were raised

about the status of slavery in these areas, a final decision would be
reached in the Federal courts.

33

The Clayton Compromise, passed by the

Ibid., 95.

34 John E. Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote,
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1957),
47.
35

Smith, The Death of Slavery. 95.
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Senate, was a solution which "ultra" Southerners like Calhoun sup
ported.^
The Clayton Compromise did not become law, however; the House
of Representatives, dominated by a pro-Wilmot Proviso majority, voted
to table it.

After several additional days of savage debate the

Senate passed a bill which included the extension of the Missouri Com
promise line to the Pacific.

This proposal was also rejected by a

majority of the House of Representatives.

The Senate then began its

final debate on the Oregon territory; a change of votes by two
Senators, Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri and Sam Houston of Texas,
resulted in the passage of the Oregon Territorial Bill with its
provision excluding black slavery .^
Southerners:

Calhoun spoke for concerned

"The separation of the North and South is completed . . .

This is not a question of territorial government but a question
qg

involving the continuance of the Union."

Although these words did

not produce an immediate effect in the Lower South, Calhoun's ideas
were being well publicized among radical politicians.
The issue of slavery in the territories was the paramount one
in 1848, but it was not the only matter of interest in the Deep South.
An election for President of the United States would occur in 1848,
and Southerners had a consuming interest in its outcome.

Southerners

36 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 461; Smith,
The Death of Slavery, 96.
37

Smith, The Death of Slavery. 95.

38

Ibid., 96.

had dominated the office since the beginning of the republic.

The

Virginia dynasty had ruled with only one interruption until 1824.

In

this year the Southern succession was broken, but it returned with
the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and 1832.

Jackson was

succeeded by a New Yorker, his lieutenant, Martin Van Buren.

In 1840

William Henry Harrison won the office but, dying almost immediately,
was succeeded by John Tyler of Virginia.

Then in 1844, with the

election of Polk, the South again placed a man in the White House.
Actually, there had never been any direct threat to slavery from the
OQ

Executive branch. 7
Politically oriented Americans had begun to speculate about
the Presidential election of 1848 when Polk had decided not to seek a
second term.

In the Whig camp the name of Henry Clay immediately

came to mind.

Would the Southern man with Northern principles, as

some viewed him, attempt another race?

It was a possibility, but

even among some of his most devoted followers there was doubt that
Harry of the West could win the 1848 election.

Politicians began to

mention possible Whig candidates; the most prominent name talked about
was General Zachary Taylor.^®

John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and

Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, leading Whigs, pushed the Louisiana
general's candidacy.

Stephens, a Georgia Congressman, represented

the wing of Southern Whiggery which went home in the summer of 1846

39

Eaton, A History of the Old South, 141-60, 185-206, 261-92.

40 Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Life of llcnry Clay (Boston;
Little Brown & Company, 1937), 383-84.

15

hoping to safeguard the South by selecting as the Whig presidential
candidate a Southern slaveholder who would defend the South's
interests.

Later this sectionslly conscious group began to create a

Taylor boom in Congress.
During the December 1846 session of Congress the Young Indians,
a pro-Taylor machine, was formed in Congress.^

Taylor also began to

receive support in the Lower South from newspapers like the New
Orleans National;

"We consider General Taylor's civil qualifications

far outshone those connected with his military c a r e e r . T h e

Florida

Sentinel editorialized:

"We are for a Southern man and a slaveholder

for the Presidency."^

Support for General Taylor also existed among

important members of the Calhoun Camp, including Beverly Tucker and
John A. Campbell of Alabama.
By late 1847 the Wilmot Proviso was for alert Southerners one
of the vital issues in the Presidential campaign.
Georgian declared:

The Savannah

"the Bank is dead, [and all other party issues]

. . . the only question before the country therefore is the Wilmot
AA

Proviso." °

Southern Democrats were becoming aware of the Alabama

41 Joseph P. Rayback, Free Soil: The Election of 1848 (Lexing
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platform which William Lowndes Yancey introduced at the Democratic
State Convention in March 1847.

The platform's basic plank was that

there existed a "natural and indefensible right of each citizen of
every state of the confederacy to reside with his property of every
description in any t e r r i t o r y A l a b a m a ' s Democratic leaders agreed
not to support any man for the presidency who did not oppose the ex
clusion of slavery in the territories.

Georgia Democrats, meeting at

Millegeville in July 1847, gave a resounding second to these ideas.48
The national Democratic leaders realized that there had to be
alternatives to the Alabama platform and the Wilmot Proviso.

Elec

tions were not won by a party split over controversial issues.
Alternatives were proposed, including an extension of the Missouri
Compromise line to the Pacific or popular sovereignty as outlined by
Lewis Cass of Michigan in the Nicholson letter.

Cass would allow

white male settlers in a new territory to decide for themselves the
status of slavery within their territorial boundaries
In early 1848 Alabama Democratic delegates affirmed the 1847
platform which supported equal rights for the South in the West.

An

Alabama Democratic convention considered James Buchanan, George M.
Dallas, Lewis Cass and Levi Woodbury as possible presidential candi
dates.

Yancey, favoring Woodbury, denounced the first three of these
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men as unacceptable since they did not conform to the Alabama plat
form.

Woodbury, a Northern Democrat, also gained support in Georgia,

Florida, and South Carolina.

However, in the two former states he

had direct opposition from Lewis Cass.^®
Although General Taylor's candidacy was gaining favor, he
still had openly to declare that he was a good Whig.
letter Taylor wrote:

In the Allison

"I am a Whig but not an ultra W h i g . " ^

Taylor's

support was strongest in the Lower South while Henry Clay was most
popular in the Northeast and the border states.

At the Whig Conven

tion Taylor had the advantage of an organization which had been
operating since 1846, and he won the nomination handily.

Southern

men like Stephens and Crittenden had helped nominate the old
Genera 1.52
At the Democratic Convention in 1848 Yancey and other Southern
Fire-eaters attempted to force the adoption of their views.

Yancey

rose in the convention with a minority report which claimed that any
Southern man had a right to move with his slave property into the
territories.

He added that there was danger that South Carolina,

Florida, Georgia, and Alabama would bolt.

The Yancey pro-extension

plan was rejected by a vote of 216 to 36, and the Alabama Fire-eater
left the convention hall.

But the departure of one Southern radical
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did not prevent the nomination of Lewis Cass on his popular sover
eignty platform.53
The campaign in the South revolved primarily around the issue
of slavery.

Southern Whigs charged that the Democratic candidate

hated slavery but that Zachary Taylor would protect the institution:
"He is a southern man and a slaveholder, one of o u r s e l v e s . A l 
though Cass was defended by Southern Democrats, Taylor had special
appeal for the Southern electorate since he was a military leader as
well as a large plantation owner.

Taylor carried the extreme pro

slavery areas in the South, and his supporters led Southern voters to
believe that their man would be an ardent pro-slavery

President

.55

When Congress convened in December 1848, it had to deal again
with the problem of slavery.

Resolutions were offered in the House

of Representatives to eliminate the slave trade in the District of
Columbia.

Immediate Southern reaction came when Daniel Gott, a New

York Whig representative, proposed:

"That the committee for the

District of Columbia be instructed to report a bill as soon as prac
ticable, prohibiting the slave trade in the said District."^
Southern Senators from ten states had formed a committee of five

53 Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism. 48; Morison,
Democratic Politics and Sectionalism. 121-26; Rayback, Free Soil.
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which called for a meeting of Southern Congressmen on December 22,
1848, in the Senate chamber.

It was attended by eighteen Southern

>•¥

Senators and fifty-one Congressmen.

A special committee of fifteen

was established, with Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia as chairman,
to consider the sectional issues.

Members from the Lower South in

cluded John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Edward C. Cabell of Florida,
William R. King of Alabama, Henry S. Foote of Mississippi and Solomon
W. Downs of Louisiana.^7
This Committee met the next day and chose a subcommittee,
including Calhoun and King, to write an Address to the People of the
Southern States.

The Address, mainly the work of Calhoun, was dis

cussed by the Committee during the first two weeks of January 1849
amidst agitation over anti-slavery attacks.

When the threat to the

slave trade in the District of Columbia declined, Whigs like Alexander
Stephens wanted to protect their new leader, Zachary Taylor.

President

Polk advised Southern Democrats to go to the meeting but to prevent any
action on the Address.

Robert Toombs and Stephens went to the meeting
CO

specifically to modify any radicalism in it.
Calhoun's Address, although characterized as "not an inflamma
tory document or one designed to stir unduly the antagonism of the
section," was a strong indictment of Northern aggression against his
beloved South.^9

These attacks included interference with the
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recovery of escaped slaves, refusal to grant equality to the South in
the territories, and efforts to check the peculiar institution in
Washington itself.^0

According to Calhoun, these actions threatened

"with destruction the greatest and most vital of all the interests
and institutions of the South [slavery]

Debate on the report

began on January 15 and included an alternative report by the Georgia
Whig Senator, John M. Berrien, presented on January 22, 1849.

Berrien's

Address was defeated by a vote of thirty-three to twenty-seven after
many Southern Whigs withdrew from the meeting.

Calhoun's Address was

adopted, but it received the signatures of only forty-eight Southern
Congressmen out of a total of one hundred and twenty-one from the
slave states.

Despite this setback, it was signed by prominent Sena

tors from the Deep South.^
At this juncture the new Whig President seemed to be under the
influence of William H. Seward of New York.

Southern Whigs either

defended Taylor as inexperienced or opposed his abandonment of the
rights of the South.

In contrast, Southern Democrats, who had always

questioned the real value of Taylor to the South, were the most out
spoken backers of the Calhoun Address .^

The only two states which

moved directly toward a Southern rights position were South Carolina
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and Mississippi.

South Carolinians established a central state Com

mittee of Vigilance and Safety.

However, the Palmetto State did not

act since there were many Southerners suspicious of her leadership.
Mississippians, at a meeting in Jackson in October 1849, acted openly,
calling for a general convention of the Southern states at Nashville,
Tennessee, in June 1850, to consider Northern abuses against the
South.64
The cold weather in December 1849 did not affect the heat of
sectional tension.
select a speaker.

Members of the House of Representatives had to
Robert Winthrop, a Massachusetts Whig, was opposed

by the Georgia Democrat, Howell Cobb.6-* Robert Toombs and Alexander
Stephens, both of Georgia, wanted to prevent passage of the Wilmot Pro
viso. ^

Therefore Toombs "was unwilling to surrender the great power of

the Speaker's chair without obtaining security for the future [of the
South]."6^

A warning was also issued by Stephens:

"I tell this House

. . . that the day in which aggression is consummated upon any
section of the country much and deeply as I regret it, this Union is
dissolved."

The House balloted over sixty times before it decided

to accept a resolution to allow the Speaker to be chosen by a
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plurality.

Cobb was elected,

but the mood of the Senate was re

vealed in a statement by Jeremiah Clemens of Alabama**"The Union is
valuable only for the privileges it confers and the rights it secures."^®
This crisis was further exacerbated in the winter of 1849-1850
by President Taylor's message to Congress.

The President described

the events in California which made her admission to the Union vital,
and also indicated that New Mexico would shortly apply for statehood.
Taylor had given impetus to the calling of constitutional conventions
in this area; California had decided upon a free state status, and it
appeared to many Americans that Mexican law made New Mexico a free
territory.

Some Southerners resented the plan since they wanted com

pensation for the South if California was admitted.

Additional issues

between the major sections involved the boundary disputes between New
Mexico and Texas, the need for a strong fugitive slave law, and the
status of the peculiar institution and slave trade in Washington, D.C.
Taylor's plan did not take into account these additional problems.71
On January 29, 1850, Henry Clay drew together a number of
proposals to solve the crisis.

The Kentucky Senator "was motivated

69 Nevins, The Ordea1 of the Union. 252-53; Hamilton, Zachary
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Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1897), V, 18-19.

by a patriotic desire to terminate the sectional

crisis."^

If a

Compromise could be achieved, the Union would be maintained and the
power of Clay's party could be preserved.

Clay proposed that:

1)

California should be admitted into the Union with her free soil con
stitution; 2) territorial governments should be established in the
rest of the Mexican cession without any provision or limitations con
cerning slavery; 3) the border of west Texas should not include New
Mexico; 4) the debt of the Republic of Texas should be assumed by the
Federal government; 5) slave trade within the capital should be for
bidden; 6) slavery in Washington should not be ended without the
permission of white citizens of Maryland or the capital; 7) provi
sions should be made for the more effective rendition of fugitive
slaves; and 8) Congress should declare that it had no constitutional
power to interdict interstate trade in slaves.^
Reaction by militant Southerners was immediate.
pian stated:

A Mississip-

"The North must choose between respect for southern

rights and dissolution."^

Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi

rejected the idea of compromising the constitutional right of planters
to migrate with black property into the Mexican cession.

Davis

thought that an answer to the problem of sectional power would be to
have each section dominate one House of Congress.

The only sectional
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adjustment possible, Davis stated, was the extension of the 36° 30*
line to the Pacific.^
The extreme Southern opinion was stated by Calhoun to a packed
Senate chamber on March 3, 1850.

Calhoun had "a long mane of thick

gray hair swept back from his leonine features . . . was emaciated
. . . and death seemed plainly written on his brow.

But his wild,

deep glowing eyes . . . his iron jaw and his massive forehead made him
as impressive as one Hebrew prophet . .

Because of illness, he

asked Senator James M. Mason of Virginia to read his speech:

"I

have, Senators, believed from the first that the agitation of the
subject of slavery would if not prevented by some timely and effec
tive measure end in d i s u n i o n , h e began.

The Southern region of

the United States had fallen behind the Northern section in power and
population because of political measures like the Missouri Compromise.
Clay's proposals were futile, and the Union would not be preserved
unless there was sectional equality in the territories, effective re
turn of fugitive slaves, an end of agitation on the slavery question,
and constitutional amendments that would restore power to the South.
Moderate men in both sections were appalled by Calhoun's
speech.

A majority of Southern Senators could not agree to the
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Carolinian's call for constitutional
his idea of secession.

c h a n g e . ^9

Calhoun replied:

They also repudiated

"As things now stand, the

Southern states cannot with safety remain in the Union."®®
Foote of Mississippi answered:

Henry S.

"I think she [the South] may . . ."81

Northern moderate opinion was voiced by Daniel Webster of
Massachusetts who spoke for the Compromise out of "love of the
op

Union."

Webster noted that both sections had grievances but peace

ful secession was not possible.

The Union had to be preserved.

Webster was praised in Georgia, Louisiana, and generally by Southern
Whig papers, but he was condemned by radical Southerners and freesoilers.

It is possible that Webster's speech quieted sectional ten

sions, but the speech did not change any Senatorial votes.
In the South opinion on the sectional crisis was divided or
confused in the winter of 1849-1850.

Georgians of both parties in

the legislature had adopted fairly radical resolutions in November
1849.

But the Georgia citizenry failed to show much interest in the

election of delegates to the Nashville Convention.®^
Louisiana displayed a generally conservative attitude.
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state of Florida had two radical Senators, David Yulee and Jackson
Morton, who urged support for the Nashville Convention, but Governor
Thomas Brown questioned the constitutionality of the Southern Conven
tion.

Local committees in Florida, however, choose delegates.®-*
In June 1850 the Nashville Convention opened.

delegates came from South Carolina;
Robert Barnwell Rhett.

The best known

Langdon Cheves, James Hammond and

Judge William Sharkey of Mississippi was chosen

President of the Convention on June 3, 1850.

Sharkey's speech to the

Nashville delegates was an appeal for careful, conservative resolutions.

He made it clear that the preservation of the Union should be

the goal of the Convention.

Moderation dominated the Convention because:

(1) delegates feared that radicalism would alienate the border states,
and (2) they could not rely on a unified Southern opinion.

Convention

members in resolutions indicated that they would settle for an exten
sion of the 36° 30' line to the Pacific coast.

A more radical position

was taken in an address written by Robert Barnwell Rhett, but neither
document gained widespread approval in the South:®^

"If before the

radicals had been checkmated, they had been given an opportunity to
clasp hands, to exchange opinion and to fortify each other."®®
Southern radicals were not able to use the Nashville
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Convention to achieve Southern unity or secession.
Earlier in 1850 Congressmen had started to work for passage of
the Compromise.

Efforts to design a Compromise had begun in February

when the sectional divisions appeared most critical.

On February

18-19, 1850, there was a meeting at Howell Cobb's home of Toombs,
Stephens, Linn Boyd of Kentucky, John McClernand, and William A.
Richardson of Illinois, and John K. Miller of Ohio.

These men, along

with Senator Stephen Douglas, agreed to the admission of California
if New Mexico and Utah were organized as territories without Congress
prohibiting slavery.

They also agreed that people in the territories

should settle the status of slavery themselves; and any effort to
abolish slavery in Washington, D. C. must be defeated.

Representa

tive McClernand and Senator Douglas introduced bills which embodied
QQ

the sense of the meetings.
The Compromise proposals confronted strong opposition by the
Taylor administration and by radical men in all sections.

Clay's

supporters (approximately fourteen to fifteen men) tried to convince
the Congress that compromise was possible and that radicals were
QA

dangerous. u

Tensions continued, however, and there was a fight

between two Southern Senators, Henry S. Foote of Mississippi and
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri.

Both men were Unionists, but Foote

had associated himself with Calhoun's Address, which Benton considered

89

Ibid.. 303-305.

90

Ibid., 305-308.

28

treasonous.
demise.

Foote defended slavery while Benton hoped for its eventual

The Mississippi Senator was pressing for a committee of thir

teen to consider compromise bills when Benton interrupted with direct
criticism of the Southern Address as the cause of sectional excite
ment.

Foote defended Calhoun and used the term "Calumniators" to

describe the South Carolinian's critics.

Benton then charged Foote

who drew a pistol which he pointed at the Missourian.

91

Although

Senators restrained the men, Benton cried: "let the assassin fire."9^
This was good evidence of the personal and sectional tensions which
were created by the vigorous Senate debate.
Foote's proposal to create a committee of thirteen was adopted
by a vote of thirty to twenty-two on April 18, 1850.

Henry Clay was

chosen chairman of the committee which consisted of men from both
parties and sections.

The committee's report, called the Omnibus

Bill, was presented to the Senate on May 8, 1850:9^
First whenever any new State or States formed out of Texas
applied for admission, Congress was to redeem its compact
with the Texan people by granting the request. Second,
California was to be admitted immediately. . . . Third,
territorial governments were to be established for New Mexico
and Utah without any stipulations for or against slavery.
Fourth, the provisions respecting California, Utah and New
Mexico . . . were to be bound up in the bill. . . . Fifth,
Texas was to be paid for surrendering her jurisdiction over
the lands she claimed within the old boundaries of New Mexico
. . . . Sixth, a fugitive law was to be passed. Seventh, the
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slave trade was to be abolished within the District of
Columbia, slavery was to continue therein.94
Men like Senator Solomon W. Downs of Louisiana objected to parts of
the resolutions, but the Compromise forces appeared hopeful.95
During the early summer of 1850 Southern Congressmen worked
actively on the Compromise.

An amendment by Senator Berrien, which

was adopted, "empowered territorial legislatures to protect slave
property (if the Federal Courts) . . . should favor the existence of
Q(L

slavery there."70

Pierre Soule of Louisiana presented an amendment

that a state formed from the Mexican cession could enter the Union
whether it was free or slave.

These amendments were adopted as a

collision appeared possible between the state of Texas and the national
government over the New Mexico boundary .^
Federal forces, stationed in New Mexico under the command of
Military Governor John Monroe, seemed poised to defend her.

A New

Mexican constitutional convention had outlawed slavery, and the con
stitution had been adopted by a vote of eight thousand to thirty-nine.
The Governor of Texas, supporting Texas claims to jurisdiction over
the area around Sante Fe-Albuquerque asked the Texas legislature for
power to send a state militia force to the disputed land.
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President

Taylor wanted New Mexico admitted as a state and indicated that the
Federal government would control the area until the question was
settled.

Southern radicals rallied to the Texas cause, and Southern

moderates were alarmed when Taylor proposed to send reinforcements to
New Mexico.

go

Representatives Stephens and Toombs visited the Presi

dent in early July 1850 but had no effect on him.

Stephens exclaimed

after this visit that if Federal troops were sent to New Mexico
QQ
Taylor would be impeached. 7

He wrote the National Intelligencer:

"The first federal gun illegally fired against the people of Texas . .
would signal freemen from the Delaware to the Rio Grande to rally to
the r e s c u e . T a y l o r denounced these men as traitors and was still
opposed to the Compromise when he died on July 9, 1850.^*
His successor, Millard Fillmore was eager to support adjust
ment measures.

But even with a friendly President in the White House

the Omnibus Bill was having rough going.

Its foes, employing a series

of skillful parliamentary maneuvers, defeated it on July 31.

Clay

lost support from the Whigs, and the "Omnibus" could not be passed as
a package.
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An Illinois Senator and a financial leader helped rescue the
Compromise.

Clay, in need of rest, retired from the battle in August,

and Compromise leadership in the Senate was assumed by Stephen
Douglas.

Douglas worked for the passage of the Compromise package as

separate bills.

Texas bondholders, who wanted the national govern

ment to assume the Texas bond debt, worked for the Compromise.
Prominent Southerners like James Hamilton of South Carolina, a former
nullificationist, also labored for the acceptance of the Compromise
and Texas debt by Congress.

Thomas Corcoran, a speculator in the

bonds, supported lobbyists like Hamilton who wanted the Compromise's
passage.

103
The success of Compromise was assured at the end of September

when the Omnibus Bill passed the House of Representatives.

By using

the tactic of voting on individual bills, pro-compromise leaders
were able to combine different Senate and House blocs to secure the
passage of the Compromise en toto.

The Compromise was successfully

enacted because of Democratic support in both houses of Congress.104Congress had passed the Compromise, but if the Union was to
be maintained the measure would have to be accepted in the Lower South.
Militant Southerners looked with hostility at proposals which admitted
California as a free state and provided for the territorial organiza
tion of Utah and New Mexico without respect to slavery.
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boundary arrangements between Texas and New Mexico were adjusted as
the Federal government assumed the Texas state debt of ten million
dollars, it was still a great loss of territory to slavery.

The

right to recover slaves was considered by many Southerners as a con
stitutional guarantee and hence its inclusion in the Compromise
represented no great concession.

Also irritating to many Southerners

was the abolition of the slave trade in the nation's capital, which
seemed to place another stigma on the section.

Pro-Compromise men

celebrated in late September 1850, but the struggles within the
states of the Lower South to obtain acceptance for the Compromise of
1850 had just begun.
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CHAPTER II

LOUISIANA:

THE BASTION OF CONSERVATISM

During the crisis years between 1840 and 1860 Louisiana was
regarded as the most moderate of the Deep Southern states.

One of

the observers of Southern politics H. W. Conner, a Calhounite, wrote
in 1849:

"I fear for Louisiana . . . Louisiana will be the last if

at all to strike for the defense of the South."*

The state’s conserva

tism was evident in its reaction to the Adjustment bills passed by the
Thirty-First Congress that were designed to quiet sectional animosities.
Reaction in Louisiana to issues dividing North from South was
largely determined by its ruling class, "the minority of merchants and
large planters."^

This elite ruled with little direct opposition

since "race or caste, not class, was the only recognized fissure in
O
society."-'

Its members, who had grown affluent through the sale of

their agricultural produce and their access to the transatlantic trade
out of New Orleans determined largely the conservative path which
Louisiana would follow in 1850-1851.
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The agricultural parishes of Louisiana produced 246,000 hogs
heads of sugar cane and 178,000 bales of cotton in 1850.

The large

planters made a profit which Professor Joe Gray Taylor has estimated
at seven percent on cotton and nine percent on sugar, depending, of
course, on crop prices, which averaged twelve and six cents a pound,
respectively in 1850.

Slavery in these parishes was obviously a

paying institution, and the plantation owners had good reason to
desire calm on the political scene.^
Wealthy sugar planters were also subject to economic pres
sures that inclined them to acquiesce in the Compromise of 1850.

The

price which a sugar planter received for his crop was partially depen
dent on the import duties on sugar.

Members of the sugar industry

sought tariff protection by trying to prove that their industry was
beneficial to the entire nation.

Planters in Louisiana believed that

a tariff was vital to their economic welfare and in fact maintained
"that protection was indispensable to their very economic survival."'*
The contest over the tariff continued throughout the entire period,

4 Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern
United States to 1860 (Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington,
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J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country (Lexington: University of
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thesis, Louisiana State University, 1968. 39-40.
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1840-1860:

"Rates set at an average of 1.1 cents per pound were sub

stantially below the figures prevailing during most of the previous
thirty y e a r s . S u g a r planters were thus concerned with the passage
of national tariff legislation which may have contributed to their
interest in protecting the Union.

A change of the average one cent

duty per pound might have resulted in serious economic problems for
the industry.^
Despite some economic readjustments in the decade before the
Civil War, New Orleans enjoyed economic growth.
stated:

One historian has

"To cite one index of many available the value of up river

receipts at New Orleans almost doubled every decade, rising from
twelve and one half million in 1820 to over one hundred and eighty-five
Q
million in 1860."

New Orleans1 prosperity was partially dependent

on trade with areas outside the Deep South--though still within the
boundaries of the United States.

There was steamboat service between

St. Louis and New Orleans, together with regularly scheduled runs by
American ships between the Crescent City and New York.
also had connections with other Southern ports and

Shipping firms

California.^

The

flatboat trade with the Northwest was important and had not yet

6

Sitterson, Sugar Country. 177.

7 Ibid., 74-78; Sanders, "The Election to the Secession Con
vention]' 39-40.
8 John G. Clark, "New Orleans and the River: A Study in
Attitudes and Responses," Louisiana History. VIII, No. 2 (Spring.
1967), 118.
9

Sanders, "The Election to the Secession Convention," 40-41.

declined to an insignificant level in 1850.*^
written:

Professor Clark has

"New Orleans does not seem to have suffered perceptibly as

of 1850, from the dynamic growth of the Great Lakes Grain Trade."I1
Any decline in this trade, even a temporary one, was likely to cause
concern in New Orleans' mercantile community which had more trading
ties with the non-slave states than any other seaport in the South.
Therefore her economic leaders had important economic motivations
which encouraged moderation in order to preserve the Union.^
Although Louisiana's elite were disposed to moderation, they
had typically pro-Southern reactions to the issue of slavery expansion
which rose in the 1840's.

Thus Louisiana was not exempt from the

debate over the annexation of the Lone Star Republic.

13

There were

differences of opinion on the annexation question between the Whig
Senators, Alexander Barrow and Henry Johnson, with Johnson's opinion
probably being closer to the views of the Louisiana electorate.

14

10 John G. Clark, The Grain Trade in the Old Northwest
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 165-67; Sanders, "The
Election to the Secession Convention," 40-41.
11

Clark, The Grain Trade in the Old Northwest. 165.

12 Ibid., 166; Sanders, "The Election to the Secession
Convention," 40-41.
13 James E. Winston, "Louisiana and the Annexation of Texas,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIX, (January, 1936), 117. Herein
after cited as LHQ.
14 Leslie M. Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana,
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1940),
223-30; Mary E. Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850,"
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1929), 1-2.

In a letter published in the Baton Rouge Gazette on June 15, 1844,
Barrow stated that he opposed annexation since it would be harmful to
Louisiana financially.

Furthermore, it would not protect Southern

political equality, or benefit the institution of Negro slavery.

He

also tried to dispel the fear that the diplomatic efforts of England
and France in Texas might lead to their domination of the region.^
Senator Johnson favored annexation, but not enthusiastically so until
after the Presidential elections of 1844.

16

Johnson, as a loyal

Whig, had muted his advocacy of annexation because of the equivocal
position which the Whig Presidential nominee, Henry Clay, took on
this important issue.
The majority of state political leaders, however, openly sup
ported annexation.

In a message to the legislature Governor Alexander

Mouton favored annexation of Texas, not primarily for Southern finan
cial advantage, but to "add to our safety and tranquility"^--probably
meaning it would ensure the South's political equality with the North.
The message was referred to a committee chaired by D. E. Burthe, a
Whig who did not want to act on the issue.

Goaded by Charles Gayarre,

a Democrat, the minority on the committee pushed for action on the
Governor's message.

A resolution offered January 14, 1845, announced

15 Baton Rouge Gazette, June 15, 1844; Norton, "A History of
the Whig Party in Louisiana," 227.
16

Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 227.

17

Louisiana Senate Journal (1845) 17 Leg, 1, Sess., 3.
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Louisiana's support for annexation, provided that Texas had the same
territorial rights as territories within the boundary of the
Louisiana Purchase.

The Whigs had an eight-vote majority in the

House of Representatives and gave overwhelming support to the reso
lution in the Senate.

The final vote was 32 to 16 in the House; in

the Senate, only John Harmanson, a Democratic Senator from Rapides
Parish, voted no.

Senator Henry Johnson presented these resolutions

to the United States Senate.

18

Alexander Barrow's refusal to support

the admission of Texas to the Union was obviously a minority view.
The discussion about the resolution indicated that Louisi
anians not only supported the annexation of Texas, but were interested
in the acquisition of additional western territories.

The protection

of slavery was an issue in the Presidential campaign of 1844.
Louisiana newspapers were bitter in their diatribes against aboli
tionists, who were condemned as fanatics.

Louisiana Whigs attempted

to associate James K. Polk, the Democratic nominee, with the Presiden
tial aspirations of James G. B i m e y of the Liberty party in order to
discredit Polk in southern eyes.

But the strong stand of the national

Democratic party on annexation enabled Polk to carry Louisiana.^
By 1846 the elite in Louisiana were becoming increasingly
alarmed about the problem of slavery in the West.

The acquisition of

18

Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana,"

19

Ibid.

228-29.
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the Mexican cession produced discussion about the rights of the South
in the territories.

Although most Louisiana leaders favored the acqui

sition of the Mexican territory, a minority expressed concern about
whether the institution of chattel slavery could survive in the
2n
Southwest. u

The Daily Delta believed that this area might not be

valuable to the South since it was "already peopled with a numerous
class of laborers who can work cheaper than slaves."

21

There was also

the suggestion that the status of slavery in the Mexican lands be
settled before the land was annexed.

99

David Wilmot's Proviso gave further impetus for the discus
sion of slavery and the Mexican territory.

Leaders in Louisiana

condemned the Proviso as the work of Northern fanatics who were
attempting to drive wedges between the sections.

Most Louisianians

continued to favor annexation of the territory as an inevitable result
of the war.

The Mexican territories should be acquired on an equal

basis with the North in order to protect the South.

Leaders like

Solomon Downs saw the Proviso as the crux of the problem between the
North and Sout h . ^
The issue of slavery in the territories did not divide the

20 Bertha Kennedy, "Louisiana and the Mexican War," (unpub
lished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1930), 87-90; Norton,
"A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 271-96.
21

Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 3.

22

Kennedy, "Louisiana in the Mexican War," 90.

23

Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 3-9.

parties in Louisiana until the 1848 Presidential elections.

Both

political parties adopted platforms which condemned the Proviso,
although the Democratic statement was more radical.

Most of the

discussion in the campaign involved the position of the two Presiden
tial candidates on the issue of abolition and the equal rights of the
o/
South in the former Mexican lands.

A part of the Whig press screamed

that the Democratic candidate Lewis Cass "was an abolitionist of the
deepest dye" who was opposed to the expansion of the South's peculiar
2S

institution. J

The Baton Rouge Gazette carried on its masthead:

"Re

member that you cannot vote for William 0. Butler, [Democratic Vicepresidential nominee] without voting for Cass the Abolitionist."26
The New Orleans Courier replied for the Democrats:

"And yet the

gentleman of the South received Fillmore [Whig Vice-presidential
nominee] as their candidate for Vice President although they are aware
that for virulence and fanaticism of hatred toward the southern insti
tution of slavery, he is not exceeded by anyone of the abolition
gang . . ,"27
Whig political speakers charged that their Democratic opponents

24 Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 295-300
Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 10-11.
25

Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 295-96.

26 Thomas W. Fife, "Presidential Election of 1848 in Louisiana'
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1956), 77.
27

Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana," 298.
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were actually fanatical abolitionists.

At various political gatherings

throughout the state, Cass was accused of being an opportunist who
devised squatter sovereignty in order to fool the S o u t h . J u d a h P.
Benjamin charged:

"Could any southern gentleman tolerate for an

instant the Cass doctrine that the ignorant Mexican, the degraded Negro,
or the savage Indian who form 'the people' of our new territories,
possess the power to exclude us, their conquerors and masters. from
entering with our slaves into the country which is ours ? " ^

Despite

counter charges by Democrats at political gatherings, Zachary Taylor's
Southern origins, and vague statements about the expansion of slavery
reassured Louisianians and enabled him to carry the state.^0
By 1848 the issue of slavery in the territories had been
thoroughly explored by the press and in political discussions.
Louisianians did not view the entire North as opposed to their inter
ests, but believed the Northern attacks came from small groups of
anti-slavery fanatics.

Some politicians were willing to compromise

the question of slavery in the territories.

Senator Downs proposed

the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific; he also
accepted the idea of popular sovereignty.

Few major politicians in

Louisiana endorsed John Calhoun's program for obliterating party lines
and creating a sectionally-based Southern party.

Louisiana's leaders

28
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and electorate had been agitated by the slavery issue, but prosperity
and moderate voices were responsible for Louisiana's basic conserva
tism.
The reaction of the Louisiana delegation "in Washington during
1848-1849 foreshadowed possible problems in 1850.

Louisiana politi

cians gave direct support to the idea of a meeting of a Southern caucus
during the winter of 1848-1849 to consider sectional grievances.
Representative Isaac Morse delivered an "earnest speech" about the
sectional crisis at one meeting, and the strong address issued by
the caucus was signed by Representatives Morse, Emile LaSere, John
Harmanson, and Senator Downs.

Although this caucus was ridiculed in

Louisiana papers, the signing of the Southern Address did indicate
some strong Southern feelings among Louisiana leaders.^
The Louisiana delegation which represented the state in the
Thirty-First Congress was composed of Isaac Morse, John Harmanson,
Emile LaSere, and Charles Conrad in the House and in the Senate by
Solomon Downs and Pierre Soule.

It was a typical Southern delegation,

but the House members do not appear to have played a significant politi
cal role in the electorate's response ort the state level.

Representative

Harmanson died in office in 1850 without accomplishing anything
meaningful.

Charles Conrad, although moderately in favor of the Com

promise, resigned to become Secretary of War in Millard Fillmore's

31

Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 21-24.

43

cabinet.

Emile LaSere's position on the Compromise was hostile and

Morse was identified with the extreme Southern faction .^

These men

voiced their opinions in Congress but were apparently not crucial in
deciding whether Louisiana would acquiesce or resist the Compromise of
1850.
The two United States Senators from Louisiana played signifi
cant roles in 1850.

In order to evaluate their political careers,

it is necessary to examine their backgrounds.

Downs was born in

Montgomery County, Tennessee, in 1801 and moved to Louisiana when he
was a young man.

He was educated at Transylvania University,

Lexington, Kentucky, and admitted to the bar in 1826.
1830's he had established himself in Monroe:

33

By the

". . . I n this North

Louisiana section of comparatively small and poor farms, his
[property] must have been one of the most prosperous of the d a y . " ^
He practiced law in Monroe, and was elected a state senator in 1838.
This led to resistance against the North and his appointment to the
United States Senate in 1846.

35

He was a defender of his region when

32 Ibid., 49. An analysis of Representative LaSere's voting
pattern indicates that despite M.S. Prichard's evaluation of LaSere
as being "pro-compromise" he voted against the Compromise on recorded
roll call votes in the House of Representatives.
33 Russell L. Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon
Weathersbee Downs," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State Univer
sity, 1935), 1-24.
34
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35
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the slavery issue erupted but was definitely more moderate in his
actions than Pierre Soule.^
Pierre Soule was a French-born immigrant.

He arrived in New

Orleans during the late 1820's and gradually established himself as a
prominent lawyer.

Soule's political participation began in the 1840's

when he rapidly rose as a leader in the Louisiana Democracy.

While

serving as a member of the upper house of the Louisiana legislature,
he gained enough support to be elected to the United States Senate in
1848.

During his senatorial career he was identified with John C.

Calhoun's political position; he ably defended slavery and states
rights and was not in accord with the conservative political mood in
Louisiana during 1850-1851.^
Even though Louisiana's Senators were divided on this issue,
the vast majority of newspapers in the state supported the Whig
party and took a moderate position on the Compromise of 1850.

Within

New Orleans, the Bee, Commercial Bulletin, Picayune, and Crescent
were pro-Union and adopted a concilatory attitude toward the Compromise
in their editorials.

The Daily Delta was more radical, but it coun

seled acquiescence to the Compromise by 1852.

In the interior of the

36 Downs never aligned himself with the states right wing of
the Democracy in the South and acted as a concilatory force in the
sectional crisis of 1850-1852.
37 Amos Aschback Ettinger, The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soule
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 101-28; Arthur Freeman,
"The Early Career of Pierre Soule" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1936), 56-144.
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state, the Baton Rouge Gazette gave additional support to the Compro
mise and the Alexandria Red River Republican concurred.-*®
In early January 1850 the Louisiana Congressional delegation
sent a letter to the state legislature.

This communication reminded

the legislators about the long history of Northern attacks against the
South, and emphasized that they should not remain silent on the subject
of slavery.

Although the Assembly should not act rashly, it should

consider the dangers to the Union.

Governor Isaac Johnson was asked

to give a copy of the letter to both legislative houses along with any
remarks which he considered appropriate.**^
In his last message to the legislature, Governor Johnson called
for Louisiana to cooperate with the other slaveholding states in
protecting the rights of the South.

He defended the doctrine of

popular sovereignty and stated that "if this right [national legisla
tion on slavery] is recognised [sic], Congress may permit or forbid
the institution of slavery at discretion."^®

The Governor did not

believe that the "aggressions of anti-slavery" would stop and wanted
Louisiana to join in any defense recommended by the proposed Nashville
Convention.^*-

38 Samples of newspaper support may be found by examining the
Alexandria Red River Republican. September 1, 1850; Baton Rouge
Gazette. June 22, 1850; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. November 14,
1850; New Orleans Daily Crescent. June 6, 1850; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. August 7, 1850.
39
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40 Louisiana House Journal (1850), 3 leg., 1 Sess., 11. Here
inafter cited as Louisiana House Journa1 (1850).
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Johnson's position was reaffirmed by Joseph Walker who took
office on January 28, 1850.^

Walker was a veteran politician and

spoke before a divided legislature— the Democrats controlled the Senate
while the Whigs dominated the H o u s e . ^

In his speech he stated: "The

anti-slavery agitation in the Northern states . . . has, within the
last two years taken such a shape, that fears are entertained by some
that it is about to reach a crisis unfavorable to the stability of
the Union.

We are prepared to make common cause with our neighbors of

the slave holding states."44

Therefore he agreed with Governor

Johnson's recommendation that delegates be sent to the June meeting
of the Nashville Convention.
The press either urged Louisiana's leadership to act cautiously
or expressed hostility to the idea of a convention.
Crescent stated:

The New Orleans

"We regret that he deemed it necessary to advise the

legislature to send delegates to the Nashville C o n v e n t i o n . T h e
Crescent considered the proposal premature and believed that the state
should only react to detrimental laws.

46

The editor of the Commercial

Bulletin agreed with some of the Governor's ideas but not with the
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43 Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 50; White,
"Louisiana and the Secession Movement of the Early Fifties," 283.
44 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 27; Louisiana Senate
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47
proposal for a Southern Convention .^

In contrast to these voices of

moderation, the Daily Delta hoped that Louisiana would be represented
at the Convention.

It would speak for the South against the hostile

actions of the N o r t h . T h e Delta was opposed by the Whig papers in
New Orleans and in the interior by the Alexandria Red River Republican
[Whig] which was against public money being spent to send delegates to
the Convention.^

It must be emphasized, however, that most of these

papers were Whig in sympathy and reflected the opinion of only a part
of the state's citizens.
At the beginning of the 1850 legislative session committees
were formed in both houses to consider Governor Walker's recommendation
about the Nashville Convention.

Resolutions offered by various House

and Senate members were also considered by a joint conference com
mittee of both houses.

The resolutions proposing that Louisiana send

delegates to the Nashville Convention were taken up in the Senate
between February 14 and February 20, 1850.

The resolutions, which were

finally adopted, were a partially modified version of a set proposed
in a minority report by members of the conference committee.

A

majority of the conference committee did not support the Convention,
but their resolutions were rejected.

Senator Stephen Duncan of St.

47

New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. January 31, 1850.
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New Orleans Daily Delta. January 30, 1850.

49
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48

Mary was opposed to Louisiana delegates participating in the Conven
tion.^

He denied that the senate possessed the power to vote for

delegates to the Nashville Convention, calling such an exercise:

"an

unwarranted usurpation of power under the state constitution."^
Attempts were made to soften the language of the resolutions in amend
ments offered by senators Duncan and Dufour.

The resolutions were

finally adopted February 20, 1850, after extensive debate, by a vote
of twenty-six to o n e . ^

The significance of the vote is that members

of both parties favored vigorous action by the state to support the
Southern Convention in Nashville.
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50 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 63-64; Louisiana Senate
Journal, (1850), 10-55, 69.
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Ibid., 69. The resolutions read: "1st Be it Resolved by
the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened,
That the powerw not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
or prohibited by it to the States are referred to the States respec
tively, or the people. 2nd Resolved, That all territory acquired by
the Confederacy, is the common property of all the States. 3rd Resolved,
That Louisiana cherishes a warm and devoted attachment to the American
Union, and would deprecate its dissolution as a national calamity; but
if, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and in dis
regard of the spirit of concession and compromise in which it was framed,
Congress should ingraft in its legislation, provision inhibiting slavery
in the territories, or should abolish it in the District of Columbia,
or restrict its intercourse between the States, she will resist it to
the last extremity. 4th Resolved, That to effect a Union of purpose,
unanimity of feeling and concert of action amongst the people of the
Southern States, entertaining similar views, by a free and full discus
sion and interchange of opinion on the subject, we recommend to the
people of each Parish in this State to send a delegate for each member
to which they are respectively entitled in the House of Representatives

49

The House of Representatives refused to concur with the Senate
resolutions to send delegates to Nashville.

The legislative history

of the resolutions in the House is obscure, but several facts emerge.
A majority of the representatives of both parties on the joint con
ference committee favored a strong set of resolutions proposing that
Louisiana be represented at Nashville.

However, there was strong

opposition to them which caused extended debate.^
Action in the House began on February 5, 1850, when Representa
tive J. G. Sever proposed a resolution requesting Governor Walker to
send all relevant information that he had to the House to aid in their
consideration of the proposal.
answer

The Governor sent an uninformative

to the request and debate began February 13.

John White of

the conference committee presented the majority plan which stated that
Louisiana did not agree with the other Southern states that a Southern
Convention was necessary.

The minority report favored Louisiana's

participation at Nashville.
Debate extended into late March 1850, and several viewpoints

of the State Legislature, to the Nashville Convention to be holden in
June next. 5th Resolved, That, in the event of the enactment of the
Wilmot Proviso, the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia,
or a restriction of it between the States, it shall be, and is
hereby made the duty of the Governor to convene the Legislature of
the State, for the purpose of determining what action shall be taken
in the contemplated emergency."
54 Louisiana House Journal. (1850), 54, 63, 84, 120-123, 127,
142-157; Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850," 53-54.
M. S. Prichard believed that it was a minority filibuster which
delayed discussion.
55
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were expressed by House members.

Representative Douglas Rivers voiced

reluctant support for the Nashville Convention because he did not want
to harm the South by voting against the minority report.

A negative

vote might undermine the position of the South in trying to solve its
problems with the North.

His reluctant acquiescence to the minority

resolutions was countered by representative Larue, who declared that
it was unconstitutional for Louisiana to be represented at the Conven
tion.

No vote was taken on the Nashville resolutions, but in early

March representative Larue, a leading opponent of the bill, was able
to obtain its consideration by the Committee of the Whole; the
majority on this issue indicates that approximately half of the mem
bers of the House were opposed to Louisiana's attendance at the
Southern Convention; despite efforts to work out a suitable compro
mise, a vote was never taken in the House because of the press of
state business and strong opposition by men like Larue .^
On the national level in early 1850 Senator Downs questioned
the benefits which the South would receive from the proposals made by
Henry Clay.

Downs rose in the Senate in late January to attack the

"concessions" which Henry Clay has purportedly given to the South .^
After briefly reviewing the Compromise measures Downs bluntly rejected
the idea that the South would accept the Clay bills:

56 Baton Rouge Gazette, March 23, 1850; Louisiana House
Journal, (1850), 150-77; New Orleans Daily Crescent. March 23, 1850.
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Can Che gentleman suppose that we of the South are so tame
that we will accept as a boon that which gives nothing to
the South whatever? What will be the effect of these
resolutions. . . .
In the first place then, it will
certainly admit another free state into the Union. . . .
In
the next place, it is to be decided by the high authorities
of the Senate that slavery is not tolerated by law in New
Mexico and California. What concession then is made to us?^®
In a speech in mid-February Downs spoke about the Compromise and
declared again his belief that the South was receiving no real bene
fits from it.

The bill to end the slave depots in Washington was

accompanied by an indirect admission that the constitutional power to
abolish slavery actually existed.

This "concession" was accompanied

by accusations that the South was traitorous which Downs denied; he
did not like the policy toward California, whose admission as a state
59
the President desired. Taylor's agents had presented Californians
with an ultimatum which they had adopted in their free-soil constitu
tion:

"One of the views to be impressed upon the people of

California was that they should adopt such a provision as would suit
the strongest party here, and, therefore, that they should prohibit
slavery,

. . ,"60

There had not been any real expression of opinion

about whether slavery should enter California.

In concluding Downs

discussed Clay's contention that the South would suffer by disunion.
He believed that the end of the Union would not be along the lines
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of the free versus slave states but that the division would occur
along the Mississippi Valley; a state like Pennsylvania would probably
join the South in a new confederacy which would not be confronted with
war from New England/** Downs, who was fairly militant at this point
believed that he was acting as a responsible Congressman:

"I con

sider that 1 am pursuing the policy that ought to be pursued by a
Representative of Louisiana on a question of this kind, . . ."62
A more moderate speech was delivered by the only Whig Repre
sentative from Louisiana, Charles Conrad, on February 28.

Speaking in

a calm manner, he declared that the unsuitable geographic conditions
of the Southwest meant that it "would be about as easy to introduce
the culture of the cotton and sugar plants on the parched plains and
the snowcovered mountains of this country, as permanently to establish
slavery there."0'' Congress had no power to legislate on the question
of slavery, which like other domestic institutions in the West should
be determined by the white inhabitants in a territory.

Although

Conrad defended the President's actions in California, he announced
that he could not vote for her admission, unless it was part of a
settlement which would solve the problem of California's Congressional
representatives.

He was not willing to calculate the financial value

of the Union and would preserve it unless Southern honor had to be
sacrificed.64
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Isaac Morse, one of Louisiana's Democratic radicals, echoed
Downs doubts about the Compromise in early March.

In a strong speech

Morse denied that the institution of chattel slavery was a moral evil.**'*
Even though men like Jefferson had questioned the justification of
black bondage, Southerners by 1850 had accepted it as a necessity:
"Whatever may have been the sentiment of the people of the South then
[early nineteenth century], it has undergone a great change.

We have

seen our country flourish under this system--a tropical climate and
soil (where the white man cannot cultivate the earth, without incurring
more or less risk of health or life) converted into a terrestrial
paradise."

66

Sectional differences, which had begun with the Missouri

Compromise in 1820, would not be allowed to threaten the peculiar
institution which was guaranteed by constitutional provisions.
Southerners must have the same guarantees of property rights as their
forefathers to insure their rights and to preserve the Union.^
By mid-spring 1850, the moderate leadership in Washington was
convinced that a compromise must be obtained.

To break the impasse

created by Clay's original proposals, Congress formed a Committee of
Thirteen, originally proposed by Senator Henry S. Foote of Missis
sippi.

Downs was appointed to the Committee, which consisted of six

Democrats and seven Whigs.
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Chairman Clay did most of the actual

54

writing of the comnittee proposals which he delivered to the Senate
on May 8.

The Committee recommended a package called the Omnibus bill

which would cover all the various proposals that Clay had included in
his February speech.

The major changes were a six-word phrase "nor in

respect to African slavery" which stopped Utah and New Mexico from
adopting any legislation regarding slavery.**®

He eliminated references

to the geographic impossibilities of slavery expansion, was vague on
the Texas boundary dispute, and "proposed a guarantee of trial by jury
in the state where the Negro had allegedly fled."69
Before Downs was appointed to the Committee of Thirteen, he had
expressed opposition to the Clay resolutions.

However, he was influ

enced by Henry Clay and what seemed to be growing public opinion in
Louisiana in favor of the Omnibus bill.^®

No minority report was

issued by the Committee, but Downs expressed some minor reservations.
He was in general agreement with the bill, although he still wanted to
limit the size of California.

And despite his support for a settlement

of the Texas boundary question, he felt that the territory taken from
Texas should be allowed to have slavery.

These mild objections did

not however prevent his approval of the total Compromise.

On May 22,

he defended the Omnibus bill in a Senate speech in which he empha
sized that the South should accept the Clay proposals.

Property

in black slaves would be protected by the right of the territorial

68 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict : The Crisis and Com
promise of 1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1964) 85-95.
69
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70 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 569;
Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon Weathersbcc Downs," 73.

legislature to enact general laws providing for security for all
property— whether ox or slave.

The Wilmot Proviso was not included

in the report of the Committee of Thirteen, and two-thirds of the
potentially valuable Mexican cession was still open to the South.
Downs also reminded Southerners that men below the Mason-Dixon line
were united in 1850 and had the support of Democrats in the North who
would not combine with them again if the Adjustment bills were re
jected:

"Let this opportunity pass and the South are left in the

minority— a hopeless, a helpless, an unavailing minority.
a chance which will never occur again . . .

We have now

If there is anything in

these bills which we do not like, let us endeavor to amend them; let
us perfect them as far as we may be able,

. . .

But let us not set

ourselves up to control the opinions and feelings of others; let us
not attempt to dictate measures to the majority,

. . .

This spirit

of realism prevailed in his attitude toward sectional compromise in
1850.
The conciliation which was evident in Downs' speeches by May
1850 was countered by the vigorous opposition of Pierre Soule.

Soule

had achieved an important place in the Louisiana Democracy by 1850.
He had defeated John Slidell in the 1847 election for the Senate and
was emerging as a strong Democratic leader.

Soule remained silent

until May when he gave his initial speech on the Compromise in the
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Senate.

The speech received favorable commentary from Martin Van

73
Buren, Jr.:'

"Mr. Soule of Louisiana made today rather an imposing

speech as to manner and matter, to which his French accent and command
of voice gave additional interest.

It was an agreeable contrast to

the previous southern twaddle and brought Mr. Clay to his feet in
reply.

The Louisiana Senator prepared a vigorous attack on the

Compromise which centered on the rights of the South in the terri
tories.

Soule was concerned that Southern rights were being lost in

Texas where slave land would be converted into free-soil.^

The

Fugitive Slave law actually placed obstacles in the way of the
recovery of escaped Negroes while anyone admitting the right of slaves
to be emancipated under the District Slave Trade bill would find it
difficult to "dispute thereafter either the power or breach of good
faith involved in making it free territory altogether. " ^

The confu

sion caused by the different opinions about whether Mexican anti-slavery
law still applied to the Southwest made any compromise very tenuous.^
In concluding Soule stated:

"Sir, I wish it was a compromise--a real

compromise--containing mutual concessions,
I must say,

in all candor,

that I donot see

. . .

But, Mr. President,

in thesemeasures

73
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compromise, nor indeed any compromise at all.

Concessions, and many

of them I see, but all of them are concessions from the South; and this
being so, where is the compromise?

Will honorable Senators point out

to me a single concession from the North to the South which these
bills contain?

I ask but for ONE, Sir, there is none; no not ONE."^®

During the early summer Soule engaged in debate with Clay,
Downs and Foote on specific provisions of the Compromise.

He advocated

the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Coast.
This proposal was a Southern idea and Soule simply applied it to the
California question with thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes to serve
as the southern boundary of the state.

The area below the compromise

line in southern California would be covered by the doctrine of popular
sovereignty.

Although he was not successful in getting passage of this

proposal, he worked diligently with other Southern leaders to amend
the Omnibus bill.

Soule's amendment was one of four successful attempts

to modify the territorial b i l l s . ^

It "provided that a future state

formed from a western territory would be granted admission into the
Union regardless of its free or slave status."®®

This amendment was

the only successful change which Soule obtained.
Press reaction to the Compromise measures was generally
moderate and pro-Union during the first half of 1850.

The Commercial
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Bulletin, which supported the Omnibus bills, had praised Zachary Taylor
as a strong President who would protect the Union against Southern
extremists.

Louisiana, according to the paper, would fully support

him if the bonds of national unity were actually threatened.

Edito

rial comments in the Daily Picayune indicated an acceptance of the
Compromise and a rejection of Pierre Soule's idea of extending the
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific coast; this action would
result in the creation of two new free-soil states by the division of
California.

The editor of the Baton Rouge Gazette called upon Soule

to listen to the conservative opinion of the Louisiana electorate
81
which favored Clay's proposals.
Furthermore, the Daily Crescent criti
cized the "representative" nature of the Nashville Convention while
questioning Soule's motivation in introducing the 36* 30’ line:
"What object is sought to be obtained besides the defeat of the Com
promise bill, by bringing forward and strenuous advocacy at this time,
QO
of the Missouri Compromise, . . ."°

Thus, the conservative opinion

makers within the state sought to solidify moderate feelings while
denouncing attempts to frustrate sectional reconciliation.
A public meeting, held in Baton Rouge on June 22, also ex
pressed approval of the Compromise despite minority opposition.

After

81 Baton Rouge Gazette. June 16, 1850; New Orleans Commercial
Bulletin. March 2, May 21, 1850; New Orleans Daily Crescent. May 20,
22, 27, June 6, 12, 14, 1850; New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 18, 22,
June 1, 6, 13, 1850.
82
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Daniel Avery was selected chairman, Colonel Cole of Lafourche Parish
QO

spoke in favor of the Adjustment bills.

Resolutions which were sup

ported by a majority, stressed their love for the Union and willing
ness "to sacrifice our pride of opinion upon the consecrated altars of
our country to ensure her perpetuity."®^

They wanted Louisiana's

Congressional delegation to support the Omnibus bills unless the pro
posals violated any important "constitutional" rights.

A minority

platform, submitted by A. S. Herron, stated that both the Texas
boundary and District State Trade bills were unconstitutional while
California's admission as free-soil state would be unjustbecause
in the

men

southern part of the territory did not want chattel slavery

outlawed.

Although Herron's resolutions were defeated, their introduc

tion and a speech in favor of Soule were signs of local dissatisfaction
with Clay's Compromise.

85

Events in the last week of July 1850 showed that the Compromise
leaders did not have complete control of the situation.

The critical

votes on the Omnibus bill came on the question of New Mexico, Texas,
and Utah in the Senate.

Downs supported the Compromise with two nega

tive votes on amendments to alter the committee's plans on New Mexico
and Texas.

Soule, in contrast, supported the efforts by those opposed

to the Compromise by two "yea" votes.

The Omnibus bill was defeated.®**
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As Thomas Hart Benten said, "We.have but Utah left— all gone but
Utah."®^

The two Senators were polarized on these Issues and illus

trate the division within the party.

Since Downs was a political

power in northern Louisiana, his vote may have represented support for
the Compromise in that area.

However, the position of Pierre Soule was

more representative of Louisiana Democrats generally.
After the defeat of the Omnibus bill, Stephen Douglas of
Illinois began to steer the various measures through Congress as sepa
rate items.

The voting of Louisiana Congressmen between mid-August

and the'end "of September indicates an interesting pattern.

On the

question of Utah, the Louisiana delegation favored its organization as
a territory without provision regarding slavery.

The question of

territorial government for Mexico, considered in a separate vote in
the Senate, won support from Downs while Soule was recorded as not
voting.

In the House all members opposed the "little Omnibus" [New

Mexico government-Texas boundary settlement],

Soule had opposed the

Texas boundary-debt settlement in the Senate.

The entire delegation

opposed the admission of California and the ending of the slave trade
in the District of Columbia while favoring the passage of the Fugitive
Slave Law.

The voting indicated no substantial difference between the

Soule and Downs wings of the party even though they would adopt dif
ferent positions on the Compromise during the winter of 1850-1851.
Democrats in Louisiana accepted the pro-Southern rendition law and the
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idea of popular sovereignty for the territories.

They rejected the

more pro-Northern features of the bills but did not condemn all of the
Compromise.®®
The only elections in 1850 were to fill the seats of Congress
man Charles Conrad, who had been appointed Secretary of War, and J. H.
Harmonson who had died.

In the second Congressional district, the Whig

party meeting at Donaldsonville in September 1850, nominated H. A.
Bullard to replace Conrad.

Their platform praised the Compromise and

the work of men like Daniel Webster.

The Democrats did not present a

regular candidate for this Congressional seat although they had met in
New Orleans.

Jacob Barker presented resolutions favoring compromise

which were tables.

Although some Democrats favored ex-Governor Johnson,

a Whig, he was not officially nominated as the Democratic candidate.
The vote in the race was 669 for Bullard to 301 for Johnson.
electorate followed party lines to support the Compromise.

The
In the

third district race Democrat Alexander G. Penn was elected over Colonel
W. R. Steward, a Whig who ran without official party endorsement.
Local issues, rather than any serious debate over the Compromise,
probably dominated the race which did not arouse much Whig

opposition.®^

88 Ibid., 192-98, Downs was willing to accept the Compromise
as a package, but felt free to oppose individual bills once the Omnibus
was defeated on July 31.
89 William Harris Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party" (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1961), 268-69;
James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," LHQ. (October, 1929),
582-83; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. September 11, 1850.
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From August to late November the divergent opinions about the
Compromise were debated in the press.

Senator Downs had received a

stern letter from men in Bienville Parish who were extremely critical
about his views on the Adjustment bills.

His reply, which was charac

terized as excellent irony by one historian, was a masterful attack
upon these Fire-eaters.^ He held that a minority of Southerners—
including Louisianians— supported the Omnibus bills:
legislature has condemned the measures in terms.

"No Southern

There have been

approvals of it given by distinguished men, and public meetings. . . .
These expressions have been more unanimous in Louisiana, than ever
known on any other s u b j e c t . D o w n s also received praise from the
conservative press which believed that he had acted responsibly during
the Congressional s e s s i o n ^ the Baton Rouge Gazette, for example, was
glad that he had supported the settlement offered by Henry Clay:
"Mr. Downs is a Democrat--and although it is likely we will disagree
in political topics, yet we honor and have honored him for his patrio
tic course in the last session."^
The Unionist press, which gave editorial support to the Compro
mise, gives insight into the moderate spirit which existed in Louisiana.

90 New Orleans Daily Crescent. August 9, 1850; Terry, ’’The
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An editorial in the Commercial Bulletin may explain part of the state's
reaction to the question of slavery in the western territories.
editor

stated

The

that there was an expanding world market for cotton

which could only be grown profitably by the use of slave labor.

There

was a danger that the Negro slaves might be drained from the South and
thus reduce the labor supply which would be needed to increase cotton
production and the wealth of the entire South.

This concern for

economic growth, and fear of loss of labor reinforced the belief that
OA

the Compromise was just and settled sectional differences.

There were

radicals who might try to disturb the existing peace but they could not
triumph over moderation:
danger from such men.

"Our excellent institutions are in no

The people of this great nation have too long

enjoyed the benefits of the Union, and too well understand the impor
tance of preserving it, to be led away by the schemes of demagogues and
factionists
Although Pierre Soule represented the feelings of many
Louisiana Democrats, he did not have the support of a majority of the
state's electorate.

In order to increase the popularity of his posi

tion, the French-born Senator spoke out strongly after returning to
Louisiana.

He delivered several speeches during mid-fall, and declared

that he had fought for the principles which Louisianians considered

94 New Orleans Commercial Bulletin. October 25, 1850; New
Orleans Daily Crescent. October 1, 1850.
95
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vital.

Since he had defended the state's fundamental values, he had

been severely criticized by the press which had not presented an
accurate picture of the issues involved in the sectional crisis.

His

opposition was based on a true understanding that the passage of the
Compromise was a betrayal of the South.^
The Senator and his ally the Daily Delta were also involved in
debate on the sectional question.

The paper noted that the Omnibus

bills had not produced peace between the sections, while Soule
engaged in further public debate.

He was first questioned by C. W.

Stanton who stated that he personally favored the course which Soule
had adopted toward the Adjustment bills.

However, Stanton asked,

whether the Senator favored disunion and the creation of a new Southern
Republic.

Soule did not like being singled out for attack from among

the Louisiana delegation.

This response was apparently not satis

factory, however, because seventy-nine Democrats wanted to know
whether he favored an end to the Union.

Since Soule did not consider

his questioners as representative of the Democratic party or people
in Louisiana, he refused to answer them.

His only defense, besides

the Daily Delta, came from A. B. Splane who denied charges that Soule
was an obvious disunionist.
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While Soule was on the defensive friends of the Union in New
Orleans began to organize Union support.
November 27, at the Saint Charles Theatre.

A Union meeting was held on
Possibly as many as five to

ten thousand people were waiting outside an impressive setting:
stage was beautifully ornamented . . . [with] . . .

98

"The

a very large drop

curtain, containing the American eagle on either side, a semi-circle
extending below of elegantly drawn and gilded medallions, the names
of the several states;--in the centre were two gold hands clasping each
other, emerging from golden rays with the inscription above of Liberty
and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable."^

After Doctor

Isaac Labatut was chosen chairman, he announced that the meeting was
open to both major parties, and that when "Whigs and Democrats . . .
are united they form a rampart against which enemies of the Union can
never prevail."*®®

Judah P. Benjamin introduced the resolutions which

stressed Louisiana's love for the Union and her devotion to the
sectional peace which was reaffirmed in the Adjustment bills.
Louisianians would not tolerate anyone who tampered with the Compromise
and they stated their belief that the North would enforce the Omnibus
i*ii
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bills.

After the resolutions were unanimously passed, Senator Downs
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spoke to the gathering.

He was saddened by criticism o£ the meeting

and yet appreciated the applause from both political parties.10^
This approbation for his career "came from a deeper source— from their
love and reverence for the Union— "which he was fortunate enough to
serve.

There could be no real objection to the admission of a free-

soil California which was created with the support of Southerners in
their constitutional convention.

The end of the slave trade in the

District of Columbia was not sufficient justification to end the Union,
and the hateful Wilmot Proviso had not been applied to the remainder of
the Mexican cession.

ifn

In fact, Downs stated;

"slaves might now be

taken to either of these Territories, as well as to Mississippi or
Texas.”10^

Settlement of the Texas boundary question was financially

beneficial to that state, and he assured the people that conservatives
in the North would enforce the Fugitive Slave Law.1^"*
Meanwhile Louisiana radicals organized a Southern Rights meeting
for December 1 at the Saint Louis Exchange to counter the Unionist

106

gathering's influence.

A crowd, estimated at between two hundred to

seven hundred people, displayed a banner emblazoned with the slogan;
"PATRIOTS OF THE SOUTH STAND FIRM."107

After Joseph Genois was chosen
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to chair the meeting, Soule spoke explaining his course of action and
opposition to the Compromise,*-®® The South had gained nothing from the
Omnibus bills which had stripped her of territories won in the
Mexican war and converted parts of Texas into free-soil:
in vain we demanded your rights;

"It was

Congress would not protect them--

you were asking only an equal share in the territories acquired,— and
instead of listening

to you, or giving you

an inch, they proceededto

deprive the South of

83,000 acres cut from

the State of Texas.

.."109

The law abolishing the slave trade in Washington was dangerous because
it was a "wedge" which might act as a precedent for Congressional
interference with slavery within the s t a t e s . ^ H e had acted

in accord

with the spirit of resistance expressed by Louisianians in early 1850
and tried to identify himself with the military heroism of Mississippi
radicals like John Quitman:
But oh! The violence of some of those denouncers who stand
by the rights of the South--where will it end, when it
seeks to trample such men as Quitman and Davis in the dust?
These men . . . led your country to victory on the fields
of Monterey, Buena Vista . . . these men are now denounced as
traitors by those very men who during the war invited the
Mexicans to welcome them with bloody hands and hospitable
graves--the latter are patriots--the former traitors. . . .
In such classification I beg to be included with the traitors.
Members of the meeting also passed a series of resolutions which

108 Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," LHQ. XII (October,
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announced their intention to protect black slavery from any Northern
attacks.

112
Interest in debating the Compromise seemed to wane at the end

of the year.

Moderates like Downs were willing to acquiesce in the

Compromise's passage while the position of Soule Democrats was accu
rately characterized by H. B. Tibbetts;

"There is a faction in the

state who are dissatisfied with the legislation of the recent sessions
of Congress.

They endorse and commend the course of Mr. Soule, one

of our Senators. . . .

He opposed the compromise bills, and since

his return from Washington, has made several inflammatory noncommit
tal speeches.

He will not openly avow whether he is in favor of
I I O

disunion or not."

Soule, of course, denied that he was a dis-

unionist, and claimed that his wing of the party was not unalterably
opposed to all of the Compromise measures.
The only discussion of the Compromise came in the pages of the
Daily Delta which sought to agitate the sectional questions in the
winter of 1850-1851.

Most leaders and newspapers appeared content to

acquiesce in the decision of Congress.

The Delta might advocate

resistance to the North for boycott of Northern goods, or warn of the
danger of national party ties, but few members of the political elite
appeared interested in discussing the question.
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Not until the summer of 1851 did debate over the Compromise
resume, incited by the Congressional elections which were to be held
in November 1851.

It was reported in the Delta that General Robert

Barrow might run from the Third Congressional district as a Whig; the
paper praised his credentials as a true defender of Southern rights
who "would send the Whig or Democratic party to the devil before he
would surrender one iota of the rights of institutions of the South,
or yield an inch to the aggressions of the Free-soilers
General Downs and the Ouachita Register were critical of the Delta1s
position on the Compromise.

11 f%

In the Whig camp there was an exciting contest in the Second
Congressional district where Theodore Hunt and I. N. Marks sought the
seat.

Neither man was successful, but when Colonel Hunt withdrew he

wanted the nominating committee to pick a Whig "devoted, above all
things, to the maintenance of the Union . . . and . . .

a friend of

the Compromise as constitutional, honorable, and advantageous to every
portion of the country."*-^

The final selection for delegates to the

convention came on August 11 at Donaldsonville where the Whigs of the
Second Congressional district met.
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Resolutions were passed declaring
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the Compromise as "honorable, constitutional, and expedient . .

In addition, they resolved that "this convention holds the advocate of
disunion to be an enemy of his country and a foe to Union-liberty
The nomination went to J. Aristide Landry who recognized that there
was a crisis over slavery but stated;

"I enter the field, not as a

defender of the South or of the North, but as an upholder of both . . .
of our common country . . . as a supporter of that wise measure of
conciliation and mutual concession--the Compromise, which impressed
a conservative seal on our glorious Union.” 120
The races for nomination in the other Congressional districts
except the fourth, were not as exciting for either political party.
In the first Congressional district Louis St. Martin, accused of being
a disunionist, announced his acceptance of the Compromise as "a final
settlement of the slavery question in Congress;"*^ he would oppose all
efforts "to repeal or change" the Adjustment bills.

122

This attitude

was shared by Democrat A. G. Penn, the third district incumbent, who
accepted the Compromise despite his pro-Compromise opponent, Whig R. A.
Upton's attempt to portray himself as the only Union candidate.
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the second district Democrats did not organize to oppose pro-Compromise
J. A. Landry.

123

In the fourth district, John Moore,a Union Whig, competed
against Isaac Morse who ran on a platform which stated:12^

"Resolved,

That while forebearing to take . . . any measures of violence or active
resistance to the laws of 1850, called the Compromise, we are neither
content with their provisions, nor satisfied with the spirit in which
they were adopted."125

^he platform did not consider it expedient for

any Southern state to secede, but it could not agree to the coercion
of any state by the Federal government.I2**

The Daily Crescent,

commenting on Morse’s selection as the Democratic nominee, stated:
"If Mr. Morse gets back to Congress, Union men must be few in that
district, or they must have precious little respect for their prin
ciples."^2^
During most of the fall campaign, local issues such as free
banking and internal improvements dominated the political campaign
debates in New Orleans and Baton Rouge.

The only real discussion which

123 Adams, "The Louisiana Whig Party," 281-82; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel, August 23, September 6, 12, 20, 27, 1851.
Professor Adams mistakenly used the propaganda conclusions of the
Whig Southern Sentinel to label A. G. Penn as an opponent of the
Compromise. Penn made no recorded speeches in Congress during 1851
and his clear statement in the Courier indicates his acceptance of the
Compromise as a permanent settlement. New Orleans Louisiana Courier,
October 6, 1851.
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dealt with the Compromise grew out of a speech made by Pierre Soule and
the candidacy of Isaac Morse in the fourth Congressional district.
Louisiana Democrats had not adopted a pro-Compromise platform but had
largely acquiesced in the passage of the Compromise.

Therefore the

concentration on popular local issues was apparently the major factor
in this rather apathetic Congressional campaign.
Soule interjected a note of controversy in a speech on
September 6.

In it, he declared that the South as a minority section

should have united to defeat the Compromise which had weakened
dangerously the influence of the South in the Union.

He could not

understand that men like Senator Downs could accept a Compromise which
benefited a hostile N o r t h . S o u l e

stated that he would continue to

fight for the Southern cause, rather than remaining mute and subserv
ient like a "Russian serf."

The Compromise was a wrong— not an

"immutable" pact between the sections which could not be repealed.
appealed to the crowd's emotion by stating that although he did not
advocate secession and would endure past wrongs he wanted to act as
the state's watchdog:

"to keep you on the watch . . . and point to,

the abyss that yawns before you."

130

Soule then proceeded to defend the right of secession.

He

129 Mr. Soule's Speech, at Opelousas. Louisiana, delivered on
the 6th of September 1851, (New Orleans: J. L. Soller, 1851), 1-19.
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considered that it was "a main attribute of sovereignty, inherent to
it, inseparable from it."131

Each state had a right to withdraw from

the Union and "resume her independent and separate action as a sovereign."

132

The state, forming a compact with the others had a right to

determine when the compact was violated and secede.

And if South

Carolina seceded, which course he did not advocate, the Federal govern
ment should not force her back into the Union.*33
Controversy also erupted in the campaign of Isaac Morse.
Morse, running on a platform openly critical of the Compromise, was
the target of severe criticism.

The Alexandria Red River Republican

(Whig Union) constantly attacked him and declared that the Democratic
convention had advocated secession.

Morse was branded as a "dis-

unionist" of the same stripe as the firebrand from Mississippi, John
A. Quitman.

1V

jn one editorial the editor stated:

"If Colonel Morse

is elected to Congress in this district, it will be hailed as a
'Glorious Secession Victory in the Fourth District of Louisiana.1"

135

0. N. Ogden, speaking for Judge John Moore at Opelousas, attacked
Morse's hostility to the Compromise of 1850 and the Democratic plat
form of the fourth district.

Ogden asked rhetorically:

"What does
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the gentleman [Morse] want?

What does he propose to do?

tion of things be as bad as he represents . . .

If the condi

Why not fight like

men for our rights, instead of weeping like women over our wrongs?

Or

is it that gentlemen hope by continued agitation, so to unsettle the
foundations of this government, that after awhile the superstructure
will topple to the g r o u n d ? " ^ 6

This contest was the strongest and

most publicized in the rather lackluster campaign of 1851.
The voting in November 1851 produced an overwhelming victory
for the Compromise.

The two parties were no longer as divided, since

all but one of the Congressional candidates accepted the Compromise
as a final settlement to the sectional crisis.

Louis St. Martin, a

Democratic candidate, won in the first district, and was pledged to
accept the Compromise.137

The Whigs won in the second and fourth

districts, electing, respectively, J. A. Landry and Judge John H.
Moore, whose victory was considered evidence "that the Whigs of the
District have made manifest of their firm determination of sustaining
the integrity of the Union, and all its Compromises."^®

The only

district in which issues were confused was the third in which contemporaries and historians had trouble identifying the position of A. G.
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Penn, who submitted to the passage of the Adjustment bills and de
feated R. A. Upton.
After the election the most critical issue for the Union wing
of the Democrary was the fate of Senator Downs in a Whig-dominated
legislature.
replaced:

140

Louisiana newspapers had speculated that he would be

"If the Whigs have a majority, no man of common sense can

doubt that their vote will be cast for a Whig,— a Union and Compro
mise man, like Downs but thoroughly a W h i g . " ^ *

The Red River Repub-

lican advocated that Downs be replaced as Senator by a good Whig.
They charged this "Union Democrat" had entered into a bargain with
Morse rather than loose votes for his own re-election.

Although

Downs received all the Democratic votes and three Whig votes in
January 1852 he lost to Judah P. Benjamin because of the Whig victory
in the November elections.

Party politics, despite praise for the

Union Democrat, ruled Louisiana.
Democrats completed the process of fully accepting the Com
promise in 1852.

Governor Walker, originally a supporter of the

Nashville movement, announced his submission to the Compromise during
a legislative message in January.

Although Walker did not believe
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New Orleans Daily Crescent. October 16, 1851.
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Alexandria Red River Republican. November 20, 1851.

142 Ibid.: Terry, "The Political Career of Solomon Weathersbee
Downs," 101-102.
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that the South had obtained justice from Congress, he emphasized:
. . w e are bound by every consideration that should have weight
with us, to acquiesce cheerfully in the federal award [Compromise which
are now the solemn form of law."

144

Passage of the Adjustment bills

did not justify secession, but Walker emphasized that the Fugitive
Slave Law must be enforced or a second crisis between the sections
would be precipitated.^''*
During the remainder of 1852 the Louisiana Democracy concentrated on presidential politics.

146

John Slidell, a leading Louisiana

Democrat, had recognized as early as the winter of 1850 that there
were serious divisions in the party:

"the course of Mr. Soule has

been such as to produce fatal dissensions in our party.

I have no

hope of our carrying a majority in the Legislature at the next elec
tion and almost as little of giving the vote of the state at the
presidential election to a democrat if there be a Whig union candidate
in the field."

147

Therefore he supported the candidacy of James E.

Buchanan of Pennsylvania who, he believed, could carry the South.
Pierre Soule, the most outspoken opponent of the Compromise, moved
toward a moderate position during 1851-52.

During the fall of 1851

143

Louisiana House Journal. (1852), 3.

144

Ibid., 3-4.
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Ibid.

146 John Slidell to James Buchanan, December 10, 1850, John
Slidell Papers (Xerox copies in Department of Archives and Manuscripts,
Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
147

Ibid.

he had not advocated secession, and his actions were increasingly
characterized by opportunism rather than devotion to Southern prin
ciples.

By the spring of 1852 leading figures in the Democracy were

more concerned with Presidential politics than sectional issues.
Slidell continued to back Buchanan, while Downs had moved into the
camp of Lewis Cass who was still popular in the state.

Soule supported

Stephen Douglas of Illinois whose candidacy was blocked at Baton Rouge
by the Slidell men who finally decided to support Cass as the Democratic nominee.

148

After Franklin Pierce's nomination as the Democratic

candidate at Baltimore on a pro-Compromise platform, Slidell wrote
Buchanan:

"I am as well satisfied with the choice of the conven

tion and I shall heartily support Pierce and King without feeling any
particular enthusiasm."^®

Members of a mass meeting of the Democracy

which was held during June 1852 endorsed the Pierce-King ticket and
the Compromise as a permanent settlement to the slavery crisis.

Thus

the major divisions over the Compromise in the Louisiana Democracy
were temporarily submerged in the drive to win the Presidency.
The Whigs in 1852 supported the candidacy of Millard Fillmore

14® Baton Rouge Gazette. March 13, 20, 1852; Ettinger, The
Mission of Pierre Soule to Spain. 120; John Slidell to James Buchanan,
December 10, 1850, May 9, 1851, February 26, March 19, June 23, 1852,
John Slidell Papers; Mr. Soule's Speech, passim.
149 John Slidell to James Buchanan, June 23, 1852, John
Slidell Papers.
150

New Orleans Daily Delta, June 30, 1852.
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and the Compromise of 1850.

A Louisiana Whig stated his reasons for

supporting Fillmore:
My reasons for believing that Mr. Fillmore should be the candi
date are, as I think, sound reasons. I have no doubt that
had General Taylor lived, the Compromise would have never
received the executive sanction. . . . The success of that
great measure which has had the happy effect of allaying preju
dices of reconciling dissensions, and of repressing unreasonable
and sectional demands, is due mainly to Mr. Clay and next,
Millard Fillmore. . . .
It was a Whig measure and carried
through by Whig influence. . . . The President then, by this
act, and by his honest and constant policy of carrying into
faithful execution the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law,
has secured the attachment and confidence of the Whigs of the
South, and a large portion of the Southern Democrats also. ^
To the disappointment of Louisiana Whigs, General Winfield
Scott was nominated on the Whig national ticket.
During the 1852 campaign Pierce had several major advantages
over Scott.
stated:
Pierce."

He was relatively unknown nationally, and a leading Whig

"I have already heard many Whigs express a preference for
152

The suspicion of Scott among Whigs was recognized by

Congressman Moore's nephew who wrote that he was satisfied that Scott
was sound on Southern rights:

"I am sorry, however, that others in

our community have been unable to satisfy themselves that the charges
(abolition tendencies of Scott] are unfounded . . . "

153

This suspi

cion hindered Scott's campaign against a Democratic party whose

151

Adams, "The Whig Party in Louisiana," 299-300.

152 William F. Weeks to John Moore, June 17, 1852, David
Weeks and Family Papers.
153 Thomas M. Moore to John Moore, September 5, 1852, David
Weeks and Family Papers.
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moderate and radical wings were reunited.

154

Furthermore, Soule

announced publicly that Pierce was pro-Southern as early as June 1852:
"I am sure that in the whole South, we could not have found one more
determined than he to see our rights respected, . .

This view

was seconded by the Louisiana Courier which emphasized that Pierce had
enthusiastically endorsed the Compromise while Scott appeared reluc
tant to accept it.^-*6

These factors helped carry the state for the man

from New Hampshire and achieve a final victory for the Compromise of
1850.
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New Orleans The Louisiana Courier. August 6, October 29,
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Ibid.. July 25, 1852.

1852.

156 Ibid., August 6, 1852. The attempts by the Whigs to
counter the reluctance of the Louisiana electorate to support Winfield
Scott were feeble since even the published letters mentioned Whig
preference for Millard Fillmore. See the public letter from Congress
man John Moore and J. Aristide Landry in the New Orleans Bee. September
6, 1852.

CHAPTER III

GEORGIA:

THE TRIUMPH OF CONDITIONAL UNIONISM

Georgia, one of the oldest Southern states, was economically
prosperous and politically moderate between 1850-1852.

Proud slave

holders in the Empire state boasted about their affluence and deep
attachment to the Union.

These conservatives ruled a state which was

potentially important in determining whether the Compromise of 1850
was reluctantly accepted or violently rejected in the South.

Conse

quently, radicals, recognizing Georgia as the key to any cooperative
resistance by the cotton South, maintained

cooperation with her

extremist elements.
Georgians were very proud of their state's economic growth-especially in agriculture.

This South Atlantic state, which had been

founded as a colony for philanthropic and military purposes, had grown
into a prosperous community by 1850.

Plantation agriculture, which

originated with the growing of rice in counties along the Savannah
River and Atlantic coast, had rapidly expanded with the introduction
of cotton and slaves in the mid-eighteenth century.

By the mid

nineteenth century, plantations and slaves concentrated in central
Georgia and in counties along the Atlantic coast were the backbone of
Georgia's wealth.^-

1 James C. Bonner, A History of Georgia Agriculture (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1964), 3-5; E. Merton Coulter, Georgia:
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Georgia planters experienced most of the same economic trends
which influenced the other cotton states in the nineteenth century.
They had benefitted from the introduction of the cotton gin after 1795,
but were constantly threatened by the problems of other plantation
areas.

Cotton prices had fluctuated greatly during the 1830's, and

soil exhaustion had become a significant problem for this older
Southern state.

The depression of the 1840's had been economically

harmful to Georgia planters, who had to sell their white staple for
as low as six cents a pound.

However, just as in Louisiana, prices

had revived in 1850 and a renewed prosperity was one factor in Georgia's
political conservatism.
Agriculture, though the dominant source of wealth, was not
the only economic activity in which Georgians were significantly
involved.

Since the 1830's there had been a great interest in expand

ing transportation facilities--railroads, canals and turnpikes-throughout Georgia.

Construction had begun on railroads, and the state

also experienced a boom in the exploitation of timber.

Georgians had

even entered the area of textile manufacturing which was developing as
a significant economic activity by 1850; there were forty textile

A Short History (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1960), 3-9, 66, hereinafter cited as Georgia; Ralph Betts
Flanders, Plantation Agriculture in Georgia (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1933), 86; Richard Harrison
Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850 (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1926), 10-15.
2 Bonner, A History of Georgia Agriculture. 52-53, 56, 61-71;
Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. 21.
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mills in the state and a growing investment in this industry.^
scholar, in describing this growth, concluded:

One

"she [Georgia] made

in the decade from 1840 to 1850 more progress in cotton manufacturing
than any other state which did a significant amount, and her absolute
increase was greater than any other state excepting Massachusetts and
New H a m p s h i r e T h u s by 1850 there were a number of economic factors
in Georgia which encouraged a desire for sectional harmony.5
The actual fact of prosperity in 1850 was reinforced by the
popularly held belief that Georgia was a prosperous state.

One

writer concluded that his state was the most affluent in the South
because she had "more cotton and corn-- . . . more railroads--more
manufacturing-- . . . more diversified wealth . . ."**

Professor

Shryock also noted that Georgia may not have looked prosperous when
compared with the North, but to many Georgians "the apparent economic
superiority of even northern states was illusory."^
Georgia's history was characterized by personal rather than
issue-oriented politics until the 1830's.

After the death of the

first party system, new political groups began to form around two

3

Coulter, Georgia, 191-206, 249-64, 281.

4

Ibid., 282-83.

5

Ibid., 191-283.

6

Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. 27-28.

7

Ibid., 28.
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prominent men, John Clark and George M. Troup.
had no significant differences on issues.
exclaimed in perplexity:

Q

These new factions

Hezekiah Niles of Baltimore

"We know not what they differ about, but
Q

they do violently differ."

However, contests based purely on strug

gles for power began to decline in 1829, partly because in that year
Clark left Georgia and went to Florida to live.1®

Issues emerged as

significant factors, however, when Georgians were faced with decisions
about federal-state relations during the nullification crisis.

The

Troup faction defended South Carolina during the tariff struggle while
the Clark faction, following the lead of John Forsyth, helped stop
Georgia from adopting a pro-nullification position.11
Political parties in Georgia began the process of establishing
national political ties in the 1830's.

George Troup's faction, which

did not like the strong stand which Andrew Jackson had taken toward
South Carolina, was now called the States Rights party while the
Clark faction, identifying itself with Jackson, was known as the
Union party.

Neither of these political positions was permenent, how

ever, and both factions by 1840 had established national political
ties.

The States Rights party aligned itself with the Whigs while the

8 Coulter, Georgia. 238-40; Paul Murray, The Whig Party in
Georgia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1948),
1-59, passim.
9

Coulter, Georgia. 240-41.

10

Ibid.. 241.

11

Ibid., 244-46; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 31-38.
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Union party remained in the Jacksonian camp.

And while Georgia Whigs

became more nationalistic in their outlook, Georgia Democrats, influ
enced by Calhoun's Southern rights philosophy, wanted a sectional
rather than a national political alliance.

12

Unity within the new Whig party was threatened by the drive to
annex Texas as a slave state.

John M. Berrien, a Whig Senator, did

not favor Texas' entrance into the Union.

Statehood for Texas would

be harmful to the South which could no longer rely on its own voting
power in Congress to protect slavery; the South would have to main
tain positive relations with the free states in order to protect her
1^

way of life:iJ

"An immediate, aggressive annexation of Texas and the

unavoidable resulting war with Mexico would damage, if not destroy,
this good will and respect."^

This position was openly opposed by

Alexander H. Stephens, a Whig Congressman, who wanted to annex Texas
and assume Berrien's position as leader of the Georgia Whigs.

Texas

thus caused a division within the Whig party which had not healed by
1850.15
In contrast, Georgia Democrats welcomed Texas into the Union.
There was support for annexation from Democratic Senator W. F.

12

Coulter, Georgia . 246-47; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia.

59-111.
13 Royce Coggins McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1971), 284;
Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 123-24.
14

McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 284.
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Colquitt, and in the House of Representatives Howell Cobb and H. A.
Haralson claimed that all Georgians favored annexation.**’ Democrat
Herschel V. Johnson wrote in 1848:

"It seems to me that at the time

of annexation, Texas was de jure and de facto an independent, sover
eign state, that she had a perfect right to enter, and we to receive
her into the Union."*^
The war with Mexico and the problem of slavery in the West
caused further problems for Georgia Whigs.

They adopted a position,

first advocated by Robert Toombs, of denouncing the war while voting
for military appropriations.*®

Furthermore, Toombs "followed the

Southern Whig line, which for the sake of party and national unity
sought to repress the issue of territorial extension, intertwined as
it was with the disruptive question of slavery

e x p a n s i o n . "*9

Senator

Berrien was impressed with this position because he believed "that if
Mexican territory was acquired, the bonds of Union would be stretched
to the breaking point."^0

However, there was an important difference

between Berrien's and Toombs' position.

Berrien was opposed to actual

acquisition of territory while Toombs was hostile only to the method

16

Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850. 130.

17 Percy Scott Flippin, Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia;
States Rights Unionist (Richmond: Press of the Dietz Printing Co.,
1931), 7.

Rouge:

18 William Y. Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia (Baton
Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 41-42.
19
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of expansion--not the acquisition of Mexican land itself.

Thus, sig

nificant tension still existed within the party.
By 1848 Georgia Democrats had advanced a strong case for the
rights of the South in the territories.

Nationally-oriented Democrat

Howell Cobb discussed the problem of the Mexican cession in debate
about the Wilmot Proviso.

He emphasized that Northerners argued that

they could exclude slavery from the West despite the fact that the
South had participated fully in the Mexican war.

In a spirit of

conciliation this moderate stressed that there must be a compromise
rather than demands that all the territories become free-soil.
Instead of banning black bondage, the North should not be afraid to

22

compete with the South in the W est:

"You have much greater

strength; your population far exceeds ours; you say your people are
more happy, prosperous,
enterprise.

. . .

South(as you call
and the

. . . that the South has lost her energy and

Throw open the territory and let the weak, enervated
her) come forward and meet you

in all your strength;

palm shall be yielded to the victor."^ But

the most equitable

solution to the problem might be to extend the Missouri Compromise
line to the Pacific coast so that sectional conflict over the place of
the peculiar institution in the former Mexican lands might be permaO/

nently settled.

H

Radical Herschel V. Johnson in a debate on the

21 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, 127; Shryock, Georgia and
the Union in 1850. 134-35; Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia, 41-42.
22
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Oregon question stated that neither Congress nor the legislature of a
territory could pass laws which would stop slavery from expanding in
the West; it was thus impossible for inhabitants of a new area to block
the peculiar institution's expansion:

25

"The institution of slavery

is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States; . . . therefore
Congress would be as bound to veto an act of territorial legislation
prohibiting it."26

Therefore, both a moderate and conservative

Democrats had proposed different but strong solutions to the question
of slavery in the territories.
Prior to the Presidential election of 1848, Georgia Democrats
were in turmoil over the slavery crisis.

Cobb returned to Georgia in

1847 to discover that his party was divided on the sectional issues.
There was a wing of the Democracy, represented by Herschel V. Johnson,
which leaned toward Calhounism rather than toward the intersectional
alliance.

In order to stop this radicalism, Cobb worked to get the

state Democratic convention in 1847 to endorse his position of
extending the Missouri Compromise line rather than a more radical
formula.^
During the 1848 campaign the rights of the South in the terri
tories was an important issue.

The Whig party in Georgia, which had

nominated Taylor on an anti-Proviso platform, made this one of the key

25

Congressional Globe. 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 887-92.

26

Ibid., 892.

27 John Eddins Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb" (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1971), 112, 115-16.
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campaign issues.

Representative Cobb, however, charged that Taylor

was an opportunist on this question:
against the Proviso?

Nobody knows!

"Is General Taylor for or
But we know this much, that he

is Proviso in the East and West and anti-Proviso in the South.
Toombs, in an indirect reply, characterized Lewis Cass's popular
sovereignty as a doctrine which would allow slavery to be excluded
from the West by undesirables:

"Mexicans, Indians, negroes, and

mixed races whom we have conquered."

30

General Taylor carried Georgia,
Ol

but each party won four Congressional seats.

L

Calhoun and Georgia Whigs clashed over the Southern Address
during the winter of 1848-49.

Robert Toombs described the Carolinians'

activities to John Crittenden, a Kentucky Whig:
This Southern movement is a bold strike to disorganize
the Southern Whigs and either destroy Genl. Taylor in advance
or compel him to throw himself in the hands of a large
section of the democracy of the South. The Southern Demo
cracy are perfectly desperate. Their northern allies, they
clearly see will unite with the Free-soilers; and even now
the peace is broken between them forever. Almost every man
of the Southern Democrats have joined Calhoun's movement.
After mature consideration we concluded to go into the
meeting [Southern caucus] in order to crush it.^2

28 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, 127-28; Simpson, "A
Biography of Howell Cobb," 123.
29
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31
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32
Robert Toombs to John J. Crittenden, January 3, 1849,
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence ofRobert Toombs,
Alexander H. Stephens, and Howe11 Cobb in Annua 1 Report of the
American Historical Association for the Year 1911 (Washington, 1913),
II, 139. Hereinafter cited as Correspondence.

This view was shared by Berrien, who helped Toombs and Alexander H.
Stephens frustrate Calhoun's goal of Southern unity.

Berrien issued a

substitute address which urged moderate men in both sections to help
suppress the abolition attacks.

Neither Toombs nor Stephens endorsed

Berrien's nationally slanted message, but it helped to defeat
Calhoun.

33

Toombs later confided to Crittenden:

"We have completely

foiled Calhoun in his miserable attempt to form a Southern party
. ...

I told him that the Union of the South was neither possible

nor desirable until we were ready to dissolve the Union."

34

Democrats from Georgia, however, were divided over the issues
raised in the Southern Address.

Howell Cobb and John Lumpkin, both

nationally inclined Democrats, had helped defeat Calhoun while
Democratic Senator H. V. Johnson and Representatives Alfred Iverson
and H. A. Haralson had supported his position.

Thus, the Georgia

Democracy was again split, and Cobb wrote his wife that he expected
to be attacked by both party presses.

35

In order to defend his position, Cobb wrote an address which
was signed by four other Southern Democrats including John Lumpkin.

33 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 334-49;
Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 141; Thompson, Robert Toombs of
Georgia. 53.
34 Robert Toombs to John J. Crittenden, January 22, 1849,
Phillips (ed.), Correspondence, 141.
35 Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 185Q . 185-90; Simpson,
"A Biography of Howell Cobb," 126-31; Howell Cobb to his wife,
February 1, 1849, Phillips (ed.), Correspondence, 145.
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This statement recounted Northern attacks upon the South but blamed
Whigs and abolitionists for causing most of the sectional

problems.

The Democratic party, which was still largely a responsible, national
organization would insure that the South's institutions and way of
life were protected:

"We yet believe, that the only true and reliable

friends of the South at the North are to be found in the Democratic
party and that the protection of our rights so far as the same is
dependent upon the legislative bonds with those who have given us
these evidences of the sincerity of their friendship,

. .

^he

Southern Address, would merely create a sectional party, which was not
necessary as long as the South's "peculiar interests" were not
threatened.

Popular sovereignty should be applied to the Mexican

cession and California as the best means of settling the question of
slavery in the West:^®

"If the measure should be passed, it will be

like oil poured upon the troubled waters, peace and harmony and good
feeling will again be restored to our country."

39

Southern rights in the West was also a campaign issue during
the 1849 race for governor.

Both wings of the Georgia Democracy

united behind Governor George W. Towns on the moderate platform

36
Howell Cobb, LynnBoyd, BeverlyClarke,and John
Lumpkin
to Their Constituents, February 26, 1849,R. P. Brooks
(ed.),
"Howell Cobb Papers," The Georgia Historical Quarterly, V (June, 1921),
39-44. Hereinafter cited as G H Q .
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39
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rather than on the Southern Address. T h e
Edward Y. Hill who was an inept politician.

Whigs nominated Judge
Hill refused to answer

questions about the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso, his posi
tion on the Clayton bill, and the course the South should follow if
Congress passes the Proviso.

41

Towns, however, stated that the Proviso

was unconstitutional, that he was a supporter of the Clayton Compromise,
and that if the Wilmot Proviso was enacted by Congress, the South must
/ O

offer "resistance at every hazard."

Professor Murray has concluded:

"Hill's avoidance of those national issues and Town's popular admini
stration gave Towns the largest majority since the Whig redemption
[major victory] in 1843. " ^

^he margin of victory also enabled the

Democrats to control both legislative houses.^
By the winter of 1849-1850, Georgia's political leaders had
begun to terminate their old party allegiances.

Men like Cobb and

Stephens, who favored national political alliances, began to cooperate
with each other on the local level.

The trend also caused Herschel V.

Johnson and John M. Berrien to break with their parties and form a
states rights alliance.

40

To understand these new political alignments,

Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb," 132-33.

41 Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia. 142; Shryock, Georgia
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it is necessary to realize the political background and philosophies
of the particular leaders.
Unionist forces in the Empire state were led by the ’’Georgia
Triumvirate"--Cobb, Toombs and Stephens.

This combination was pre

dominantly Whig in make up, but the man who profited most from it was
the Union Democrat, Howell Cobb.

Cobb, who was elected Speaker of the

House in December 1849, came from a wealthy family which had "a long
tradition of public service."

45

He entered politics in the 1830's

as solicitor general in northeast Georgia, and was elected to the
House of Representatives in 1842.

This rotund Representative was a

national Democrat who had loyally defended his party during the
1840’s.

46

Although he supported Southern rights, he had a deep

loyalty and love for the Union.

This allegiance to the country as a

whole came from his conscious effort to model himself after nationalists
like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster .^

His loyalty to the Union caused

him to favor a national rather than a sectional party.
Alexander Stephens and Robert Toombs were the Whig components
of the alliance.

Stephens came from a middle-class background, had

been educated at the University of Georgia, and was admitted to the

45 R. P. Brooks, "Howell Cobb" in Allen Johnson and Dumas
Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (11 vols., New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-58), II, P t . 1, 241-42. Hereinafter
cited as DAB.
46

Ibid., 242-43.

47 Interview with Professor Horace Montgomery, University of
Georgia, January 18, 1973.

bar in 1834.

Although Stephens suffered from severe depression, he was

a successful politician.

He won a seat in the state legislature in

1841 and was elected to the House of Representatives in 1843.

By the

mid-1840's he was challenging John M. Berrien for leadership and was
willing to unite with conservative Democrats in 1850.

Toombs, in

contrast, was born into a planter family and entered the state legislature in 1837.

48

After his election to the House in 1844, he maintained

the image of "a conservative Whig rather than a champion of the
South."^

jn 1850 both men, detecting a danger to the Union and a

growing anti-slavery feeling among Northern Whigs, were ready to lead
their party in Georgia into a new alliance to protect the South and
save the Union.
Extremists drew one of their potential leaders from the ranks
of the Whig party, John MacPherson Berrien.

This conservative had been

a prominent lawyer in the early nineteenth century, found himself in
opposition to Andrew Jackson by 1829, and became a leader of the States
Rights party in Georgia.

By 1840, however, he had emerged as a

national Whig who was more Union than sectionally inclined.

He

represented a moderate opinion in the 1840's and only broke with the
national party in 1850 when he saw moderation as futile.

However, his

most recent biographer emphasizes that he retained a residual sympathy

48 McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 300-350;
Ulrich B. Phillips, "Alexander Hamilton Stephens," DAB. IX, P t . 1,
569-70; Thompson, Robert Toombs of Georgia. 1-40.
49 Ulrich B. Phillips, "Robert Augustus Toombs," DAB. IX,
Pt. 2, 590.
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for the Union and was an isolated man rather than a party leader in
1850.50
The leaders of the Southern rights forces in Georgia were
Governor George W. Towns, H. V. Johnson and ex-Governor Charles
McDonald.

None of these men had the stature or capability of the

Georgia Triumvirate.

Towns's political career began in the 1820's

when he had denounced nullification.

During his career he had opposed

most of the Whig economic measures and by 1849 was regarded as a
militant defender of Southern rights.

H. V. Johnson, a planter-lawyer,

had served one year in the United States Senate and acted mainly as a
propagandist for states rights.

Charles McDonald's political career

had involved successful service as governor of Georgia in the early
1840's when he had defeated an extreme Southern rights advocate.

He

re-emerged in 1850 as one of the local leaders of the Southern Rights
party and Nashville movement.^
In November 1849, Governor Towns opened the debate on the

50 Robert Preston Brooks, "John MacPherson Berrien," D A B .
I, Pt. 2, 225-26; McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia,"
300-362, passim.
51 Flippin, Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia. 1-30; Fletcher
M. Greene, "George Washington Bonaporte Towns," DA B . IX, P t . 2,
615; Horace Montgomery (ed.), Georgians in Profile: Historical
Essays in Honor of Ellis Merton Coulter (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1958), 168-91; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia.
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sectional crisis with his message to the state legislature.^

jn this

address he decried the growth of anti-slavery parties which were
determined "that slavery shall never exist in the present or future
territories of the United States."^-*

Claiming that Southerners had

suffered numerous "wrongs," Towns declared that "future aggression is
not to be endured, and if attempted by the Federal Government, must
be repelled, all amicable means being first exhausted,

. . ."54

order to prepare Georgia to resist Northern hostilities against
slavery he asked the legislature to pass a bill permitting the
Governor to call a state convention in case the Wilmot Proviso or
other objectionable laws passed Congress.
Debate on the Governor's request and on resolutions introduced
by state legislators lasted for several months.

The Governor's

message was referred to an appropriate committee in each house which
considered various proposals introduced by legislative members on the
state convention and sectional matters.

A joint legislative committee

considered these propositions and made its report before Christmas

52 Journal of House of Representatives of the State of
Georgia at a Biennia 1 Session of the General Assembly, Began and Held
in Milledgeville, The Seat of Government, in 1849 and 1850 (Milledgeville: Richard M. Orme, State Printer, 1849), 34-37. Hereinafter
cited as House Journal (1849-1850).
53
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Senate of the State of Georgia, at a Biennial Session of the Genera 1
Assembly, Begun and Held in Milledgeville, the Seat of Government in
1849 & 1850 (Milledgeville: Richard M. Orme, State Printer, 1849),
9-37. Hereinafter cited as Senate Journal (1849-1850).

1849.

The report contained a rambling preamble listing Northern aggres

sions and a clause including statehood for California as one of the
justifications for calling a state convention.

Moderate legislators,

who tried to amend the resolutions calling for a state convention,
were unsuccessful.

The Georgia legislature, despite stubborn opposi

tion led by Whig conservative Charles Jenkins, provided for a state
convention, and called for elections for delegates to the Nashville
convention during April 1850.^
Both Southern rights and Union forces had trouble arousing an
apathetic Georgia public.

Southern righters held a meeting in

Hamilton County on March 12, 1850, at which Henry L. Benning and
Colonel Martin J. Crawford spoke.

Benning, a secessionist, recounted

Southern grievances while Crawford defended the idea of the Nashville
Convention.

A similar meeting held in Floyd County expressed approval

of the Southern Convention and the idea of extending the Missouri
Compromise line.^

The Federal Union, to counteract any fears about

the Convention, editorialized:

"The idea seems to exist in the minds

of some that this Convention must necessarily result in disunion.
Its design is directly the reverse:
Union."

58

to preserve not to dissolve the

Despite these states right's efforts, it was apparently

56 House Journal (1849-1850), 49-50, 309-14, 485-520, 656-58;
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impossible to interest Georgians in the issues raised by the crisis of
1850.
The indifference in Georgia worked to the advantage of antiNashville Convention forces.

Unionists had not been at all successful

in organizing public opinion or encouraging conservatives to attend the
meeting.

There was a meeting in Cass county on March 5, 1850, which

expressed disapproval of the Convention but encouraged conservative
delegates to attend so that a moderating influence would be present;
conservative efforts were not very productive, however and the average
voter was not influenced by thera.^
On election dsiy in early April 1850, apathy ruled at the polls.
There were less than 4000 votes cast for convention delegates throughout all of Georgia.

60

The most honest reaction to the election results

was an editorial comment in the Southern Recorder:

"The election for

delegates to the Nashville Convention has proven an abortion."^
Macon Telegraph declared:

The

"It is almost impossible to get our people

out to vote, no matter how important the elections, when there is no
opposition."^

However, the Federal Union blamed the Whigs for the

electorate's indifference; the Whig party, which had faith in President
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Taylor, created false impressions about the purpose of the Nashville
meeting in the public mind.

63

Public reaction to the Nashville Convention may also be gauged
by an indirect debate between a Georgia jurist and a secessionist
editor.

Judge James S. Scartgrough of Twiggs County stated:

"I shall

never refuse to respond to the call of any portion of my fellow
citizens, when made in harmony and concert for the common weal of the
State or the South.

But to be made an instrument to excite to the

dissolution of this glorious Union by the employment of unconstitutional
means I will never lend my name."

64

The editor of the Columbus Times

was happy that the Judge had decided not to go to Nashville; Georgia
should be represented by delegates who would not "libel its character
and o b j e c t s . F u r t h e r m o r e Scarbgrough1s charges were absurd since
they would make any action which did not involve submission to injus
tice an unconstitutional a c t . ^

Georgia's elite was thus still

divided about the objects of the Southern Convention even though the
mass of people had rejected it.
Nationally, Howell Cobb was trying to further sectional harmony
while protecting Southern rights; Speaker Cobb wrote in early January
that Southerners must not reject California's admission simply
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she had a free-soil constitution;

"it will be in violation of the

doctrines of all southern statesmen on that subject and will be found
indefensible."**^

Furthermore, he wanted the South to react cautiously

during the crisis:

"The danger to be guarded against at the South is

the fear of going too far and making false issues."**®
The course of Toombs and Stephens puzzled many observers in
early 1850.

They had broken with the Whig party when the caucus re

fused to endorse Toomb's resolution which stated;

"Congress ought not

to pass any laws prohibiting slavery in the territories of California
or New Mexico."

69

They attended the meeting of moderates at Cobb's

home in February, however, and Toombs wrote Governor Towns that "as a
citizen of the state I shall oppose the action proposed by the legis
lature even if California shall be admitted against my v o t e . " ^
These moderate actions were countered by acts and speeches
which placed Toombs and Stephens at the forefront of the Southern
Rights movement.

Toombs spoke out strongly in May 1850 for Southern

rights:
I claim the right for her to enter them [territories] all with
her property and securely to enjoy it. She will divide with
you if you wish it, but the right to enter all or divide I

67 Howell Cobb to Joseph Henry Lumpkin, January 11, 1850,
John Henry Lumpkin Papers (University of Georgia Libraries, Athens,
Georgia).
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shall never surrender. In my judgement, this right involving,
as it does political equality, is worth a thousand such
Unions. . . . Deprive us of this right and appropriate this
common property to yourselves, it is then your government, not
mine. Then I am its enemy, and I will then, if I can, bring
my children and my constituents to the altar of liberty, and
like Hamilcar, I would swear them to eternal hostility to your
foul damnation.
This "Hamilcar speech," which was not in accord with Toombs' basic con
servatism, may have been the result of a temporary burst of emotion or
perhaps was designed to block a bill asking for immediate statehood
for California.

Stephens had a similar lapse from conservatism when

he thought that Federal troops might be sent to fight the Texas
militia.

Neither man, however, allied himself with Southern radi-

Berrien strongly supported Southern rights in a speech deliv
ered in the Senate during February 1850.

It was an extended discus

sion of the "constitutional rights" of the South to take black
property into the Southwestern territory acquired from Mexico.

He

stated succinctly the position of many Southerners:
Well, now, Sir, the South, as I have said before, asserts the
right of any citizen of the United States to participate in
the benefits of all public property, and in the territories of

71
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the Union. It asserts this in relation to the citizens of the
slaveholding states, as well as in relation to those of the
free states. That assertion necessarily includes the denial
of the right and power of Congress to pass any law prohibiting
them from emigrating into those territories, and taking with
them their property of whatever sort, or to interpose any
legislative obstacle in their w a y . 73
Since the states were equal partners in the Union they could not have
their rights in the Southwest denied.

Berrien proposed that an

equitable compromise might be to submit the question of sectional
rights to the proper courts.

But he stressed in a lengthy discourse

that Congress did not have the power to restrict the expansion of
slavery and that Mexican anti-slavery laws were not operative.

He

thought that there was no real danger that the North would abolish
slavery in the states, but he stressed that he would stand by his
state--even to the point of disunion--if she choose to resist when
laws violating her rights were enacted.

Berrien did state, however,

"7 /

his abhorrence of that course:

"For myself, I do not hesitate to

say, that disunion is an idea which even in imagination I cannot fully
realize.

In moments of despondency, it floats before my mind, as a

shapeless vision, to which I can give no distinct form, dimly exposing
to my view in the background the horrors of anarchy and civil commo
tion."^^
By May 1850 Senator Berrien had formulated his opinions on the
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Clay bills.

After stating his approval of the proposal to pay Texas

for the disputed land, Berrien emphasized that he could not support
California's admission as a state unless her boundaries were adjusted
and unless her representation in the House was limited to one Congress
man.

He favored the idea of granting territorial governments in Utah

and New Mexico without the Wilmot Proviso but criticized the Committee
of Thirteen's report on this section:
I concurred most cheerfully in the omission of the Wilmot
Proviso, but I regretted that that had not been a simple act,
unaccompanied by the reason which took from it the healing
influences upon the public mind it would otherwise have had.
It left the inference . . ., that, in the opinion of the
comnittee, a power existed to impose that restriction, and
that it might be exercised whenever a case should arise
rendering it necessary to do so. I believed that this ex
pression of the reasons which induced the withholding of that
proviso was calculated to diminish the beneficial influence
it would have in producing harmony among the people of the
United States, . .
Although he did not mention the remaining bills, Berrien stressed
that the Compromise could not receive his support unless it was
modified.^
By mid-1850 Georgians were fully aware of the Southern rights
position.

Georgia radicals like ex-Governor Charles J. McDonald

attended the Nashville Convention and denounced the Compromise as unconstitutional.

78

The Federal Union constantly criticized the
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Omnibus bills while the Augusta Republic boldly defended the Southern
"ultras" while condemning Southern moderates who "go for the Compromise,
which not only gives up, all the territory to the Free States, but
proposes to cut OFF SLAVE TERRITORY from Texas.
Herschel V. Johnson wrote a lengthy critique of the Compromise
in mid-1850.

He reviewed the acquisition of the Mexican cession and

declared that the South "ought to be satisfied with no adjustment,
which does not secure to her beyond dispute, a portion of the terri
tories in question and give finality to this painful and perilous
80
c o n t e s t The Clay bills did not meet this criterion and actually
violated Southern rights.

Adventurers in California and the actions

of the national government had prevented Southern settlement on the
Pacific coast.

The free-soilers in California did not represent the

wishes of all the population--especially not the opinion of settlers
living south of the 36° 30' line.®*

He concluded:

"The admission of

California, as she is, is the grand desideratum with the free-soilers
. . . [once]

. . . the whole Pacific coast . . . are secured to the

grasping appetite of Northern cupidity.

They know full well that,

flanked by Oregon on the North,' and California on the West--both
boundless fields for the operation of abolition fanaticism and rascal
ity.

Utah and Mexico will fall as easy prey to their

79 Milledgeville Federal Union, June 18, 1850, quoting
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machinations."®^

Hence, these areas, in addition to the disputed land

in west Texas would be lost to the free-soilers.

83

The Slave Trade and Fugitive Slave bills would not end sec
tional tensions, Johnson continued.

Eliminating the slave pens in

Washington would be acceptable if it quieted sectionalism, but this
would merely give impetus to further abolitionism.

The Fugitive Slave

bill could not be enforced in the North, and Johnson predicted that it
would be amended or repealed within five years after its passage.®^
After reviewing the "weaknesses" of the Clay Compromise,
Johnson predicted dire consequences if it became law:

"But let Mr.

Clay's bill become a law and by its operation all the territory of the
United States appropriated to free soil; and the child is now born who
will see the day when the South has to choose between dissolution and
abolition in the States."

85

Johnson favored the Missouri Compromise

line which would allow slave labor to be used in California's gold
mines and in staple crop agriculture.®®

The South must unite behind

this proposal and force the North to accept it "as the only means of
perpetuating the Union."
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Radical objections to the Compromise were accompanied by the
organization of Southern Rights associations.

Various meetings were

held in July 1850 approving the Nashville Resolutions and extension of
the Missouri Compromise line.

The Columbus Times advocated abandonment

of old party ties in order to protect the South, and by August the
Federal Union reported that there were twenty-four counties in which
Southern Rights associations had been organized.

88

The most important Southern Rights meeting was held in Macon
on August 22.

Important Southern righters attended the meeting and

heard speeches by local radicals and Robert B. Rhett.

The delegates

adopted resolutions which endorsed the Nashville proposals-especially the extention of the Missouri Compromise line.®^

They

strongly opposed admission of California to the Union and expressed
hostility to the national government, which through its ’’territorial
policy" was trying "to prevent the admission of another slave state
into the Union, subvert the rights of the South in the public terri
tories eventually and to abolish slavery in States.

Thus converting

a Government which was established for the protection of all into an
engine of attack and spoliation of a portion of its members."^®
Members also supported calling a state convention to protect Georgia's
"rights" while giving impetus to further efforts for the protection of
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black slavery.
Although the Southern Rights forces were prominent during the
summer months, Georgia Unionists were not dormant.

Union meetings were

organized to give expression to Georgia's deeply felt loyalty to the
Union.

A typical meeting, presided over by Thomas J. Burney, met in

Morgan County on July 20.

A committee of fourteen from both political

parties stated that the only practical measures before Congress to
settle the sectional problem was the Omnibus bills.

In Americus,

moderates resolved that Southern fanatics and Northern abolitionists
were working to defeat the

Compromise.^

They wanted Congressman M. J.

Wellborn to vote for the Adjustment package which would "restore peace
and harmony to the country, and be approved by a large and overwhelming majority of the people . . ."
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These meetings, and one

held in Lee County are indications of the loyalty to the Union and
belief that the Clay's bills were a potentially just settlement.^
A competent defense of the Compromise proposals, written by
Howell Cobb, appeared in mid-July 1850.

Cobb, who had been encouraged

by Absalom Chappell, produced an address which defended the efforts of
the Compromise forces.

He reemphasized that the sectional crisis had

arisen out of the conflict over the Wilmot Proviso and that there were
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two plans to settle the crisis which he could accept:
Compromise line and Clay's Omnibus.

the Missouri

Cobb then proceeded to defend

the Omnibus bills as part of a general plan of settlement.

He could

accept California's admission as a free-soil state because it was the
wish of her people.

The

and actually opened more

territorial bill repudiated the Wilmot Proviso
territory to the South

the Missouri Compromise line.9^

than would adoptionof

Texas' title to the disputed land was

valid, but Southerners should have no difficulty in accepting the right
of a state and the Federal government to settle a question in a manner
which was beneficial to Texas:

"The pecuniary equivalent which she

would receive from the Government for the cession . . . would enable
her to throw off a heavy debt which now hangs like an incubus over
her. . ."96
Cobb also worked

actively for the Union cause in Congress.

His

position as Speaker of the House enabled him to judge the temper of
the Congress and helped him pass the Compromise.

He cooperated with

Northern moderates, wanted a settlement based on Clay's proposals and
was the dynamic counterpart to Stephen Douglas in the House of
Representatives.9^
Toombs and Stephens played a marginal role in obtaining

95 Absalom Chappell to Howell Cobb, July 10, 1850; Phillips
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17, 1850, ibid., 196-205.
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(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1964), 150-66.
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acceptance of the Compromise.

They had been actively opposed to

Taylor's plan of settlement and had visited the President before his
death to protest possible Federal aggression against T e x a s . T o o m b s
participated in Congressional debate during August-September, and
stated:

"From the first day of this session to this hour, I have had

but one ultimatum.
our property.
resist.

That was--hostile legislation by Congress against

That I have been, now am, and shall ever be ready to

No man is more rejoiced than I am that this alternative is not

presented to me by these bills."

99

On August 9 Stephens delivered a strong speech in the House
criticizing President Fillmore's proclamation on Texas.

In shrill

language, he denied the power of the President to use force to stop
Texas from extending her boundaries over the disputed

t e r r i t o r y .

^0

Although he declared that he wanted a settlement of the sectional dif
ferences, Stephens also stated:

"If you, gentlemen of the North, then,

intend to ingraft upon the policy of this common Government your anti
slavery views, and make its action conform to your sectional purposes,
it is useless to say anything more of compromise settlement, adjust
ment or union . . . and whenever this Government is brought in hostile
array against me and mine, I am for disunion . .

98
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must make concessions on the sectional questions to preserve the peace,
and agitation had to be kept out of the halls of Congress or the

102

future of the Union would be in doubt.

John M. Berrien's course in the Compromise was erratic and
indicated great mental strain.

His speeches were often vague, and his

only success was an amendment permitting the Federal courts, rather
than Congress or settlers, to decide the fate of slavery in the terri
tories.

In mid-July he proposed economic retaliation against the North

as an alternative to secession.

The South should place a heavy tax on

Northern products after they entered Southern ports.

This position,

known as the Berrien Platform, was completely constitutional in the
Senator's opinion, but as a practical solution it was seriously flawed.
It was offered too late in the Congressional session to receive any
support and it would have only alienated the Northern mercantile com103
munity.
The voting patterns by the Congressional delegation did not
indicate the position which these men would adopt in the fall of 1850.
Both Senators and all the Representatives were recorded as voting
against statehood for California while approving the bills for terri
torial government in Utah-New Mexico and the Fugitive Slave Law.

The

pattern ended, however, as Senators Berrien and William Dawson, along

102 Ibid., 1084. Stephens had returned to Georgia by late
August and did not participate in Congressional voting until midSeptember 1850. Rabun, "Alexander H. Stephens," 275-76.
103

McCrary, "John MacPherson Berrien of Georgia," 336-70.

110

with Representatives Toombs and Allen Owen, favored settlement of the
Texas boundary question which Representatives H. A. Haralson and James
W. Jackson opposed.

Both Senators opposed the abolition of the slave

trade in Washington, which every House member recorded as voting
also opposed.

104

From September to December 1850, radicals in the Deep South
watched the state of Georgia.

Men from the radical states of South

Carolina and Mississippi were concerned about the course which Georgia
would adopt.

Would this basically conservative state reject or submit

to the Adjustment bills?^®^
In late September Governor Towns issued a proclamation calling
for a state convention.

Since the goal of the Northern free-soilers

was abolition, elections should be held on November 25 so that
Georgians could meet in a special session to find a method to protect
the peculiar institution.

106

Immediate support for the Governor's call came from the
Federal Union which declared that the major question, before the Con
vention would be:

"THE CONTINUANCE OR ABOLITION OF THE INSTITUTION

OF S L A V E R Y . T h e
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decide whether to resist or submit to Northern oppression:

"The eyes

of the whole country is [sic] upon Georgia— she now stands in the van
of her southern sisters . . .
South.

If we advance, all is well with the

If we recede all is lost."

108

Practical politicians in the newly formed Southern Rights
party immediately organized for the November elections.

On the local

level meetings were held to express opposition to the Compromise, to
organize resistance, and to gain public support.

On September 30 a

meeting was held at the Methodist Church in Thomasville.

The members

resolved that the admission of California "is a gross wrong upon the
southern people."^09

They further declared:

"the tendency of the

action of the general government is gradually to abolish slavery in
the Southern states.

The result of which would be, in short, the

utter destruction of our prosperity as a country and the degradation
to the level of the slave of the honest hard working portion of our
fellow citizens
A nominating convention gathered in early October to select
Southern Rights candidates to the December convention.

A committee of

twenty-four drew up resolutions which declared that the South intended
to live as equals with the North under the Constitution.

A list of

Northern aggressions beginning with passage of the Ordinance of 1787
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and ending with California's admission as a state was drawn up.***

The

Compromise measures were harmful to the South since there might be a
danger of emancipation which "is in our judgement a question of life
and death to the white race of the South."

112

They wanted men who

were opposed to the Compromise elected to the convention, but the
resistance must still be within the Union.**^
Several messages by Southern Rights men encouraged the popu
lace to resist the dangers to slavery.

Two Southern Rights candidates

for the December convention called upon Georgians to stand firmly for
their "rights":

"It cannot be possible that the people of Georgia

will submit to wear the yoke of oppression. . . .
us maintain that freedom.
maintain that equality.

If we are free, let

If we are equals with the North, let us
If the property we hold be ours, let us assert

our right to it, and resist at every hazard, every act of Congress,
which seeks to destroy our property, or render it valueless in our
hands."
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Similar sentiments were echoed by radical Governor Towns

in a letter mid-way in the campaign.

Towns maintained that the entire

North was anti-slavery and that it was organized for sectional purposes.
The aggressive feelings of the free-soilers "rests upon a hatred of the
South, a feeling of jealousy at Southern prosperity, . . . and an
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universally aggressive disposition to tear down and demolish whatever
they cannot fully monopolize and enjoy."*^

He believed that the

North was strengthening the abolition forces by the admission of
California and that the border slave states would probably abolish
slavery in the future.

Therefore, the South had to act in 1850 to

protect slavery while there were still parts of the Northern population
who opposed the peculiar institution, but respected the guarantees
which it had in the United States Constitution.^^
Conservatives welcomed the return of the Triumvirate in the
fall of 1850.

They recognized that these three men could help lead

the state in a peaceful rather than a radical course.

Governor Towns

of Georgia, along with other Fire-eaters, wanted the state to stand
firm against the Compromise.

Moderates, in contrast, emphasized the

deep Union feeling of the masses of Georgia and encouraged Cobb to
campaign vigorously against d i s u n i o n i s t s ; o n e moderate wrote:

"you

have had a most laborious session, and ought to have some leisure. . .
But it is important that you should mingle with the people and make
I IO

speeches."

Another man noted that the "stock" of the radicals "has

fallen" when it became apparent that the Stephens and Toombs would
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support the Union rather than the Southern Rights cause within the
- - 119
state.
Unionists began organizing throughout the state to influence
the rural electorate.

Alexander Stephens spoke in Macon where he

declared that there were situations in which disunion might be neces
sary; however, resistance was not justified by the passage of the
territorial bills--which did not contain the Wilmot Proviso--or
California's admission to the Union.

Primary meetings were held

throughout the state which expressed conservative sentiment.

120

A

meeting in Monroe county in early October expressed the sentiments of
Georgia moderates:

"The true issue then in the election of Delegates

to the Convention is, Union or Disunion.

We hesitate not to avow our

selves in favor of the former, and the uncompromising enemies of the
lO 1
latter--we are not yet tired of the Union .n14-1 a similar feeling was
expressed in a gathering at Lumpkin on October 4 which was chaired by
Judge James Clark.

The purpose of the meeting, in the Judge's opinion,

was to preserve the Union.
the United States;

122

It had brought prosperity and growth to

resolutions were adopted which stated that the

convention which Towns had called would result in resistance which
"necessarily lead to a Revolution and revolution to Disunion.

119

The

Luther J. Glenn to Howell Cobb, September 21, 1850, Ibid.,

213.
120 Macon Georgia Journa1 and Messenger. August 29, 1850;
Milledgeville Southern Recorder, September 10, 1850.
121

Macon Georgia Journal and Messenger. October 9, 1850.

122

Ibid., O cto be r 16, 1850.

115

issue is therefore a plain one.

It is UNION or DISUNION."*^

If the

United States was divided, it would become "balkanized" without any
power.

These men were therefore willing to acquiesce in the Compro-

, ,
124
mise s passage.
A persuasive discussion of the Compromise appeared in a letter
which Toombs wrote to his constituents in early October.

Toombs

stated that he had established three grounds for resistance in the
1850 session of Congress:

1. abolition of the peculiar institution in

Washington; 2. prohibition of slavery in the western territories; and
3. refusal by Congress to enact a "fair measure" for the rendition of
escaped slaves.

These standards were not violated by Congressional

legislation, and the South had the right to expand into the Southwest
with its institutions.

The land transferred to New Mexico from Texas

came under the provision which allowed it to enter the Union without
regard to the status of slavery.

Furthermore, Texas municipal law

still applied to the area, and the laws of the United States were ex
tended to the Southwest.

Toombs did want a direct repeal of Mexican

(probably anti-slavery) law in Utah-New Mexico along with positive
laws to protect slavery.

However, he recognized that many people

still clung to the doctrine of non-intervention.

Although he had

voted against California's admission to the Union, Toombs stressed
that his objections were not sectional and that statehood for
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California was entirely within the boundaries of Congressional preroga125
tive.
Other conservative viewpoints were voiced by Charles Jenkins,
a leading Whig and Judge M. J. Wellborn.

Jenkins, a former ally of

Senator Berrien, defended California's admission to the Union.
California, whose statehood he might have opposed on grounds of
expediency, had a legitimate right to regulate her own domestic insti
tutions.

She could not be constitutionally denied statehood simply

because her citizens had adopted a free-soil constitution.

In a

public letter to voters in Georgia's second Congressional district,
Wellborn expressed a definite spirit of conciliation.

The Utah-New

Mexico bills allowed slaves to be brought into the territories so that
the institution might be established in the Southwest.

Four slave

states might be carved out of Texas, and the Slave Trade Law for the
District of Columbia was a police regulation which the slaveholders
in the capital seemed to favor.

The irregularities in California's

admission to the Union were not justifications for secession in this
moderate Georgian's opinion.126

In concluding, Wellborn stated:

"Gentlemen, there is no dishonor done the South in the late measures.
None had been intended.

Nor has the North triumphed.

such unworthy feeling among them."

There exists no
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The most isolated figure in the fall of 1850 was Senator
Berrien.

He was alienated from his conservative Whig supporters, who

had broken with him on the issue of slavery.

In order to gain support,

he was forced into a loose alliance with Fire-eaters like James Y.
Smythe, editor of the Augusta Republic.

His brother, with a letter

from the Senator, traveled throughout the state advocating economic
retaliation against the North rather than secession.

128

Berrien him

self hoped to form "fusion tickets . . . pledged to his Berrien
Platform."129

since this did not prove feasible, his ideas made no

real impression on the electorate.
Georgians overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of acquiescence to
the Compromise on November 25, 1850.

Union delegates were victorious

in ninety percent of the counties and thus won a tremendous victory
over their Southern Rights opponents.

Conservative delegates like

Charles Jenkins and Thomas Spalding were
the electorates in their districts.
was completely victorious.

overwhelmingly supported by

The Whig-dominated Union party

130

The Federal Union provided a cogent if somewhat inaccurate
evaluation of the triumph:

"The Unionist victory was primarily the

result of the Southern Rights men being universally denounced as
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1

"disunionists.ni

Unionists had support from local office holders and

"demagogues who were enlisted in the Union cause."

132

However, the

paper was most bitter at the mercantile community and planter class:
A portion, too of the commercial interest— an interest to a
considerable extent under the control of northern men, many
of whom are mere birds of passage, more identified with the
North than the South, lent their aid to the prostration of
Southern Rights. And it cannot be disguised, that there are
large cotton planters who have acted upon the principle openly
acknowledged by one . . . give me my negroes for ten years,
and cotton at thirteen cents, and then I shall be rich
enough, and the negroes may go the d
1. ^
The editorial correctly emphasized several of the important
factors in the Unionist victory.

Conservatives in Georgia had

apparently succeeded in creating an image of the Southern Rights party
as composed of dangerous plotters seeking an end to the Union.

Pros

perity had also reinforced the natural moderation in the state, but
the Union coalition was led by extremely competent men--not mere party
hacks and demagogues.

The factor which the paper did not mention was

the emotional loyalty to the Union that existed in Georgia and which
made most Georgians reluctant to adopt any radical course.

This

Unionism was conditional, however, as Luther Glenn noted in a letter to
Howell Cobb:
But the North must not take this election as evidence of an
unconditional submission by Georgia to any and all encroach
ments upon the rights of the South. The fugitive slave bill
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must not be Interfered with. It must be faithfully executed
and carried out. Slavery must not be abolished in the
District. The Wilmot Proviso must 'sleep the sleep of death.'
In short, Georgia is willing to abide by the settlement of the
question made by the last Congress, and the North must and I
have no doubt will carry out in good faith her part of it. If
so the country is safe and the ultras d e a d . ^ ^
The state convention in Milledgeville opened on December 10,
1850, with the selection of Thomas Spalding as chairman.

Spalding, a

staunch Unionist, stated that rather than see the Union broken;
"I should prefer to see myself and mine slumbering under the load of
136
monumental clay."

He actively aided the Union cause by appointing

Union men to the Committee of Thirty-Three which was created to draft
a report of the convention's position.

137

The Committee of Thirty-Three, which drew up what came to be
known as the Georgia Platform, was chaired by Charles Jenkins.

138

Jenkins was characterized by a contemporary as the "Madison" of the
convention:

"He stood like a great towering and impossible statue by

the paths that seemed to lead to degradation and humility, on the one
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side, or to disorder and strife on the other.“139

^his eulogy, though

overdrawn, does emphasize the important role which Jenkins played as
the actual author of the Georgia Platform.

140

The Georgia Platform was a clear statement of the mood in the
state in 1850.

It announced that although no one in Georgia totally

supported the Adjustment bills, the people were willing to submit to
them with definite reservations.

There were certain violations of the

institution of black slavery which even moderates in the state would
not tolerate:
Fourthly Resolved that the state of Georgia, in the opinion
of this convention, will and ought to resist even (as a last
resort) to a disruption of every tie that binds her to the
Union, any action of Congress upon the subject of slavery in
the District of Columbia, or in places subject to the juris
diction of Congress, incompatible with the safety and domestic
tranquility, the rights and honor of the slaveholding states;
or any act suppressing the slave trade between the slaveholding states, or in any refusal to admit as a state any
territory hereafter applying, because of the existence of
slavery therein; or any act, prohibiting the introduction of
slaves into the territories of Utah and New Mexico, or any
act repealing or materially modifying the laws now in force
for the recovery of fugitive slaves.
Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave law was so vital that the preserva
tion of the Union was dependent on it.

Thus, Unionists had estab

lished a platform which acquiesced to the adjustment bills of 1850
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but threatened secession if there were further encroachments upon the
■
142
South's most vital domestic institution.
The Union party of Georgia was formed in Milledgeville while
the convention was in session.

Unionists gathered in the House of

Representatives on December 11 and selected General John W. Sanford
as their chairman.
tone of the meeting.

Eloquent speeches by Toombs and Stephens set the
Toombs began by declaring the United States had

just passed through a crisis which had tested the political system.
The people had made a peaceful decision at the polls about the vexa
tious sectional problems which had risen with the acquisition of the
Mexican cession and the anti-slavery feelings in the North.

143

He had

supported resistance when there were strong attacks upon slavery, but
believed that the bitter struggle in the Thirty First Congress demon
strated the depth of nationalism in all sections:

"After reviewing

the events of the last 6 or 8 months, before God I believe that there
is no act of justice which the people of all portions of the Union
will not render whenever the Union is in danger.

The national heart

may slumber, but when aroused, its devotion to the Union is stronger
than fanaticism, stronger than faction."

144

Toombs emphasized that

although there were still hostile groups in the North Southern
Unionists must not cut themselves off from an alliance with
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conservatives north of the Mason Dixon line.

145

Slavery, which had

been "swept away" in other parts of the Americas was secure under the
national Constitution:

"The greatest security to this institution,

is found in the Constitution of the United States.

This is the aegis

which will protect you and your property, as long as you can preserve
it.

It is now the strongest legal bulwark for property in slaves.

He was ready to unite with Northern men, and emphasized that he was
proud to be both a Georgian and an American.
Alexander Stephens spoke next about Georgia's desire to pre
serve the Union.

Since it was still endangered by men from both

sections, it was necessary for conservatives to unite:
I say to you frankly, my opinion is, that the friends of the
Union, North and South, must rally together. They must stand
shoulder to shoulder, hand to hand, and meet in open opposition,
those whose objects or policy will lead to its destruction.
This must be done irrespective of past party association or
organization. When the country is in danger, all these minor
questions must be buried.^®
He did not believe that the continuance of the Union was incompatible
with the preservation of Southern rights.

The Wilmot Proviso had been

eliminated from national political discussion while the principle was
established that a territory could enter the Union regardless of the
status of slavery.
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He wanted to protect his section's interests in
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the Union, and called for the formation of a national conservative
party:
To the friends of the Union then I say, that we should organize
. . . upon a platform as broad and as wide as this Republic.
We should meet those men at the North who cherish sentiments
in common with us, and . . . Let them with us then link our
destinies, and form one great national party under the name and
style, if you please, of the Union Constitutional Party.
With the formation of the Union party old party ties were terminated
and men who had been political enemies tried to work together on the
basis of the Georgia Platform.
In the winter of 1850-1851 Howell Cobb was prominently men
tioned as a possible gubernatorial candidate.

He was acceptable to

the Union coalition with its strong political base across North
Georgia.

Although his most recent biographer stresses Cobb's ambition

for office--possibly even a desire for the Presidency--he seems to
have rather reluctantly accepted it as a public duty:*"**

"I do not

want to run for governor and if they would fall upon another candidate
it would suit me exactly . . . but . . .
race if it is desired by my friends."

152

I have determined to run the
Therefore this practical man

began to seek the nomination of the new party during the spring of 1851 153
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The Union party attempted to reinforce its coalition at a
large Union meeting in Macon on February 22, 1851.

Local Unionists

had corresponded widely with Georgia and national Union men to obtain
their opinions on this occasion.

Prominent Georgia Unionists who

attended the meeting were A. A. Chappell, James A. Nesbit, and J. H. R.
Washington, Mayor of Savannah.

At a banquet, toasts were made to the

new Union party which stood firmly on the Georgia Platform.

Letters

from leading Unionists, including Howell Cobb, were read at the meeting
and later circulated throughout Georgia as endorsements for the Com
promise and support for the party's conservatism.
In his letter, Cobb discussed the dangers to sectional harmony.
Tensions between the sections still existed because Northern abolition
ists and Southern rights men continued their agitation.

He noted

especially the dangerously parochial attitude of the Southern rights
movement:

"All the sympathies of the Southern Rights Party of Georgia

are with sectional men, sectional issues and sectional associations."^^
These radical men, like their counterparts in South Carolina, were in
favor of secession.

Moderates, in contrast, had worked out an adjust

ment with the North which had defeated the Wilmot Proviso and which
would enforce the Fugitive Slave Law.

157

He concluded by stating:
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Your organization [Constitutional Union party] has laid down
a sound and patriotic principle— a faithful adherence to the
compromise measures of the last Congress.
It is your platform--^^8
In the winter of 1851 Southern Rights men tried to influence
the Georgia electorate.

Editorial statements were constantly issued by

the Federal Union which emphasized that there was no real danger to the
Union.

The Southern Rights party accepted the Georgia Platfora but was

denounced by Unionists who wanted only to preserve their own party:
"their rickety, consumptive, dead and buried, constitutional Union
party, to which they cling with a death like tenacity, as their only
hope for power and spoils, is without excuse or apology, unless they
make believe, that their [sic] is a party opposed to the Union . .
The party had to die since it was only a Whig trick to obtain power.
The Augusta Republic claimed that the Southern Rights principles had

158 Ibid.; Simpson, "A Biography of Howell Cobb," 148, believes
that even at this early date that Cobb wanted to return to the national
Democracy but that he had to consider practical political problems.
These problems were amplified in a letter from John Lamar to Cobb:
"The Democratic party in Georgia is given over to "fire-eating" and
Disunion. For us to go back among them would be to offer ourselves
willing victims to their vengeance. I for one never will. The Whigs
as far as I know are eager for the organization and consolidation of
the Union party and are willing to give up their tariff notions. . . .
My opinion is that there will be very little difficulty in organizing
in Ga. a Union party that will adopt Democratic principles." John
Lamar to Howell Cobb, January 11, 1851, Howell Cobb Papers.
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triumphed in the December convention, and that radicals would also beat
"the opposition of demagogues and office seekers."1**2

These statements

criticized the Constitutional Union party as a coalition based on a
desire for power and patronage rather than on loyalty to any great
principle.
The Southern Rights party also began to prepare for the 1851
elections.

Meetings were held throughout the state in the spring of

1851 to select delegates to the state convention which was planned for
May.

Leaders in the party had to create unity among various state

associations which held divergent views on the Compromise of 1850.

163

Southern Rights men meeting at Irwinton agreed to support the Georgia
Platform as "the expressed will of the people."
Rights meeting in Crawford was more radical:

164

However, a Southern

"Resolved that we do not

acquiesce in the Platform of the Georgia State Convention . . ., sus
taining as it does, those measures of abomination, miscalled the Compromise Bill, . . ."

163

Therefore party unity had to be created so

that victory could be achieved in the 1851 political races.
The state convention, which was held on May 28-29, 1851, was
apparently unable to work out a compromise between the radical and
moderate wings of the Southern Rights party.

The faction did not heed
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the advice of the Federal Union which wanted the party to resist the
Constitutional Unionists but also "to act cautiously, prudently and
wisely."166

party members instead adopted a fairly radical platform

which stated that the rights of the South had been violated in the
Compromise of 1850; secession was upheld as the right of sovereign
states, and convention members announced that the only just settlement
to the question of slavery in the territories was the extension of the
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific.

These bold statements were

the platform upon which the Southern Rights nominee, Charles J.
McDonald, ran for governor.

16 7

At its convention the Union party endorsed the principles of the
Georgia Platform and nominated Cobb by acclamation.

John J. Floyd,

appointed President of the Convention, selected a committee of Thirtythree which announced its devotion to the resolutions passed by the
Georgia Convention, while stating their regrets that the Southern
Rights party stood in opposition to them:

". . . we have witnessed

with profound regret the opposition to these principles by the Conven
tion of our opponents . . . that opposition is calculated to destroy the
moral force of the position which our state has taken . . .

to create

divisions and dissensions . . . thus weakening us, to invite a renewal
of aggressions upon Southern rights, which may end in the overthrow of

166
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our Union, . . ."

168

This sentiment, which seemed to unite the party,

was threatened by Cobb's proposal to base his campaign on the idea
that secession was unconstitutional; Georgia Unionists, represented
by Robert Toombs, were opposed to this plan, and a temporary rift was
opened between the former Democrat and W h i g . ^ ^

Alexander Stephens,

expressing the views of pragmatic politicians, wanted the gubernatorial
candidate to concentrate on campaigning rather than a discussion of
secession:

"You must be wide awake with all your wits at command

from the word go.
competitor.

No time is to be lost.

You have an adroit and wily

Take the stump and keep it on all suitable occasions."^®

Cobb finally admitted that "Secession or revolution" might be justi
fied under the most severe conditions of oppression, but not in
1851:^*

"If the people of Georgia are prepared to reverse a deci

sion so recently made and rush the ship of state into the gulf of
disunion, in obedience to the summons of a neighboring state [South
Carolina], then it is manifest that I am not the man to select for
their chief magistrate."172
During the 1851 campaign Cobb conducted an extensive canvass
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throughout Georgia.

He had been advised to treat the Southern Rights

party as formidable opposition:

"Thus entering the lists we shall

yield no inch of ground without a struggle feeling all the while that
each particular blow dealt the aversary [sic] is absolutely essential
to our success.

•,173

The former speaker apparently followed the recom

mendation because he was engaged in a lengthy speaking tour during the
summer.

He was urged by correspondents to visit Cherokee because the

Southern Rights men had been active in the area.

At Thomasville Cobb

declared that the various Compromise bills did not violate the prin
ciples which Georgia established on slavery in the territories.
Radicals, who had originally submitted to the Adjustment by accepting
the Georgia Platform would resist it if they ever gained majority
support in the Empire state;

174

the Union had to be maintained as

"the friend and protector of the people."175

gy September Cobb pre

dicted that Georgia would go Unionist "by an overwhelming torrent."176
Strong Unionists sentiments were expressed by the conservative
candidates for the Constitutional Union party.

Robert Toombs empha

sized that party lines had broken down in 1850, and that the

173 Thomas P. Harris to Howell Cobb, June 15, 1851, Howell
Cobb Papers.
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Constitutional Union party supported the Georgia platform; he defended
most of the Compromise of 1850— especially the territorial bills for
Utah-New Mexico— as consistent with Southern principles.

Although he

was very critical of the disunionist tendencies of the McDonald Southern
Rights' party, Toombs declared that the ultimate danger to the Union
came from anti-slavery elements in the North; the national political
parties should "purge themselves"

of this radical group or the

Unionists would have to create a new political organizagion.
Absalom Chappell, another Unionist candidate for Congress, declared
that if the Adjustment bills "had been finally lost in the last Congress, their failure would have been the knell of the Union."

178

But

secessionists had still tried to destroy the Union after the passage
of the bills.

Even though Georgians had decided on a more moderate

course in the convention of 1850, it had not ended the efforts of
Georgia extremists:
Its effect [Union victory in 1850] was not so much to put an
end to the formidable and organized warfare against the
Union in Georgia, as to drive the routed disunion forces of
this state from the post of honor, the van of battle, where
they figured in the campaign of last year--into their more
natural position of auxiliary subordination to the movements
of South Carolina. The great struggle going on in Georgia is,
really, to seduce the people from their allegiance to her and
the noble platform on which she has planted herself, and to
prepare their minds for abetting and sustaining South
Carolina . . .179
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Chappell asked Georgians if they were thus willing to abandon the course
of action decided upon in 1850 to adopt a more radical one which might
threaten the Union.18®
The Union press was able effectively to brand the Southern
Rights party as a threat to the Union.

Hopkins Holsey, editor of the

pro-Union Southern Banner, wrote that Charles McDonald's election would
be "THE FUNERAL KNELL OF THE AMERICAN UNION."181

The Southern Recorder

also took this viewpoint in discussing the choice of candidates:
Those who are for uniting with Carolina in resistance to the
Compromise, by secession alone, or by the creation of a
Southern Congress and a southern confederacy, will doubtless
vote for the Resistance candidate [MacDonald], who will, of
course, give the whole influence of the state government to the
promotion of his views. But those who are in favor of abiding
by the Compromise, who go for the integrity of the Union upon
that Compromise, will vote for Mr. Cobb. . . .18^
But the Macon Journal and Messenger stated that the Union position most
succinctly:

"The only question now before the people is:

will they

support McDonald and disunion in disguise, or Cobb and the action of
the Georgia convention?"188
The Southern Rights campaign was based primarily upon letters
which their gubernatorial candidate wrote.

Ex-Governor McDonald made

two main statements during the summer which emphasized the race
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question.

In his acceptance letter, the gubernatorial candidate

denounced the Compromise of 1850 which would not permit the Southern
black population to go West;

"The rapidly increasing slave population

are to remain here, and the work of the abolitionists is to be accom
plished, either through the vast multiplication of the race, or by the
change of the Constitution to be effected by the early formation and
admission of free states into the Union."

184

Emancipation, according

to McDonald would turn loose poor blacks who would reduce the value of
the labor of lower class whites.

185

Furthermore, if abolition was

achieved the black man might possibly be granted rights which would
lend to race war:
Those who, acting under the control of soft consciences, had
abrogated the condition of slavery, might feel constrained,
by a powerful morality to provide by law for the support of
those who had been reduced by their humane policy to a state
threatening starvation. Again their notion of the equality of
the African might prompt them to the enactment of laws to
confer on them the rights of citizenship, the rights of suffrage,
and the power to hold office. A deadly rivalry between two
distinct races, the one claiming superiority from nature would
immediately spring up. °
Thus the Southern Rights candidate attempted to portray vividly for
the Georgia electorate the "ghastly" problems of a post-abolition
society.
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By fall the Southern Rights forces were obviously going to be
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defeated in the election.

Unionist leaders throughout the state

accurately predicted the extent of the party’s victory.

McDonald, whom

one contemporary historian has characterized as an ineffective speaker,
evidently began to debate Cobb in the late fall after numerous invitations had been issued during the campaign.

188

The Speaker was so

enthusiastic about this opportunity that he wrote his wife:

"McDonald

is again with me, and I believe that it is his intention to remain
with me during the remainder of the campaign.

At least I hope so."

189

The Unionists campaign was also aided by Stephens who defended both the
Compromise and the Georgia Convention.

His speech at Macon, for ex

ample, was highlighted with pro-Union sentiment and stressed the fact
that the Union had brought freedom and prosperity to Americans.

These

appeals to Georgia conservatism enabled the Unionists to win a decisive
17,868 vote margin for Cobb in the gubernatorial race, and to carry
most of the congressional districts in Georgia.

190

Georgia was thus

firmly entrenched in the moderate camp and unlikely to support con
tinued agitation throughout the South on the sLavery question.
After the Unionists' victory in the fall of 1851, the key
question was whether the new party structures would be maintained or
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whether there would be reunification with the national parties.

Toombs

and Stephens, who had isolated themselves from the national Whig party,
had a definite stake in the new Constitutional Union party and fought
for its survival.

Howell Cobb, in contrast, wanted to reunite with a

national Democratic party based on pro-Union principles; the Southern
Rights faction within Georgia's Democracy also began to reestablish
ties with the national party and hoped to control the state.
The decline of the Constitutional Union party in Georgia began
during the early months of 1852.

A meeting of Unionist legislators on

January 20, 1852, resulted in a declaration in favor of the Constitu
tional Union party sending representatives to the Democratic convention
at Baltimore.

Alexander Stephens, in a public letter, stated that he

could not accept the resolution which called for Democratic reunification:

191

"I am unqualifiedly opposed to i t ."

192

believed

personally that the national parties had to adopt conservative prin
ciples and that the Constitutional Union party would have a more
positive influence on them if they remained outside the national
organizations.
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"Our policy is to hold our positions.

We should

unite with no party that fails as a condition precedent to incorporate
in its creed those principles which we consider as essential to the
maintenance of our rights and the preservation of the Union."

194

191

Milledgeville Southern Recorder. January 17, February 24,

192

Ibid., February 24, 1852.

193

Ibid.

194

Ibid.

1852.
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Spokesmen for the Union in Georgia expressed their viewpoints in
Congress during March 1852.

Junius Hillyer, a Union Democrat aligned

with Cobb, stated that he favored the action of the Constitutional
Union legislators in calling for a convention in April to consider
sending delegates to the Democratic national convention.

His colleague

E. W. Chastain defended the party against charges that it had abandoned
the national Democratic party and its principles.

195

He criticized the

States Righters in Georgia and stated:
Were we, in your iudgement. deserters from the Democratic
faith in giving our support and countenance to those measures
of the compromise which have received the votes of a majority
of the party. . . .
We were deserters from the Democratic
party in refusing our assent to the doctrines of the Nashville
Convention, . . . in refusing to unite in the recommendations
of that convention not to go into any National Convention under
any party name whatever, . . . in resisting the doctrine of
peaceable secession . . .
If these acts constitute desertion
from the Democratic party, then, sir we have abandoned a party
whose principles we never held, and to whose organization we
shall never return; but with us you excommunicate every
national Democrat in the land, . . .196
These appeals by the Cobb faction of the Union Democracy were designed
to recreate national party alliances rather than maintain the existence
of the new parties formed in the winter of 1850-1851.
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During the late spring and summer the process of unification
continued in Georgia.

At the April Constitutional Union Convention,

195

Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 255-58,

196

Ibid.. 257.

197

Ibid.

319-22.

the Whigs blocked an attempt to bring the entire party into the Demo
cratic fold, and forced the Union Democrats to meet separately to
select delegates to the National Democratic convention.

Southern

Rights Democrats, who had met earlier in the month, had also nominated
representatives to the Baltimore meeting.

In June, both groups were

seated at Baltimore, but they were unable to achieve a reconciliation
of their political differences.

During July the position of the

Toombs-Stephens faction continued to be equivocal, and Union Democrats
were hopeful that Toombs would support the national Democratic ticket.
This goal proved illusory, however, and the Constitutional Union party
disbanded in mid-August with statements from Union Democrats in favor
of a Pierce-King ticket.

Herschel V. Johnson, a radical Democrat,

responded favorably to the possibility of Democratic unity by offering
to resign as an elector on the Southern Rights ticket (Pierce-King) so
that a Union Democrat could assume his position.

1QR

y

He wanted the

Southern Rights Democrats to meet with the Unionists in Atlanta so
that a compromise could be secured:

"I trust that . . . we will respond

cordially and promptly to the call for the proposed meeting and that
the result will be a total oblivion of past differences and . . . the

198 Address of a Portion of the Executive Committee to the
Union Democracy and Union Whigs, friends of Pierce and King. [August,
1852], R. P. Brooks (ed.), "Howell Cobb Papers," GHQ. V (December,
1921), 56-58; Congressional Globe. 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix.
816-20; Federal Union, April 16, 1852; Herschel V. Johnson to the
Democratic Executive Committee, August 24, 1852, Herschel V. Johnson
Papers (Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina);
Milledgeville Southern Recorder. April 16, 27, 1852; Montgomery
Cracker Parties, 70-90; Robert Toombs to Howell Cobb, June 10, 1852;
R. P. Brooks (ed.), "Howell Cobb Papers," GHQ. V (December, 1921),
53-54.
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re-establishment of that fraternal union of our party."199
Political anarchy characterized the remaining months of the
presidential campaign of 1852.

Since the Stephens-Toombs wing of

Georgia Whiggery was not able to unite with the Winfield Scott faction,
they fielded a ticket with Daniel Webster for President.

Although com

promise was expected at the meeting in Atlanta, the Southern Rights
Democrats were not willing to be conciliatory despite Herschel V.
Johnson's call for unity.

Union Democrats therefore endorsed the

Southern Rights ticket which precipitated a further secession by ultraUnion Democrats led by Hopkins Holsey.

These four political factions

competed with each other for electoral support in the election which
saw Pierce carry the state by 34,000 votes to 16,000 for Scott, 5,700
for Union Democrats, 5,200 for Webster and 1,000 for the minority
Southern Rights extremists

Georgia, which had been one of the

first states to accept the Adjustment bills, had voted for a Presiden
tial candidate in 1852 whom most Southerners recognized as proCompromise.

Thus they re-affirmed the state's basic conservatism and

hope for harmony on the question of black slavery.

199 Herschel V. Johnson to the Democratic Executive Committee,
August 24, 1852, Herschel V. Johnson Papers.
200 Milledgeville Federal Union, September 28, 1852; Montgomery,
Cracker Parties, 80-91, passim.

CHAPTER IV

ALABAMA AND FLORIDA:

SEATS OF FRUSTRATED RADICALISM

Alabama and Florida, neighbors in the Deep South, had similar
reactions to the Compromise of 1850.

In both states the Southern

Rights forces, though led by outstanding individuals were not able to
overcome the conservatism of the electorates or the relative moderation
of the governors.

Consequently each state displayed the spectacle of

radicals who could see their goals but could not achieve them and had
finally to subside in frustration.
Florida, largely a pioneer state in the nineteenth century,
was not admitted to the Union until 1845.

She was definitely under

populated in 1850 since the census recorded only 47,000 whites and
39,000 slaves living on a land mass stretching from Key West to
Jacksonville.

The largest city, Key West, had only 1,900 people, and

the state was divided into three pronounced political-economic units:
1) West Florida, consisting of the seven counties nearest the Alabama
border; 2) Middle Florida, consisting of the six counties between the
Apalachicola and Suwanee Rivers; and 3) East Florida, consisting of the
remaining underpopulated counties.

Middle Florida, the oldest and most

prosperous of the three regions was the only part of the state which
was not a frontier.

It was a rich sugar and cotton producing area,
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populated by slaves and well-established plantation owners.*
The party system in Florida was fully developed by the mid1840's.

It had emerged out of the maze of local economic issues and

personal factions which were grouped around prominent men like Richard
Keith Call and David Yulee.

The Democrats became the major party as a

result of the depression of the late 1830’s, and succeeded in electing
Yulee as a territorial delegate to Congress in 1842.

He held this

post for three years during which time Florida made applications for

2

statehood.

Parties in Florida developed along definite class and geo
graphic lines.

Whigs drew their main support from eleven counties

centered in Middle Florida which had a total property value of $4,100,000
as compared with $1,400,000 for the Democratic counties in southeast
Florida.

3

Professor Doherty has noted:

"It is also interesting that

the value of land in one Whig stronghold, Leon County, was $1,751,759,
or slightly more than one-third of the value of land in all eleven Whig
counties, and more than the value of all the ten Democratic counties

1 Herbert J. Doherty Jr., The Whigs of Florida 1845-1854
(University of Florida Monographs: Social Sciences, No. 1, Gainesville,
Florida: University of Florida Press, 1959), 63-72; The Seventh Census
of the United States 1850 (Washington, 1853) 400-401, 407. Herein
after cited as The Seventh Census.
2 Herbert Doherty, Richard Keith Call; Southern Unionist
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1961), 1-135; Arthur W.
Thompson, "David Yulee; A Study of Nineteenth Century Thought and
Enterprise," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,
1954), 11-51.
3

Doherty, The Whigs of Florida, 64.

140

reporting."4

The Whig counties were also characterized by high con

centrations of black slaves and their commerical ties with the outside
world through ports like Jacksonville and Pensacola.

The Democratic

counties, in contrast, were largely white and isolated from the type
of outside economic ties which existed in north Florida.^

Although

there were exceptions to this general pattern, Professor Doherty's
conclusion is probably correct:

-"The Whigs were primarily the party

of the rich, earlier settled, plantation areas of Middle Florida,
while the Democrats were primarily the party of the new, frontier,
small farmer regions of East and South Florida."**
The patterns of political-economic development in Alabama were
similar to those in Florida.

There were six geographic regions in

Alabama running from the Tennessee Valley in the North to the coastal
areas along the Gulf.

A Black Belt, which extended across the north

central part of the state, contained cotton plantations which were
established in the 1830's.

The plantation system was extended into

northeast Alabama's Coosa Valley during the 1840's as the production
of cotton reached a half million bales.^
The rural population of Alabama enjoyed prosperity during

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid., 65-72.

6

Ibid., 72.

7 Charles S. Davis, The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama (Montgomery:
Alabama State Department of Archives and History, 1939), 1-146, 169-91;
James Bensom Sellers, Slavery in Alabama (University: University of
Alabama Press, 1950), 1-43.
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1850-52.

Although the greatest profits in the growing of cotton were

made in the 1820's and late 1850's, planters estimated that cotton
could be profitably grown if prices averaged eight cents a pound.

This

price was exceeded by three cents in 1850, and although some planta
tion areas may have suffered economically, the agricultural popula
tion was generally affluent.®
Parties in Alabama had developed slowly and chaotically.

There

had been no really strong party organization until the election of
1840 when both parties had campaigned vigorously and had attracted
ninety percent of the voters to the polls.

Whig and Democratic

strength tended to concentrate in certain geographic areas.®

The

Democratic party had its "greatest strength in the eastern counties
of the Tennessee Valley and in the mountainous and hilly counties of
central Alabama.

The greatest strength of the Whigs was in the Black

Belt and in the western counties of the Tennessee Valley."*®

Political

contests between the two parties were fairly balanced during the 1840's
since they had equal influence in counties on the northern edge of the
Black Belt and in the eastern counties along the Gulf coast.**

8 Davis, The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama. 169-89; Sellers,
Slavery in Alabama, 1-43. Davis noted that slavery may not have been
profitable in Alabama--except during the 1820's and late 1850's.
9 Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System:
Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1966), 287-94.
10 Lewy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama from 1850 Through
1860 (Wetumpka: Wetumpka Printing Company, 1935), 13.

11

Ibid.
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When Florida applied for admission to the Union in the 1840's,
sectionalism was at a high point.

Ante-bellum politicians had tried

to maintain political equality between the sections in the United
States Senate; this goal had been achieved by balancing the admission
of a free state with a slave state so that the South would not become
a political minority.

Both Florida and Iowa applied for statehood at

the same time and were caught in the struggle for political supremacy
between the North and South.

The "Florida Compromise," unofficially

reached in 1845, provided the solution by a joint admission of the
states.

This experience familiarized Floridians with the growing

dangers of sectional politics.

12

"Mr. Polk's" War, which Floridians generally supported
caused a Congressional struggle over Southern rights in the West.
Democrats were especially angered by the attempts to exclude the South
11

from the territories,J

their most militant spokesman, David Yulee,

offered a resolution in 1848 which denied both Congress and the terri
torial legislatures the right to pass laws "by which the equal rights
of all citizens of the United States to acquire and enjoy part of the
common property may be impaired or embarrassed."^

Yulee's strong

demand was not shared by Whigs whose 1848 statement on the question of

12 Franklin A. Doty, "Florida, Iowa and the National Balance
of Power, 1845," The Florida Historical Quarterly. XXXV (July, 1956),
30-59.
13

Tallahassee Floridian and Journal 1846-48, passim.

14

Congressional Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 302.
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Southern rights in the territories was vague and ambiguous; ^

slavery

in the states and territories "was a purely local affair over which
the Constitution gave Congress no jurisdiction."1®

This statement was

never explained and was probably a political device to maintain planter
support for the Whig party.1^
During 1848 Floridians were active in presidential and state
politics.

Florida Whigs worked for their ticket headed by Zachary

Taylor for President and Thomas Brown for Governor.

Taylor's Southern

origins pleased the electorate, and the Whigs defeated a divided
Democratic party in both the presidential and gubernatorial races.
Brown became Governor and the State Assembly picked James Morton, a
States Right Whig, to replace James Westcott as United States
Senator.18
In 1849 the sectional debate was revived by politicians in
Florida.

Governor Brown warned that the Union was endangered by

fanatics in both sections.

The state legislature passed resolutions

which stated that the bonds of the Union were being weakened by Northern
attacks on slavery in the territories or in the District of Columbia;
Southerners had a right to take slaves into the Mexican cession-especially below the Missouri Compromise line.

Legislators also

15 Edwin L. Williams, "Florida in the Union," (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1951), 490-99.
16

Ibid., 492.

17

Ibid., 490-93; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, 1848, passim.

18

Doherty,

The. Whins of Florida. 25-32.
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stressed that attacks on black bondage in Washington threatened the
peculiar institution in the South
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, invol
ving, as it does, an exercise of power not granted by the
Constitution, and designed, as it is, as a means of
affecting the institution of slavery in the States, against
which it is aimed as a blow, should be resisted on the part
of the South, by whatever means are best adapted to the
protection of the Constitution, the defense of herself, and
the preservation of the Union.20
The General Assembly thus announced its support for resistance as a
means of maintaining Southern rights.

21

Controversy also erupted about Calhoun's Southern Address.
Yulee, as a radical Democrat, readily signed the document, but
Representative Edward Cabell and Senator James Westcott refused to
support it.

A meeting was held in Gadsden.County on February 17,

1849 in support of Calhoun's position.

There was praise for Yulee who

supposedly represented public opinion in Florida but criticism of
Cabell and Westcott
Resolved that we desire respectfully to inquire of the Hon.
James D. Westcott and the Hon. Edward C. Cabell, a statement of
their objections to the said address, and why (holding to this
constituency the relative positions which they do) they have
thought proper to withhold from the said address the sanction
of their names, and thereby, in our opinion, greatly weakened
and measurably destroyed the beneficial effect which united

19 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, January 16, 1849; Tallahassee
Floridian and Journal, January 20, 1849.
20

Tallahassee Floridian and Journal, January 20, 1849.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid., February 24, 1849.
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action on the part of Southern Representatives, was calculated
to produce. 3
Members also stressed their loyalty to the Union while emphasizing
that it had to be based on state equality.^
In Alabama the question of the status of slavery in the terri
tories produced a strong defense of Southern rights.

Both political

parties denounced the Wilmot Proviso in political speeches and in
their party presses.

2S

An editorial in the Mobile Advertiser expressed

a popular viewpoint;
We never did believe that the abolitionists ever would be
satisfied with anything short of total emancipation. We felt
convinced all along that the slavery agitation at the North,
once in the hands of politicians, had become a contest for
power, and like all such contests, never will cease short of
absolute submission, unless met with stern, determined resis
tance.^
Representative Edmund Dargan defended Southern rights in the terri
tories and declared that the North seemed determined to stop the expan
sion of the peculiar institution.

A just solution to the problem of

territory acquired from Mexico would be to apply the Missouri Com
promise to it in order to prevent disunion.^

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.

25 William Warren Roger, "Alabama and the Compromise of 1850,"
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1951), 1-15.
26 Carlton Jackson, "The Alabama Delegation and the Compro
mise of 1850," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Birmingham Southern College,
1959), 9-10.
27

Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 135-36.
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In 1847 the Chivalry, the militant, pro-slavery wing of the
Democratic party in Alabama, began to plan for the presidential
campaign of 1848.

Its leaders, Senator Lewis Dixon and William

Lowndes Yancey, prepared to struggle against the conservative branch
of the party which was dominated by William R. King.

Yancey and

Dixon's goals were to aid the presidential aspirations of Levi Woodbury
of New Hampshire, a "doughface," and to force the national Democracy
to endorse a position satisfactory to radical Southerners--by adop
tion of the Alabama platform.

This document, co-authored by Yancey

and John A. Campbell, included two major planks:

1) the Alabama

delegation to the Democratic national convention would not support a
presidential nominee who did not oppose both the Wilmot Proviso and
popular sovereignty, and 2) the Federal government must protect
slavery in the territories.

Yancey and Dixon had designed the plat

form so that the entire delegation from Alabama would be committed to
Woodbury who had indicated through private correspondence that he
could support the positions set forth in the platform.

It was also

an attempt to eliminate Lewis Cass' political ambitions since he was
closely associated with squatter sovereignty in the public mind.^®
During 1847 Whigs in Alabama also prepared for the presiden
tial election.

They took a stand in Congress in support of Southern

28 Levy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama. 1-42; Ralph B.
Draughon, "William Lowndes Yancey: From Unionist to Secessionist
1814-1852," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North
Carolina, 1968), 176-95.
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equality in the territories, and Henry Hilliard worked with other
Southern Whigs to further General Taylor's candidacy.

Party members

hoped that Taylor's status as a Southern military hero would enable
their party to carry the s t a t e . ^
The election of 1848 was frustrating for all political groups
in Alabama.

Yancey's Alabama platform, which conservative Democrats

opposed and which radicals like John Campbell abandoned, was rejected
by the Baltimore convention.

Yancey, angered by this defeat, walked

out of the convention and returned to face a hostile public in Alabama.
Conservative Democrats, supporting Lewis Cass incorrectly maintained
that popular sovereignty meant that slavery could be excluded only
when a territory drew up a state constitution and applied for admission
to the Union.

This interpretation tended to weaken Yancey's opposition,

and also frustrated the Whig party in Alabama which pictured Taylor as
a pro-slavery man.

Cass, because of the massive apathy of the Alabama

electorate, carried the state by less than one thousand votes.

The

margin of support for the Democratic candidate in traditional party
strongholds was reduced, and Yancey succeeded in publicizing his idea
that the Federal government had a positive duty to protect slavery in
the Mexican cession. w

29 Carlton Jackson, "A History of the Whig Party in Alabama
1828-1860," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia,
1962), 109-20; Evans C. Johnson, "A Political Life of Henry W. Hilliard,"
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1947), 40-50.
30 Draughon, "William Lowndes Yancey," 175-205; Jackson,"A
History of the Whig Party in Alabama," 109-40.
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During 1849 there was renewed debate over the slavery question
in Alabama.

Two conservative Congressmen, Whig Henry Hilliard and

George Houston of the Democracy, refused to sign Calhoun's Southern
Address.

Their actions were not popular with Alabama radicals;^1

Hilliard M. Judge, an Alabama Calhounite, wrote that Houston justi
fied his action "by stating that the slavery question is agitated
alone for party purposes and party effect."32

South Alabamians were

supporting the ideas expressed in the Address, and Judge expected
public support to grow in the northern part of the State.

A "favor

able omen" of popular sentiment in north Alabama was Houston's deci
sion not to run for another term in Congress.

Judge also stressed

that radicals had to educate the yeoman about the dangers to
OO
slavery: J

"The great difficulty is to make the Masses see beyond

their noses--they do not see and feel that the necessary consequence
of allowing the outposts of slavery to be carried, involves a certain
destruction of the Citadel itself."^

He felt that Alabama was being

rapidly prepared for disunion and that she was almost as prepared for
resistance as was South Carolina.33

31 Hilliard M. Judge to John C. Calhoun, April 29, 1849.
J. F. Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of John C. Calhoun. in Annual
Report of the Anerican Historical Association for the Year 1899
(Washington, 1900), II, 1195-97.
32

Ibid.. 1195.

33

Ibid., 1196.

34

Ibid.

35

Ib id ..

1195-97.
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Elections in mid-1849 were held for both state and national
political offices.

Democrats, after a brief

intraparty struggle

between the Yancey and conservative forces, agreed to support Henry
W. Collier of north Alabama as their gubernatorial nominee and to work
for the election of William R. King, the Union Democrat, to the
United States Senate.

Since Collier ran unopposed, the main focus of

the elections was on the Congressional and legislative r a c e s . ^
The most exciting Congressional contest took place in the
Montgomery district where Hilliard was opposed by a States Rights
Whig, James L. Pugh.

Yancey, joining an anti-Hilliard coalition,

campaigned vigorously against the Whig congressman.

Hilliard, while

posing as a defender of the rights of the South, was critical of
radicals
They (the Democrats of the Calhoun school) compass sea and
land to make proselytes to their cause which has neither
sincerity to apologize for its extravagances nor principle
to dignify its excesses. They hope to overthrow the friends of
General Taylor in this District, to carry the House of Represen
tatives against him, to rob us of the fruits of our late
glorious victory . . .3®
The Democratic state convention condemned anyone refusing to sign the

36

Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama, 32-36.

37 Austin L. Venable, "Alabamas War of the Roses," The
Alabama Review. VIII (October, 1955), 243-59. Hereinafter cited as
the A R .
38 John W. Dubose, The Life and Time of William Lowndes Yancey;
History of Political Parties in the United States, from 1834 to 1864;
Especially as to the Origins of the Confederate States (Birmingham:
Roberts & Son, 1892), 235-36. Hereinafter cited as The Life and Time
of William Lowndes Yancey.

A
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Southern Address; George Houston emphasized:
Intended to kill off Hilliard, . .

"It was first and mainly

Southern rights newspapers

also entered the partisan campaign with strong editorials condemning
Hilliard:

"Let the Southern Whigs and Southern Democrats vote for Mr.

Pugh, and the Northern abolitionists comply with the mandates given
them by the abolition organ the New York Tribune . . . and vote for
Mr. Hilliard, who will not represent the South, upon this question,
but the N o r t h . D e s p i t e these attacks, Hilliard carried the dis
trict by six hundred votes, "taking the Black Belt counties in the
upper part of the district by large majorities.

Black Belt planters

were the bone and sinew of the Whig party in Alabama and these were
the men who supported Hilliard."^l
In the remaining election contests, the Democracy was more
successful.

Henry Collier, running unopposed, was victorious in the

gubernatorial race, and the Democracy carried five of the remaining
Congressional districts.

Alabama Democrats also won a majority in

the lower house of the state legislature while the Senate came under
Whig domination.

Although several radicals were elected to the House,

39 George S. Houston to Howell Cobb, June 26, 1849, Ulrich
Bonnell Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence of Robert Toombs. Alexander
H. Stephens. and Howell Cobb in Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for the year 1911 (Washington, 1913), II, 166. Herein
after cited as Correspondence.
40

Johnson, "A Political Life of Henry W. Hilliard," 60.

41 Ibid., 61; Venable, "Alabama's War of the Roses," AR,
VIII (October, 1955), 259; "The V a r of the Roses' in Alabama is
significant because it was one of the first efforts of the southern
people to follow Calhoun's advice to unite irrespective of party,
against the advancing tide of the northern radicals."
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the legislature chose a conservative Democrat, William R. King, to
replace the militant Dixon H. L e w i s . ^
By late 1849 the men in Florida and Alabama who would provide
leadership during 1850 had emerged.

Radicals in both states usually

belonged to the Democratic party and were capable exponents of the
Southern rights.

However, the conservative forces were led by ex

perienced politicians who were ready to join together in order to
protect the Union.

The background of both types of men is important

in understanding the course of events in 1850-1851.
The key figure in the states rights movement in Florida was
David Yulee, a Fire-eater.

Yulee, a leader of the Democratic party,

had played a significant role in its growth during the 1830's.

After

his election to the United States Senate in 1845, he had gradually
moved toward an extreme Southern rights position.^

ne had originally

argued for cooperation with the North in a letter to Franklin H.
Elmore of South Carolina:

". . . b y resting our organization upon the

base of the slaveholding interests, we impress a character upon the
struggle which must drive from us all northern cooperation, . .

42 Thomas P. Abernethy, "Henry Watkins Collier" in Allen
Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (11
vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), II, Pt. 2,
302-303. Hereinafter cited as D A B ; Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama.
32-42.
43 Thompson, "David Yulee," 11-51. It should be emphasized
that Yulee had a Jewish background and was still able to achieve an
important office in the South.

44

I b id ., 275.

This statement indicated that Yulee obviously wanted political ties
with Northern Democrats based on a common state's rights philosophy—
rather than creation of a new Southern alliance.

This political

attitude had completely changed by 1849 when he allied himself with
the most militant Southern Democrats.

After signing the Southern

Address in the spring of 1849, he wrote John Calhoun about the in
creasing cooperation between Northern free-soilers and Democrats.
Slavery, endangered in the territories and District of Columbia,
needed the protection of constitutional guarantees "against the aggres
sions of the more powerful northern section of the s t a t e s . I f
necessary amendments were not adopted, the Union would have to be
dissolved
Conservatives in Florida were led by Whig Governor Thomas
Brown and Congressman Edward Cabell.

Brown, elected in 1849, had been

a sugar planter, hotel proprietor and "in territorial Florida politics
he had been associated with the pro-bank conservative

p a r t y . "49

Cabell, a popular young Congressman, was often criticized for his
moderation.

After his election in 1846, the St. Augustine News was

45

Ibid., 275-79.

46

Ibid.. 46-47, 289-93.

47

Ibid.. 292.

48 Ibid.. 289-92. The latter part of Thompson's dissertation
is primary sources taken from the David Yulee papers at the University
of Florida.
49 Herbert J. Doherty Jr., "Florida and the Crisis of 1850,"
The Journal of Southern History. XIX (February, 1953), 32-33.
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critical of his ties with the Northern wing of the Whig p a r t y " T h e
abolition Whigs now claim him as their own, and struggle as he will,
he is bound to them head and foot by the ties of

p a r t y . "51

Cabell, for

his part, emphasized the broad umbrella of his party which "embraced in
its comprehensive view the whole country.

It is not influenced by a

narrow contracted sectional p o l i c y . A l t h o u g h he was more militant
than Brown, Cabell refused to adopt Calhoun's philosophy as expressed
in the Southern Address.
11
'
111 '-■ 1
Alabama's most prominent radical was W. L. Yancey of Montgomery.
Yancey, a South Carolinian by birth, had been "reared in Troy, New
York, and educated in New England . . ."54

jje returned to South

Carolina as a Unionist in the 1830's but turned increasingly toward a
pro-slavery position.^5

one writer has contended that he shifted in

order to meet his psychological needs;-***

"His need to reject an

anti-slavery stepfather he had come to hate was paralleled by a deeper
commitment to slave society."57

He moved to Alabama in the 1840's where

50 Doherty, The Whigs of Florida. 23-35. The entire state of
Florida was considered as one Congressional district; candidates ranat-large.
51

Ibid., 23.

52

Ibid.

53

Ibid., 35.
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he had a brief career as a state legislator and Congressman.

Essen

tially a non-officeholder, he enjoyed the role of agitator and orator
as he tried to move his "white" South toward secession.-*®
Union forces, in contrast, were led by outstanding, practical
politicians in Alabama.

Their most important leaders were Henry W.

Hilliard in the House of Representatives and Senators Jeremiah Clemens
and William R. King.

Each of these men became identified with

moderate politics and were important in the Union victory in Alabama.
Hilliard, a moderate Whig, had a background as a Methodist
preacher before being elected to the House of Representatives in the
1840's.

He combined strong denunciations of "Mr. Polk's War" with an

ardent desire for American expansion.

All new territory acquired by

the United States had to be open to people of both s e c t i o n s . H e
favored the idea of extending the Missouri Compromise line, and had
opposed the Clayton Compromise in 1848 because he believed that
"slavery was . . .

a political rather than a judicial question . . ."60

But he had refused to sign the Southern Address, and instead was one of
few Southerners who openly endorsed Berrien's alternate proposals.®^
Alabama's two United States Senators although coming from

58

Eaton, The Mind of the Old South. 267-87.

59

Johnson, "A Political Biography of Henry W. Hilliard,"

43-49.
60 Ibid.. 49. The clayton Bill would have allowed the question
of slavery in the territories to be settled by the Supreme Court.
61

Ibid., 52-53.

155

different backgrounds, were powerful forces for moderation in 1850.
Clemens had been an attorney and a soldier in the Mexican War.

Al

though lacking political experience, he had been elevated to the Senate
in 1848 over popular ex-Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick.
1786, had a long political and diplomatic career.

King, born in

He was first

elected to Congress in 1810 and later to the United States Senate where
he served several terms.

In 1844 King left the Senate to become envoy

to France but was reelected to the Senate in 1849.

Although he was a

nationally oriented Democrat, he wanted to protect the South and feared
for her future in 1849-1850.^
The most cautious leader in Alabama was Henry W. Collier from
north Alabama.

He was a Virginian who moved to Alabama in 1818 and

entered a law practice in Huntsville.

By the 1830's he was a well

known Democrat and served as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court
until 1849 when he was elected governor by a large majority .^

Collier

held the office of governor with "the placid dignity which had charac
terized him as a judge," and would not adopt an extreme position in
1850.64
Discussion of the sectional crisis began in earnest during the
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winter of 1849-1850.

After the Alabama legislature convened on November

12, 1849, retiring Governor Reuben Chapman delivered a lengthy presenta
tion about the rights of the South in the territories.

Alabama had

entered the Union as an equal, and her citizens had an equal right to
take slave property into the Southwest.

Although the Wilmot Proviso

was unconstitutional, it was not the real source of danger to the
South.

Southerners were being excluded from California by the "miser

able chicanery" of the Federal government which kept Mexican anti
slavery law in force in California and directed the Bear Flag republic
to form a state constitution without Congressional approval; therefore,
California should not be admitted to the U n i o n . I n concluding
Chapman stated:
I recommend that provision be made by the Legislature at once
for the calling of a convention of the people of the State
immediately upon the passage of the Wilmot Proviso in Congress,
or any similar measure having a tendency to exclude slavery
from the territories, or abolish it in the District of Columbia,
or interfere with the removal of slaves from one state to
another
He also wanted Alabama to consult with other Southern states in case
Congress enacted additional dangerous legislation.^^
Coincidentally with Collier taking office in December 1849, the
legislature received a communication from six members of the House of
Representatives and Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick about the
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difficulties involved in choosing a Speaker.**®

They blamed the obstruc

tion tactics on a minority of Free-Soilers who wanted to obtain pledges
from a new Speaker
to appoint committees to aid them in the purpose of directing
the legislation of Congress against the interest and honor of
the slaveholding states in such manner as to abolish slavery
in the District of Columbia and to deprive the slaveholding
states of the cononon enjoyment of the territory acquired in the
recent war with Mexico.
A resolution was passed by the Alabama Senate which called for her
Congressman not to allow Congress to organize if such pledges were
obtained from a specific Speaker.^

The senators outlined the

action it should take if Congress excluded slavery from the terri
tories:

"we call upon the people of the slaveholding states to meet

in convention for the purpose of taking such action as our rights may
d e m a n d . A l t h o u g h other resolutions were considered in the House,
no joint resolutions were passed because the House wanted a state
rather than Southern Convention.^
The suggestion that Alabama be represented at the Nashville Con
vention caused controversy within the state.

Whigs generally opposed

the idea of the Convention, their views being voiced forcefully by
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Henry Hilliard in the spring of 1850:

"As to the Nashville Con

vention, my opinion, as things now stand, is against it.

I adhere to

the position taken by me last summer— that no convention ought to be
held in advance of some act of aggression on the part of the government."

73

Hilliard's idea was not acceptable to the majority of the

Alabama Assemble which met in early February for the purpose of ap
pointing delegates to the Southern Convention.

Eight men were to be

appointed from the state at large and four convention members were to
be selected from each Congressional district.

The delegates from the

Congressional districts were to be balanced equally between the two
major political parties.

Men who were selected included such out

standing leaders as former Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick and radical
John A. Campbell of M o b i l e . ^
Debate continued throughout the spring on the merits of the
Southern meeting.

Colonel T. B. Bethea, a Nashville delegate, did not

feel that he could participate in the gathering if it was going to be
more than an advisory body.

It if became necessary for the South to

act seriously, her delegates should have been appointed by a state con
vention.

Bethea's concern was not shared by radicals in north Alabama

who declared that the Federal government had no power under the Consti
tution to abolish slavery; these men wanted the delegates at Nashville

73 Dallas T. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention of 1850,"
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to embody Southern sentiment, draw up a protest, create a Southern
party, and present a solution to the sectional crisis.

They declared

their devotion to the Union was second only to the reason for calling
the Convention— to protect Southern

" r i g h t s . "75

On May

13

a public

gathering was held in Montgomery to discuss the Nashville Convention.
Judge Williams and John A. Elmore were appointed co-chairman of the
meeting which appointed Yancey as head of a committee to draw up reso
lutions embodying the feelings of the gathering.

Yancey's committee

favored the Nashville Convention because of the anti-slavery feeling
which had the effect "of keeping slaveholders from emigrating to the
territory of California, and has thus enabled the non-slaveholding
interest exclusively to predominate in the set[t]lenient of that
territory,

. .. ."76

All men who were agitating for the end of slavery

in the District of Columbia or for passage of the Wilmot Proviso were
declared enemies of the United States.

However, the statement con

tained no reference to secession, an indication that radicals realized
they would have difficulty in moving to an extreme position.77
A definite division of opinion on the Nashville Convention had
also occurred in Florida during early 1850.

The Congressional delega

tion believed that an aggressive North would use the powers of the
Constitution to harm the South.

75
13, 1850.

Since there was no way to stop this
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movement on the national level, the South had to oppose Federal aggres
sion by meeting in Nashville.

Representative Cabell also wrote the

Governor that he was no longer opposed to Florida's participation in
the Southern meeting:

78

"It is to be an advisory body . . . not to

threaten but to warn the people of the North of the consequences of the
measures by many and most of their Representatives."^

Governor Brown

was not persuaded by these arguments, and refused to name delegates to
the Convention.

He feared that it might emerge as a revolutionary body

or be an ineffective means of presenting the Southern viewpoint.®®
Senator Jackson Morton sent the Governor a caustic letter which
expressed the opinion of Florida radicals.

The North would continue to

use the power of the Federal government for its own purposes until it
was positive that the South would use any means to resist further
81
aggressions.0i

The Southern Congress must meet to provide ways "to

preserve the Union if it can be preserved, and to preserve the South--if
82
it cannot b e ."

Morton savagely criticized Brown for not acting to

stop the dangers to the South and for declaring that the Nashville Con
vention might become a revolutionary body which would promote agitation
on the sectional question.®®

In a devasting passage the Senator asked:
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Can you tell me what manner of oppression would make you an
’’agitator?" Would the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, in the forts,
dockyards, and arsenals, and the prohibition of the transporta
tion of slaves from one slave state to another? Would either
of them or all, make you an "agitator?" If not would the
abolition of slavery in the States by Congress make you an
"agitator?" Would any or all of these wicked measures make
you, as a Southern man, calculate the value of the U n i o n ? 8 4
The people of Florida wanted to be represented at Nashville, and Morton
declared that he would fight for Southern "rights" in the halls of
Congress.®^
Unofficial meetings were held throughout the state to select
delegates to the Nashville Convention.

One of these gatherings in

Gadsden County gave an elaborate justification for the necessity of
finding a remedy to the forces which were gradually destroying the
bonds of Union.
tution.

Southern rights had to be protected under the Consti

They could only be secured by united public opinion which

would be fostered at the Nashville Convention.

District meetings

should be organized in the major sections of Florida to choose dele
gates to the Southern Convention in order to protect the South against
emancipation:®®
That in the openly avowed purposes of a large majority of the
Representatives of the non-slaveholding States, to pass
through Congress bills containing the principle of the
"Wilmot Proviso," we recognize an increasing spirit of
fanaticism, which in total disregard of our Constitutional
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rights, aims at the abolition of slavery in the States.
ultimately; as it now avowedly does in the Territories.®^
Similar meetings were held in other parts of Florida which resulted in
larger sectional meetings which appointed delegates to go to Nashville.®®
The apparent militance of the Florida electorate was reflected
in David Yulee's rejection of Clay's proposal to admit California as a
state.

Yulee countered with a bill which would have established the

southern boundary of California at the 36° 30' line.®^

Inhabitants

north of the old Missouri Compromise line could apply for statehood
while the area south of the line would be organized as a territory "with
a provision for the equal protection of all property recognized by the
Constitution of the United States."^®

The bill was designed to rectify

the injustice to Southerners who had not settled in California because
of lack of time and the debate over the Wilmot Proviso.

Yulee also

hoped that passage of his bill would prevent recognition of "illegal"
action by the Executive branch which had given impetus to California's
Q1
application for statehood. i
Yulee was also worried about the maintenance of political
equality between the North and South.

87

There had always been a balance

Ibid.

88 Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, March 5,19,26,April 2, 1850;
Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. March 23, 1850, April 6, 1850.
89

Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 1158.

90

Ibid., 1159.

91

I b id .,

1158-59.

163

of power between the sections in the Senate but this would be destroyed
if California was admitted to the Union as a free state.

Yulee proposed

that sectional equality be maintained by allowing the South to dominate
one of the House of Congress— preferably the S e n a t e . C o n t r o l of the
Senate would protect the South against the " . . .

unchecked power of

the Government" which was dominated by a hostile Northern majority.^3
The maintenance of a sectional balance of power was also neces
sary to protect the South's dominance over the black man.

She

had a growing slave population which made expansion into the West
mandatory:

94

Their South population is composed of two races of utterly
opposite and irreconcilable aptitudes and nature-’-races
incapable of fusion in social mass, or partners in social or
civil community. . . . If, then, they are confined to fixed
limits, and without vacant territory to colonize, whenever
the population of the slaveholding section becomes too great
for subsistence or comfort, one of the two results must
follow; either the black race must be sent out free as emi
grants, at the cost of their value and an entire subversion
of the structure or habits of our society, or the whites must,
by an equally sure and progressive process, emigrate, leaving
in the end the graves of their sires to be trodden under the
heal of the African.95
The latter result could be avoided only by freeing the blacks and
colonizing them, a process which Yulee considered financially ruinous
and impractical, or by allowing the South to expand so that the
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future growth of population would be manageable.^
Yulee's apprehension about the North was apparently shared by
moderate Edward Cabell during the spring of 1850.

He expressed his

concern about thw growth of abolitionism in the North:

"I believe that

the sentiment or hostility to slavery, is common to all parties, and
that there is a determination to invoke all the powers of the Federal
Government to break down that institution, and thus to destroy more
than fifteen hundred millions of the property of the South.

The

South demanded an equal right to take slaves into the territory, and
Cabell noted that, although Northerners demanded freedom for the black
man they were determined that he remain south of the Mason-Dixon
line.

98

Abolition would require expensive compensation of slaveowners,

and if blacks were confined to the South "we should have no alternative
but to abandon our homes or exterminate the s l a v e s . C a b e l l warned
that disunion might be the inevitable result of the sectional conflict
and that the South could maintain herself in a conflict with the
North.

But he wanted a just compromise worked out and declared emo

tionally:100

"May THIS UNION be perpetual." 101
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displayed the tension which existed in the conservative Southern mind
between love for the Union and concern about the economic and racial
future of white society.
Several members of the Alabama delegation agreed with the Con
gressmen from Florida that the North was hostile and aggressive.

David

Hubbard, a Democratic representative from the Florence district, wrote
his constituents that the North was determined to abolish slavery.
The peculiar institution could not stand if exposed to anti-slavery
attacks for a prolonged period of time:

102

"I give it to you my firm

conviction, that the institutions of the South cannot long stand under
this state of things; and that the Southern people ought not to let
them continue exposed to this constant and dangerous agitation.
Samuel Inge stated in the House of Representatives that the "California
Proviso" had replaced Hilmot's method of excluding the South from the
West:

104

"No argument is necessary to show the identity of these two

measures.

The Wilmot Proviso excludes the citizens of the South, with

their property, from emigrating to the Territories of the Union . . .
The California proviso is the same thing,

. . ."105

slavery was pro

tected by the Constitution and it had helped made the United States a
wealthy nation.

The "California Proviso" would be resisted by the
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South, and Inge warned that, despite the South's love for the Union,
sectionalism might destroy it.

The South would stand firm against

statehood for California which would destroy the balance of power be
tween the North and South:
Will the representatives of the North attempt, by the power of
numbers, to outrage the Constitution and degrade the South by
the admission of this Territory as a state, without the offer
of some equivalent? . . .
The attempted consummation of such
an act would be the overthrow of the Constitution which the
people we represent would resist to the last e x t r e m i t y . 107
In the Senate a formidable critic of the Compromise proposals
was Jeremiah Clemens.

He attacked the continual agitation on the slave

question which had discouraged Southerners from migrating to California
with their black

p r o p e r t y .

*08

jn May he announced his intention to

oppose the Report of the Committee of Thirteen, and was especially
critical of the proposal to grant statehood to California.

She had no

more right to be admitted to the Union than did the territories of
Utah and New Mexico.
Two Alabama Congressmen, one moderate and one a radical, offered
detailed defenses of the institution of slavery.

Representative

William J. Alston delivered a lengthy justification of slavery based
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on Biblical grounds.

He also argued that slaves were treated well and

that slavery was not an evil:**-®
You tell us that slavery is a great evil. Why so, Sir? Was
it an evil to the slave to be brought from the barbarous
cruelty of infantacide and cannibalism in his native wilds,
to the mild treatment and personal security of a Christian
land?— from heathern worship to Christianity? Is he injured
by being better feed, better clothed, and less worked than
the labor classes of other l a n d s ? m
Alston also emphasized that the peculiar institution benefitted the
North by providing it with inexpensive agricultural products and a
market for many of its goods.
David Hubbard, a radical Southerner, joined Alston in uphold
ing. chattel slavery.

While admitting that African slavery had been

considered an evil by prominent Southerners when it was first estab
lished, Hubbard maintained that it had proven itself beneficial to the
nation:
The negro has improved tenfold since then. He is now a kind,
useful domestic servant, and is the only labor that can bear
the southern climate, and be employed to advantage in the
cultivation of those valuable products of the South which have
enriched the whole Union, built up your manufactures, extended
your commerce, and given the country an amount of prosperity
and power unequalled in the growth of nations.*^
While slavery had improved the African, it had also protected the white

110

Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 464-67.

HI

Ibid.. 466.

112

Ibid., 467.

113

Ibid.. 947.

114

Ibid.

i6 a

man o£ the South who would never be degraded to the level of the Negro.
All Southerners would defend this institution if it was attacked by the
»
115
North:
All enjoy political equality who are white and upright citizens
and no act that you could pass would be permitted to change
these relations, by putting black and white upon an equal
footing. The very threat and attempt to do so have nearly torn
asunder every ligament which binds us together . . .
These bold manifestos in defense of slavery indicate the con
sensus which existed in Alabama on slavery.

Both Alston and Hubbard,

who would adopt opposite positions on the Compromise, defended the
peculiar institution as beneficial to the South, the Negro and the
nation.

But Alston's speech was the most detailed defense of slavery

by a Unionist recorded in the Congressional Globe.

It indicates that

both Unionists and fire-eaters like Hubbard were concerned about a
post-emancipation society and the need to maintain chattel slavery in
the South.

The key difference in their thinking would be the degree

of danger they saw to white supremacy by the end of 1850, and the depth
of their love for the Union.
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Although the two delegations had expressed hostility to the
Omnibus bill, expressions of moderation were voiced by the summer of
1850.

Representative Edward Cabell of Florida wrote his constituents:

"I can only say here that I want a SETTLEMENT.
repose for my country.

I want peace, quiet and

I want to get rid of the agitation on the

slavery question, which too many are fomenting for selfish purposes.
To effect this object, I am willing to sacrifice every thing [sic] but
the honor of the S o u t h . ^

similar sentiment was expressed by

Alabama's W. R. W. Cobb before the House of Representatives on June 3,
1850:
One word as to the bills reported by the Senate committee of
thirteen. There are several features in those bills to which,
apart from a compromise and a desire to get rid of the slavery
question . . . .
I never, no, never would agree: But as it
holds out a light of hope . . . I for one will not stand in the
way of its passage.
Whig Henry Hilliard, while speaking strongly for Southern rights,
stated:
Mr. Speaker, I have never permitted myself to look to a
destruction of the Government, as a remedy for existing evils.

Indies, which, if they can find entrance into Northern minds, will
cause reaction in our favor," Montgomery Alabama Journal. May 17,
1850, quoting Huntsville Southern Advocate. The paper believed that
Whigs like Alston were truly defending the South while Democrats like
Inge were using the agitation over the slavery question for party
purposes. Abolition was a danger which all white Southerners feared,
but it was the degree which they perceived it as present in the spring
of 1850 which may help explain Alston's speech which broke a pattern
for Unionists in the entire Deep South.
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I have not sought to explore the dark and perilous future
which lies beyond the hour of separation between these States,
bound together by so many ties. I have a sincere desire to
preserve the UNION. Its disruption would involve the North
and South in common r u i n . 1 2 0
Although these statements were hardly commitments to nationalism they
did show a desire to work out a Compromise and preserve the Union.
In the Senate, William R. King spoke in favor of Compromise
during late July 1850.

He could support the idea of ending the slave

depots in Washington and Clay's proposals for a more stringent Fugitive
Slave Law.

The Texas boundary proposal was more complicated, but King

believed that Congress could equitably solve that problem.

Territorial

governments for the Utah and New Mexico territories were based on the
"principle of non-intervention" supported by the South.

He believed

that slave property was protected in the southwest under the proposed
laws:

121

there?

"Are we not protected in our property if we choose to go
I hold that we are, and that the Territorial Legislature had

no power whatever to pass any law which destroys that description of
property in the Territory."122

However, King was opposed to California's

admission to the Union because her boundaries were too large.

He pro

posed an amendment to reduce her boundaries and thus eliminate one
major objection to her admission.12*1
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Voting on the Omnibus bill reflected only partially divisions
which had appeared in speeches by the end of August 1850.

No member

from Alabama or Florida favored statehood for California or the aboli
tion of the slave trade in the District of Columbia;
passage of the Fugitive Slave bill.

all favored

Senators King and Clemens and

Representatives Cobb, Hilliard, Alston, and Cabell supported the Texasdebt boundary settlement which both Florida Senators and the rest of
the House delegation from Alabama opposed.

Three Alabama Representa

tives opposed territorial government for Utah which had secured even
David Yulee's support.

King voted in favor of territorial government

in New Mexico, which the four moderates in the House had approved with
their votes on the Texas boundary bill.

Neither delegation was in

favor of the Compromise en toto, but they accepted the Fugitive Slave
bill, and a majority supported territorial governments from the south
west.

Conservatives were also willing to accept the Texas boundary

settlement which radicals rejected.
During the summer and fall of 1850 the radicals in Florida ex
pressed their desire for resistance to the Compromise.

John Beard was

nominated as the Democratic candidate for Congress on June 17 at
1 <yc

Suwannee Springs in Columbia c o u n t y . H e

opposed the Compromise

proposals unless they "shall be so amended as to recognize the right
of Southern people to occupy, with their property, any portion of the

124 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Com
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territory acquired from Mexico lying South of the Missouri line. . ."126
These sentiments were similar to those expressed at a meeting
in Gadsden County which approved the proceedings of the Nashville Con
vention.

Men attending the meeting stated that acquiescence to

Northern attacks by the South was impossible:127
Resolved, that in times like the present, when our rights,
lives, and property have become the sport of insatiable, un
scrupulous, and reckless party, who scorn to regard the obli
gations of a written Constitution, which they have sworn to
support, and boldly announced that we are forever excluded
from our rightful possessions, and that our utter and final
ruin is only a question of -time, it becomes us solemnly to
speak out and avow our deliberate purpose no longer to submit
to such aggression.128
At a public meeting in Madison County which also endorsed the
Nashville resolutions, it was resolved that any Congressional compro
mise not based on the Missouri Compromise line "is oppressive and
degrading to the slaveholding states as equals with the North in the
Confederacy, and as binding one portion of the Confederacy to a date
[state] of abject dependence upon the other."129
A detailed account of Beard's ideas was presented in his
address "To the Freemen of Florida."

The concepts expressed in the

preamble to the United States Constitution were not being met by the
exclusion of the South for the territories or by helping escaped slaves,
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the document began.

The Southern states themselves would never have

entered the Union If they had been able to forecast passage of the
various compromises and provisos.

Even though Southerners were willing

to settle for an extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the
Pacific, the free-soil men were not willing to accept it even though
the South would only be able to take slaves into twenty-five percent
of the Mexican cession;

i in

But 'no' say the free-soilers, 'we can never consent to give you
another chance to have a slave state.1 We don't care about the
"Wilmot Proviso" any longer, because the laws of Mexico are a
sufficient proviso against slavery; these laws are still in
force in California, and New Mexico and we will not repeal them;
but if we choose to enter into such an arrangement we will do
this; we will take California and New Mexico; we will buy
enough of Texas to make two more free-soil states, (if you, of
the South will help us to pay for it,) and we will pass a law
requiring runaway negroes into the free states to be given up,
if their masters will convince a jury of abolitionists that
slavery is consistent with the laws of God, and that negroes
are slaves, and that the claimants are the real owners.131
This was a "compromise" which Beard could not accept, and he stressed
that it was a common problem for the entire South.

He loved the Union

for the benefits it gave to the county, but the attacks against the
South had to be stopped or the Union would be destroyed.
The Whig party nominated Edward Cabell, a safe Union-loving
I OO

man, to oppose the radical Beard.

Although Cabell had opposed parts
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of the Compromise, he emphasized that he was not "going to war because
of their passage."

134

In contrast, this conservative Whig depicted

Beard as a secessionist who favored disunion because of passage of the
Compromise.

Although the Democrats denied the charges, Cabell won by

over four hundred votes out of eight thousand which were cast. *-35
In November 1850 there was

a call for the formation of a

statewide Southern Rights Association in Florida.
Southern Rights Association of Jefferson issued

A meeting of the
an

"Address to the

People" of Florida which reminded the states' white citizens that the
North had been trying to abolish slavery for thirty years.

Thousands

of fugitive slaves had been "inveigled or stolen" from the South, and
the hostile Northern public encouraged slaves to revolt or even murder
to escape bondage.

It was useless to protest against the North's goal

of emancipation:336
In vain do we remonstrate that these institutions are a part
of our social organization— that we have the moral and
political right to choose between slave labor and free labor,
to prefer the one or the other— that the emancipation of the
African race in our midst, would be attended with such an
increase of pauperism and crime as to doom that people, now
amply provided for, to inevitable extirpation . . .*-’7

134 Letter to Doctor G. P. Fisher by E. C. Cabell. (1850)
(Xerox copy of pamphlet in Library of Congress in author's possession),
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135 Ibid.; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. November 19, 1850;
Tallahassee Floridian and Journal. Sept. 21, Oct. 5, 1850.
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The South, moreover, was endangered by men who had long tried to foment
slave rebellions and who believed that the South would accept any
oppressive Federal law.

Therefore the Jefferson Association called for

the creation of a state Southern Rights Association.
The state legislature was also involved in sectional politics
in late November.

Governor Brown tried to justify his action in regard

to the Nashville Convention, and stated that the Compromise of 1850 was
already threatened by Northern hostility.

Repeal of the Fugitive Slave

Law would be positive evidence that the North no longer intended to be
bound by the Constitution.

Therefore Brown stated:

I invite you, if you think proper, to authorize the Executive,
by law or resolution in the event of the repeal of the
Fugitive Slave Bill, or the consummation of any other aggres
sive measure, at his discretion to proclaim and convoke a
convention of the People of this State, at such time as may
comport with harmonious action with our sister states of the
South, for the purpose of devising a remedy.140
The call for a Southern Congress, issued by the Nashville Convention,
was also presented to the legislature.

Although a number of proposi

tions on the question of slavery were introduced in the lower chamber,
there apparently was little interest in the topic in the Senate despite
a narrow Democratic control of each house of the legislature.
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The most important question was the selection of a United
States Senator.

Most observers had believed that David Yulee would

easily regain his seat, but he was opposed by a number of important
factions.

The moderate forces in Florida were alienated by his radi

calism, and the important railroad interests were repeled by his plan
to control a cross-Florida railroad.

These forces combined with

shippers and citizens of south Florida to defeat Yulee's bid for reelection.

Ironically, this coalition of commercial interests and con

servative politicians elected Stephen R. Mallory of Key West, an opponent
I/O
of the Compromise of 1850, to replace Florida’s leading "Fire-eater."
Radicals in Alabama began to organize in the summer of 1850 to
gain approval of the Nashville convention and to express their desire
to protect slavery.

A large meeting was organized by the Fire-eaters

in Montgomery during early July to approve the proceedings of the
Southern convention.

George Goldwhaite, a delegate to the Nashville

Convention, gave a report on its activities and declared that the
offer to extend the Missouri Compromise line was a great concession by
the South which had been rejected by the United States Congress.

A

Governor Brown. They did have so narrow a margin of support that they
may not have wanted to risk a vote. But, there is no available evidence
on why the Governor's request was not acted upon by either legislative
house. Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. January 28, February 4, 1851.
142 Doherty, The Whigs of Florida. 47-49; Thompson, "David
Yulee," 5. See Stephen Mallory's letter reprinted in the Tallahassee
Floridian and Journal. Feb. 8, 1851 in which he recognized Northern
hostility to the South's rights and the need for Southern unity.
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majority report was offered which praised the Nashville Convention,
but did not discuss the Clay proposals— except for Texas.

Judge Mays

presented a "minority" report which denied Congress the power to exclude
slavery from the territories and condemned the Omnibus bill. Extension
of the Missouri Compromise was "a last concession" by the South which
wanted guarantees that territorial legislatures would not be permitted
to pass laws abridging property (slaves) rights until they were ready
to enter the Union.

Economic connections with the North should be

severed, a state convention should be called, and Alabama's congressmen
should withdraw from Washington if California entered as a free state
or if a satisfactory compromise was not achieved.

Yancey offered amend

ments to the minority report which called for defense of Texas' rights
to the disputed land with New Mexico.

143

The refusal of the Senate to

accept the 36° 30' line also led inevitably "to the conclusion that the
North will not do justice to the South, and that the time has now come
in which all must admit it to be her duty to look to herself alone for
safety and protection, to set her house in order--not to die but to
live."144
Debate on the various proposals finally resulted in a compro
mise.

R. P. Ware was opposed to calling of a state convention, economic

retaliation, and withdrawal from Congress "because he thought them pro
ductive of no practical benefit at the present time."14^
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resolutions on the Texas boundary dispute were accepted in the final
draft passed by the meeting which approved the Nashville resolutions
while declaring ’’that justice to the South is a necessary preliminary
to the perpetuating of the Union, and that we do not hesitate between
them to choose justice to the South."
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Other meetings throughout the state expressed the radical senti
ment of many Alabamians.

A meeting in Eufaula on July 4 received the

Nashville resolutions favorably while declaring that the Omnibus bill
was unacceptable unless it was amended to conform to the proposals
passed by the Southern C o n v e n t i o n . j n Talladega "ultras" resolved
that their political equality, autonomy and freedom were so valuable
that they would
not sacrifice them for the sake of continuing any Union which
is controlled by and [sic] abolition majority (reckless alike
of the constitution which favored that Union and our feelings,
rights peace and honor), and wielded by such majority for the
destruction of sixteen hundred millions of slave property,
and the degradation of the white people of the South to a level
with the negro race.*^®
At Wetumpka, ex-Governor Benjamin Fitzpatrick and Arthur Bagby spoke
about the slavery crisis.

Fitzpatrick emphasized that the dispute

over slavery had a long history.

The North was responsible for the

aggressions against the peculiar institution and Northern economic
groups must be made to see that attacks upon slavery hurt their own
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affluence.

Bagby was opposed to California's exclusion of slavery from

her boundaries.

Debate over whether Mexican anti-slavery laws were still

valid in Utah— New Mexico had discouraged Southerners from settling in
the territories.
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The Clay and Taylor plans of adjustment were synony

mous because "both virtually exclude the Southern people from all the
territory acquired from Mexico."150

^ »C0mpr0mise" solution was a

division of the Mexican lands along the 36° 30' line, but it was the
last such settlement that the South should agree to accept.I-’*
A measure of the degree of nervousness about "abolition" came
from a report in the Wetumpka Guard.

A meeting had been held in

Wetumpka about the dissemination of abolitionist propaganda among black
slaves by three white men.

The "accused" abolitionists were forced to

leave the area and a vigilance committee was founded.
the Advertiser was

The editor

of

critical of this action:^ 2

We think we have a right to complain of our Wetumpka friends in
not making a more [illegible] mark of their displeasure upon
these abolitionists. The ring leader should have been hung as
high as haman and the others treated to a genteel coat of tar
and feathers— first having received the "cats" well laid on.
We have great veneration for the laws of the land as a general
thing, but when we see a man putting a torch to our dwelling, and
enacting means for the butchery of our wives
and children, it is
criminal to wait for the slow, uncertain process of the law.^3
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Dissatisfaction with the radical Nashville Address was evident
in the private correspondence of Thaddeus Sanford.

Sanford, a leading

newspaper editor in Alabama, stated that he did not personally accept
the idea that the entrance of a free-soil state in the Union was equiva
lent to Congressional passage of the Wilmot Proviso;
X disapproved privately, and would not say it in the paper, of
that part of the Nashville address that assumed the ground that
for Congress to admit a state into this Union whose constitu
tion prohibited slavery, was the establishment of the Wilmot
Proviso by the direct legislation of that body. It is not a
true fact. If there is any political proposition to which the
Southern Democracy is committed, it is to the doctrine that
slavery is exclusively a State Institution, and that the people
of a State have a right to establish or abolish it, at their
discretion. ^ 5
Objections to California's admission should have been based on stronger
grounds which "could not have been cavilled at."^^Union sentiment was expressed by William R. King in a letter
during August;

"I will not say that madness rules the hour, but this

I will say that as it seems to me passion has seized the nation and
for the time being the sound sense and patriotic devotion to country
which has heretofore characterized people is permitted to slumber.
King's private concern about the "madness" of sectionalism was shared
by other conservatives in Alabama.

154 Thaddeus Sanford to W. P. Browne, July 10, 1850, W. P.
Browne Papers (Alabama State Department of Archives and History,
Montgomery, Alabama).
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Beginning in September 1850, meetings were held throughout the
state to encourage moderation and devotion to the Union.

One held in

early September at Gadsden, warmly endorsed the idea of loyalty to the
Union.

158

A resolution was passed which declared:

", . . w e have no

sympathy with those who would overturn the constitution and destroy the
Union, and we regard attempts at either wild, chimerical and destructive
to our best interest .'*159

These Unionists were also willing to support

the Texas boundary settlement if it was acceptable to the Lone Star
State.

They protested against irregularities in the formation of

California's constitution, but did not regard her admission as a state
as "sufficient cause for dissolving the Union."160
The issues were clearly presented at a debate in Patton's
Springs in Lauderdale county.

There three hundred people heard a sharp

debate on the Nashville proceedings and the Omnibus b i l l . ^ *

A local

radical, General Walker, attacked the Compromise of 1850 and asserted
"that the Union was not worth the sacrifices which the friends of the
Compromise required of the southern people."

162

His arguments were

countered by Richard W. Walker who defended the Omnibus bill; this
conservative tried to prove that "the Compromise had been grossly

158 Huntsville Southern Advocate, September 25, 1850.
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misrepresented by its enemies and by designing men who were striving
to force the South into a false position for the purpose of bringing
about a dissolution of the Union.u1^

^his appeal was apparently so

convincing that the Southern Rights men did not attempt to gain approval
for the Nashville resolutions at the meeting.
During October Senator King, who did not participate actively in
the Unionist campaign, expressed his hopes for moderation in Alabama.
The Senator was worried about the efforts being made in Alabama to
equate the Democratic Party with s e c e s s i o n : " j n the present state
of things it is calculated to destroy us and if persevered in will
inevitably place our State in the hands of the Whigs.

The majority of

the Democracy of Alabama is not prepared from what has already taken
place much as they feel its injustice to resort to such an extreme
measure."

166

His main goals were to insure the success of the Democracy

while also preserving the Union.

King stressed, however, that the

South must not tolerate any future aggressions by the North which had
to "understand that we will bear no more--that another step taken by
her to endanger our safety must and will snap the cord which binds us
together."167
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moderate Democrat believed that the awareness by

165 William R. King to Bolling Hall, November 19, 1850, Bolling
Hall Papers (Alabama State Department of Archives and History,
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the North of the future probability of disunion would cause her to end
attacks on the South.
Senator Jeremiah Clemens began an extensive canvass in support
of the Compromise.

He had been converted to a moderate position by

September 1850 and wanted Alabama to acquiese to the passage of the
Adjustment bills.

On November 4, 1850, Clemens delivered an important

speech on the Compromise of 1850 in Huntsville.

He believed that

California's admission to the Union was unjust, and yet he emphasized
that she had been granted statehood only by the support of Southern
Congressmen.

The Slave Trade Law was also dangerous since it estab

lished a precedent for future abolition of slavery in the District of
Columbia. ^ 9

was a »serious aggression," but did not "justify

resistance by secession and civil war— the supreme court is the proper
tribunial to determine the question" [of Congress' power to abolish
slavery in Washington].*^®

He defended the Texas boundary settlement

since Texas's title to the disputed land was doubtful and since no
coercion was involved:
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"The Senate bill does not settle the boundary

of Texas— it simply makes a proposition to her [Texas] for settle
ment

Southerners had obtained definite advantages in the
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territorial bills which opened land north of the Missouri Compromise
line to slavery. *-7^
In concluding, Clemens stated his strong opposition to secession.
He did not believe that there was any middle ground "between secession
and acquiescence in the measures."17^

The idea of economic retaliation

against the North, which he favored, still involved acquiescence in
the Adjustment bills.

Secession was not a practical solution

since

it would not result in any expansion of slavery.*-7-* He concluded:
If then any man asks me if I am in favor of disunion, I answer,
No— Nothing has been done that disunion can remedy, and I am
not mad enough to rush into civil war from idle fear that
something may be done hereafter. There are grievance[s] I
would not bear. There are oppressions which ought to be
resisted by every means that God and Nature have put into
our hands, but they have not yet come upon us, . . .*76
Southern Rights men, embittered by the passage of the Compro
mise of 1850, were also active in the fall of 1850.

Sampson W. Harris,

a Congressional Fire-eater, wrote that the South was being restricted
because of the peculiar institution:*-77
She walks in prison bounds--because the leprosy of slavery is
about her, and she must not come too near the untainted
immaculateness of Northern puritanism— The North may expand
but we must stop— Her institutions are to be made the peculiar

173

Ibid.

174

Ibid.

175

Ibid.

176

Ibid.

177 Sampson W. Harris to Bolling Hall, September 21, 1850,
Bolling Hall Papers.

185

objects,— the protegees of Government patronage, while its
very energy is to be restricted in every possible way, to th[e]
destruction of ours, [way of life] . ..*'®
The desires of the Northern majority rather than the Constitution con
trolled the national government which had already excluded the South
from the territories and

yet was preparing

further "aggressions."

South was not united and

was thus in grave

danger :*^9njf the south

The

falters in this crisis— she is gone forever."*®®
The sense of outrage which radical Alabamians felt was ex
pressed in primary meetings throughout the state.

Fire-eaters within

central Alabama, who were especially enraged by the passage of the
Compromise bills called for a protest meeting in Montgomery in early
September to discuss the sectional crisis.

After the usual statement

about the limited powers of government, these "ultras" stated that
the escape of black slaves to the North cost the South millions of
dollars and would have caused war between the sections if they had been
foreign nations.*®*

The South "should require forthwith of the North,

a convention of all the states so to amend the constitution as to add
more checks for their future rights, or else they will secede from
the Confederacy."
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Texas was encouraged to resist Northern designs
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on her land, but even if she acquiesed the rest of the South had to
continue to resist.

There was strong disapproval of the idea of

admitting California into the Union, and these extremists wanted the
legislature convened in a special secession so that a state convention
might decide

on a way to end the sectional problems or to create a plan

for cooperation with other slave states.

They also encouraged Alabam

ians to patronize merchants loyal to the South while encouraging them
not to vote for any candidate who adopted a position against the
rights of the South.
Division on the course of action which the state should adopt
was evident at a meeting of the citizens of Lowndes and Dallas Counties
on September 27.

Local firebrands introduced a resolution which pro

tested the exclusion of the South from the Mexican cession and a
declaration that the end of the slave trade in Washington was a prece
dent for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia as well
as in federally controlled areas throughout the S o u t h . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
they resolved:
that theaction of the North for many years past, and especially
a series
of measures enacted by the present Congress, envince
a settled determination on the part of the North to deprive the
South of equality in the Government, and are such as will
steadily and surely lead to an alteration of the constitution,
to the abolition of negro slavery, and to the final ruin of the
South.185
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A Southern Rights Association was formed to promote the cause, but
differences of opinion appeared on the question of the proper means of
resistance.

Extremists had declared that there were evils worse than

disunion, but Colonel E. F. Byrd wanted resolutions passed which would
have stated that the Compromise of 1850 was not unconstitutional or a
sufficient justification for secession.

This resolution was postponed

and two speeches in favor of secession were delivered; many Alabama
Fire-eaters, however, were not yet ready to leave the Union.
A major address, issued in pamphlet form, was delivered before
the Mobile Southern Rights Association on December 14, 1850, by Josiah
C. Nott.

The association, which had been formed in November, included

John A. Campbell, a true extremist and Nott, one of the earliest
scientific racists in the United States.

Nott's speech dealt with the

origins of races, the impossibility of racial equality or emancipation,
and the conflict between the North and South.

He stressed the fact that

there were three distinct races in the world which did not have a
common origin as had been described in the Bible.

The South owned three

million black slaves in 1850 which could not be emancipated; slavery
was an institution which was necessary to the South's wealthy and poli
tical p o w e r . B l a c k s were biologically and physically inferior, and

186

Ibid.

187 John A. Campbell, Substance of the Remarks of John A.
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(Mobile; Dade, Thompson & Co. Printers, 1851), 3-7.

i8 a

it was an error to believe "that cultivation, through a series of gen
erations, can expand the defective brains, develope [sic] the intellec
tual faculties of the negro race, and thus raise them by degrees to the
full standard of excellence which belongs to the Caucasian Races
• • •"
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In addition to the black man's "supposed" inferiority, there

was a problem in the rapidly increasing slave population which could
not be educated successfully and which could not be shipped out of the
South into the Northern states or colonized in Liberia.

After discus

sing the growing spirit of abolition which endangered slave property,
Nott's summarized his "factual" conclusions about black people and the
peculiar institution
1st. It is conceded on all hands, that the Negroes have existed,
with their present physical types for at least four thousand
years; that there is no evidence that they have anywhere during
this time achieved civilization; that they have always shown
inferior intelligence; and occupied the lowest grade in the scale
of nations; . . 2nd. There is no example on record, to prove
that climate, or any combination of known external agencies, can
change a White Race into Negroes, or vice versa. . . . 3rd.
Though often asserted, there is not an atom of proof in the
world's history to show that a Race can be changed by cultiva
tion, and raised in intelligence, from the lowest to the
highest grade. . . . 4th. From the past history of the
negroes, not a single fact or argument can be drawn to encourage
the belief that the slaves of the United States can be colonized
in Africa, or elsewhere, with a prospect of improving their
condition; . . . 5th. That the slaves now in our Southern
States must continue, with all their increase, to exist here as
slaves, or be driven off to die of want and misery elsewhere.
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A cordon of free-soil states was encircling the South which was also
condemned by world opinion.

If the Northern states continued their

attacks on the South, she would have to expand militarily and establish
191

control over lands to provide "an outlet for her negroes. .

Nott supported the idea of secession and believed that a violent con
flict was the probable result of the increasing sectionalism.
fore, he concluded that the South must be prepared to defend

There
h e r s e l f :

192

"The spirit of Liberty, the spirit of Philanthropy, the spirit of
Christianity, aye, and the ghosts of the murdered Whites of St. Domingo
rise up— shake their gray locks at you--and bid you, 'sleep no

m o r e

.'"193

The Southern Rights press also contributed editorials which
criticized the submissionists and predicted white resistance against
threatened emancipation.

The Hayneville Chronicle was very critical of

the Unionists in Alabama who were responsible for continued Northern
attacks against the South.

Their submission to the North encouraged

her aggressions which could only be stopped by united resistance by the
entire South.*94

in order to encourage support for the peculiar insti

tution, the Huntsville Democrat stressed that the North was trying
gradually to achieve the abolition of slavery in the South.

The emanci

pation of three million black slaves would be disastrous for the
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lower-class white man who would be reduced to the degraded level of the
black man.

Negroes would compete with poor whites for employment, and

white families might be forced to have social contacts with Negroes.*95
The paper, emphasizing white solidarity, asked:
what man would willingly bring about
a state ofthings, that
would inevitably bring him down to a
level with the negro?
Abolitionists would bring about white slavery as it exists
in the North, in the place of negro slavery which now exists
here . . . who can believe that any poor man at the South is
anxious to take the place now occupied by negro slaves. None
but a fool or a fanatic.196
This appeal to non-slaveholders was based on both racial and status
considerations which might cause the yeoman to rise to the defense of
slavery.
A concerted

attempt was

Governor Collier to

take action

made during the fall of 1850 to get
on the sectional question.A set of

resolutions was passed which encouraged the governor or the state
legislature to call a convention of the people of Alabama.

Collier was

also contacted by radicals who wanted him to convene the legislature
to meet the threat of the Omnibus bills.

The South had a choice between

using force against the North or quietly acquiescing to

aggressions

which included abolition and consolidation of political power in the
hands of the Federal government:*97 "Let us not disguise the fact that,
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ibid.
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the question for the Southern States is--life or death:

we shall then

clearly comprehend our duty and [illegible] go forward to discharge
it."198
Collier, however, refused to act.

He recognized that Alabamians

wanted to resist the attacks on slavery, but believed that public opin
ion had not yet reached a decision on the proper course of action to
adopt.

If the state legislature met early, it would merely reflect the

current differences in viewpoints in Alabama.

The state legislature

should be called into session after the second Nashville Convention;
Collier announced his disapproval of the Omnibus bills which strength
ened the free states.
1QQ
support disunion:*77

But he emphasized that Alabama was not ready to
"I believe that a large majority of them [people

of Alabama] are strongly disinclined to withdraw from the Confederacy,
until other measures have been unsuccessfully tried to resist further
aggression."^^

The South should end her economic dependence on the

North and prevent abolition which would be more harmful to lower-class
whites who would have to stay "in the country with the races placed
upon a footing of equality without an adequate protection of their
persons or the earnings of their industry."

2m

Collier had not acted

with the Fire-eaters, but was still concerned about the dangers of
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emancipation.
Historians have generally noted that public opinion in Alabama
was divided into three different segments by late 1850.

One position

was held by a minority within the state which apparently accepted the
Compromise of 1850 as an equitable adjustment of the slavery problem.
A second group, the Southern Rights men who saw dangers to the "rights"
of the South in the Compromise which had to be resisted by measures
ranging from secession to economic retaliation against the North.202
A third group, the Southern Rights Unionists acquiesced in the Com
promisers passage but "their cup of forbearance was full; and if the
Northerners caused it to run over, they would be driven to ally them
selves with the
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^ careful perusal of the available

primary sources indicates that there was actually no clear cut position
on the Compromise or the slavery question.

There were men who were

more radical than William L. Yancey, and there was a broad spectrum of
opinion in the category of Southern Rights Unionists which Denman
defined.

There were men who adopted the Georgia platform verbatim,

while others looked to economic resistance along the lines suggested
by Senator John M. Berrien of Georgia.

These broad categories will be

used even though they do not actually reflect the state of chaos in
the public mind in 1851.

The only area on which Unionists and radicals

agreed was that Alabama was not ready for secession unless the attacks
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against slavery were intensified.

o rv,

Unionists organized officially in Montgomery on January 19,
1851, at a convention called by conservative members of the legisla
ture.

They announced their support for the Compromise of 1850 and

opposition to s e c e s s i o n . H o w e v e r , reflecting the division of
opinion within the state, they admitted the right of revolution "which
belongs to every free people to overthrow their government when it
20 fi

fails to answer the ends for which it was established." w

In mid-January there was a report about a slave conspiracy
from "many planters" in the Mobile area.

A note addressed "TO THE

PLANTERS OF ALABAMA" described an alleged attempt to incite a slave
insurrection in South Alabama.

Two white men had reportedly told the

slaves that an election was going to be held to free them and that
when it occurred there would be support for "throat-cutting" by the
black population.

The authors of the announcement called for a

204 W. H. Crenshaw to Bolling Hall, January 11, 1851, Bolling
Hall Papers; Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, 39-42; Huntsville Southern Advocate, 1850-1851, passim; W. R. King to Boiling Hall,
November 16, 1850, Bolling Hall Papers; Mobile Alabama Planter. 18501851; Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette, 1850-1851; Montgomery
Alabama Journal, 1850-1852; A. P. Moore to Bolling Hall, November 15,
1850, Bolling Hall Papers.
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Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama, 49.

206 Ibid. Dorman's source for this meeting was the EuFaula
Spirit of the South for February 18, 1851. This paper is no longer
extant and a check of the Montgomery papers and the Mobile Advertiser
(Whig Union) did not reveal any account of it. Therefore a meeting was
probably held but its importance was obviously overemphasized.
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planters' convention in Mobile to stop such agitation.

The Alabama

Journal was very critical of the report which would simply increase
fears among the white population and in a tone designed to reassure the
citizens of Montgomery, the editor declared that a slave revolt could
207

never succeed. u/
In February 1851 the Yancey forces attempted to form a Southern
Rights party.

Yancey had said in a previous month that such a gathering

could unite the radicals of the State.

However, when the meeting opened

in Montgomery only seventeen Southern Rights Associations were in
attendance out of fifty-two of Alabama's counties; the vast majority of
the ninety-seven delegates came from Montgomery, Lowndes and Dallas
counties
Extremism and radical statements of purpose dominated the threeday convention.

All the proposals for a potential preamble and reso

lutions of the convention [Montgomery Platform] were similar in that
they held that the crisis between the sections was based on the Northern
goal of abolition, and that secession was a right.
of resolutions introduced by one Gayle stated;

A very radical set

209

That although it is desirable that more States than one
should secede together, yet we recommend to the good people of
Alabama to meet in convention at as early a day as practical

207 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette, January 15, 1851;
Montgomery Alabama Journa1, January 15, 1851.
208 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette, January 15,
February 19, 1851. Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette quoting
Mobile Register, February 26, 1851.
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after the adjournment of the Southern Congress in November
next [proposed by South Carolina], and secede alone from the
Union, if the simultaneous action desired cannot be had.
These resolutions were too extreme for Yancey who suggested that aboli
tion was the goal of the national government, but omitted a resolution
favoring separate s e c e s s i o n . I n s t e a d the Montgomery Fire-eater
declared that "the rights, honor and interests of the people of this
state, and each of the Southern states, demands that they should at
once" set their house in order "with a view to secession."

212

Further

more, Yancey held that the secession of Alabama was a matter "of time
21 o

and policy only."

h6

approved the calling of a Southern Congress

while stating that Alabama should join any other states which might
actually secede.

Voting on Yancey's resolutions changed one slightly

with the dropping of the word "policy" in a statement on secession
which then read that the question of disunion was "reduced to that of
time only."

914

A plan for establishing a Southern Rights Organization through
out the state was devised, and a Committee of Publication was created
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214 Ibid.. See Montgomery Alabama Journal, February 14, 1851
for a complete copy of the final preamble and resolutions. Policy,
of course, implied action to achieve secession rather than waiting for
it as an inevitable result of Northern action.
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to handle propaganda on the subject of

s l a v e r y . 215

Yancey established

a Committee of Vigilance, to consist of five members, "who shall be
clothed with discretionary powers, for the purpose of protecting slave
property,

. . ."216

Financing for these two important parts of the

association were to come from the Southern Rights clubs organized in
the various counties.

217
'

The radical mind in Alabama during 1851 can be understood by
closely examining the convention's "Address to the People of Alabama"
which was probably

the work of Yancey.

favor of the Southern way of life.

It was a militant manifesto in

Attacks on the South, which had

begun with the Hartford convention in 1814, were increasing.

The

organization of California by the Executive branch of the Federal
government was a serious threat to Southern rights.

Congress itself

was responsible for this action since it could have rejected statehood
for the former Bear Flag Republic.

Mexican anti-slavery laws should

have been declared null and void if they were in conflict with the
Constitution.

218

Texas had been dismembered by the national government

"and the vast tract yielded by her— larger than the State of Alabama-was at once put under the free soil act incorporating the territorial
government of New Mexico."219

jn

^aw abolishing the slave trade
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in the District of Columbia, which gave Congress the power to manumit
slaves under certain conditions, a principle was established for the
emancipation of other slaves.

220

The most dangerous act of the majority section was the restric
tion on the expansion of slavery.

After the peculiar institution was

confined to the slave states, the South would have the problem of a

991

rapidly increasing black population;*-*--1We are surrounded by free soil. The outlets, provided by
nature and the wise forecaste of statesmen, have been seized
upon by our enemies and forever closed against its diffusion.
The institution is circumscribed. . . .
By reason of its being
confined to its present limits (if indeed those limits shall
be left undisturbed) the supply of slave labor will become so
great and consequently so cheap, that it will gradually
drive out from among us all free white labor of every
description. From being confined almost entirely, as at
present, to agriculture, the slaves will necessary become
mechanics and artisans of every class. This will inevitably
enlighten them and give them power and new and dangerous
ideas. There being no outlet for them, they will in time
overflow all the channels of labor. The whole country will
become one vast African population, a land of the slave and
his owner. And then, how far distant will be the day when
the black and loathsome tide, in vain seeking for an outlet,
will find it by an overthrow of the body politic, drowning
all distinctions between the white and black man?222
Even if the North ended all future attacks upon the South, she could
patiently wait inevitable emancipation of the Negro and Northern
domination of the government.

The only viable solution was secession

which Alabama was advised to prepare actually to proceed with if
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another Southern state chose the path of disunion.
An obvious division was displayed in the Southern Rights camps
by their reactions to the Montgomery Platform.

The Mobile Register

declared that the convention in Montgomery was not representative of
O A

I

the Southern Rights men:

"it

is obvious that such a body could not

utter the voice of the State; and we are sure that its proceedings will
meet with the overwhelming condemnation of the people.

..."

225

The

Southern Rights Associations of Alabama were called upon to repudiate
the entire proceedings.

°

In north Alabama the Huntsville Democrat

declared that it was not yet ready to declare for secession until the
North was given "an opportunity to recede from her present position of
hostility to the South."

227

The South should develop her economic

resources, give the North time to redress past grievances, and provide
guarantees for the future, even if this action seemed hopeless.

20Q

Although the editor of the Hayneville Chronicle approved of the
Montgomery resolutions, he emphasized that those men who disagreed with

223 Ibid. The latter quote was at the heart of this truly
radical document and yet was not stressed in Ralph Draughons' dis
sertation on Yancey who was the primary author of this important
address.
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the Platform should not be thrown out of the party:32^

"Such men as

these we would not have driven from our ranks but hail them as friends
of our cause; and though we may be somewhat ahead of them in our mode of
resistance, yet we condemn them not, . . ."230
In Mobile a meeting of the Southern Rights Association held in
mid-spring challenged portions of the Montgomery Platform.

These

radicals, like all "ultras," believed that slavery was endangered, but
they wanted to create a platform which was broad enough to include all
men who opposed the Compromise of 1850:231

"We desire that all should

stand together who are now for resistance, either moral or legal, of
any kind or form; and if the time should arrive when the people of
Alabama, in solemn convention should prescribe a form of resistance
beyond this, we should regard as aliens those only who then refuse to
enlist under her banner."

o oo

A policy of commercial non-intercourse

had to be imposed against states hostile to the South and her own
economic resources would be developed so that she would be ready to
defend herself against the "triumph" of abolitionism which would deso
late the South.233
During 1851 Floridians contented themselves with unofficial
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expressions of opinion on the Compromise.

The States Rights forces in

Florida voiced their opinion through local associations which were
organized in at least four counties (Gadsden, Lee, Madison and Jeffer
son).

On May 31, a meeting, chaired by James Gibson, was held in

Gadsden county to establish a local Southern Rights Association which
would defend the principles established in the Virginia and Kentucky
resolutions.

In September 1851 Brown wrote that Southern Whigs would

be able to unite with Northerners who supported the Compromise in the
1852 Presidential elections, but not with '•demagogues1' who would continue to agitate the issue of slavery on the national political level.
Brown favored a conservative political course:

234

"a national Union con

vention, disregarding old party lines, would be the course of wisdom;
but if that cannot be affected, there ought to be a National Whig
convention, and all the Southern States should send delegates to it."235
The call for a National Union Party was seconded by conservatives like
Richard Keith Call who wanted to save the Union.^36
Alabama, in contrast, saw massive political chaos and apparent
public moderation in the struggle between the loose-knit Southern
Rights and Union-oriented forces.

There was competition in the races

for the state legislature, Congress and the office of Governor.

234 Dorothy Dodd, "The Secession Movement in Florida 18501861, Part I," Florida Historical Quarterly. XII (July, 1933), 12;Tallahassee Florida Sentinel. June 10, 1851; Tallahassee Floridian and Journal,
Nov. 1, 1851.
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Radicals like Yancey knew that these contests were vital to them since
Georgia and Louisiana had already acquiesced to the Compromise of 1850.
If they were to successfully resist the Adjustment bills, they would
have to begin by winning at the polls.
Union forces had great difficulty in securing a suitable candi
date to run for governor.

No Union Whig was available, and the only

man who was willing to oppose Governor Collier was the Unionist,
Benjamin G. Shields of Marengo.

237

His candidacy was supported by the

Unionist editor of the Southern Advocate who announced that he could
no longer support Collier:

"We look upon secession as a rank heresay

and cannot support Gov. Collier for reelection since he maintains that
a state has the right by an act or ordinance of secession" to leave
the Union peacefully.

2 3ft

Shields, an uninspiring candidate, also

received the support of the Alabama Journal which believed that he
stood for the Georgia Platform as advocated by Southern Rights
Unionists.^39
The races for Congress were the most significant contests in
Alabama during 1851.

These contests saw a confusing pattern of candi

dates who reflected all shades of opinion on the compromise.

John

Bragg of Mobile was nominated as the Southern Rights candidate by the
Association in Mobile.

He believed that the Compromise was not just

237 Montgomery Advertiser and State Gazette. February 5, 1851,
quoting Florence Gazette.
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and that it violated Southern Rights.

States had the right to secede

for just cause but the Compromise of 1850, in his opinion, did not
provide sufficient justification for this action.

However, he was

opposed to the use of federal force to keep a state in the Union, and
indicated that if coercion was used against a seceding state that other
communities with common interests would support her action.

His

Unionist opponent, C. C. Langdon, was actually opposed to the admission
of California and the abolition of the slave trade in the District of
Columbia even though he accepted passage of the Compromise.
A particularly exciting electoral contest occurred in Montgo
mery.

Since Representative Henry Hilliard had declined to run for

reelection in December 1850, and William Yancey refused to run for the
Southern Rights party in the spring of 1851, these two antagonists
were represented by stand-ins.

The conservatives (Whigs) in Montgomery

nominated James Abercrombie who was a strong Unionist.
tance letter Abercrombie set forth his vifews:

241

In his accep-

"I am a Union man--

ardently desiring and resolutely determined to devote all my energies
to its preservation, as long as honor and Constitutional protection can
be mine as a member of the Union.

The South has a great and controlling

interest to protect, and it must be protected."

242

The United States

should not be "balkanized" by the secession of a couple of states which

240 Mobile The Alabama Planter, July 19, 1851; Montgomery
Advertiser and State Gazette, June 4, 1851.
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would "hasten beyond any other possible contingency the destruction of
that peculiar property,

. . ,"2^3

contrast the Southern Rights

Association meeting on June 9 selected fire-eater Colonel John Cochran.
He was recognized as an extremist and had stated that he opposed the
Omnibus bills and believed that the South must secede from the
o//

"tyranical" Federal government:

"...

How can the South submit to

remain a party to a government which this avows, both in word and deed,
its purpose to be its ruin and degradation?

I think not— I hope not.

I PRAY GOD THAT THE SOUTH MAY TEAR HERSELF FROM THE POWER OF THE
MONSTER."

245

Although Cochran did not believe that secession would

immediately occur he concluded that "A LEAVEN OF DISUNION" existed in
Alabama ,2^6
The Congressional contests indicate that Alabamians were con
cerned about the sectional crisis in 1851 but were not in favor of
disunion.

A prominent citizen described the feelings of many

Alabamians during the summer of 1851:^^

"All we desire here is for

the abolitionists and Free Soilers as they term themselves, to let us
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247 S. Forwood to W. F. Forwood, July 13, 1851, W. S. Forwood
Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina
Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
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alone and we are as happy a People as any under the Globe."248

since

this Southern Righter believed that disunion was probable in the future,
he declared that Southerners were ready to meet the crisis--except for
a few submissionists.249
Citizens throughout Alabama were exposed to a variety of
appeals during the races for governor and Congress.

Governor Collier,

who had always adopted an ambiguous position, stated his views in a
letter published during May 1851; he stressed his horror at the idea of
a conflict between a state and the national government:

2 SO
•

My mind revolts from the contemplation of a warlike collision
between the Government and anyone of the members of the
Confederacy. No territorial limits could be prescribed to
the belligerent operations; nor could the end of such a con
troversy be foreseen. It would unsheath myriads of swords,
and perhaps involve the members of the Union in the most bloody
civil war known to modern times, if not to all history.251
He would not commit himself to any course of action in regard to requisi
tions of troops for Alabama in case South Carolina seceded from the
Union.

252

J

Unionist Benjamin Shields, who withdrew from the race during

the early summer, did not believe that the North would interfere "with
our rights of slave property, or our sovereign and exclusive right of
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state legislation and state control over the subject,

. . .'*253

shields

thus stressed that slavery could be protected within the Union which
itself was endangered by Southern secessionists.^^
Candidates and members of Alabama's Southern Rights Party
campaigned actively in the sunsner.

Yancey's point of view was expressed

in a letter to a committee which had nominated him for governor.

Al

though he refused the position, Yancey stated his opinion of the party
conflict
In the ranks of the advocates of submission will inevitably
be gathered whatever there is of federal and abolition ten
dencies in our midst; while beneath the banner of secession
will, as inevitably, be rallied all.that are true to the
institution of African slavery, as a part of the fundamental
bases of the social and political policy of the South . . .256
Colonel Phillips, a Mobile extremist, spoke about the necessity
of having new territories into which the rapidly expanding slave popu
lation could be transferred.

Blacks had to remain as slaves, be sent

out of the United States or "being the majority they must be the
masters, and the present masters be the servants."

257

The editor of

the Alabama Planter wrote about the "impossibility" of emancipation:

253 Address of the H o n . Benjamin Shields to the People of
Alabama (June 10, 1851), 7.
254

Ibid., 1-14.

255 W. L. Yancey to Messrs. Joel E. Matthews, et al., May 10,
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But suppose, (what we think no rational, enlightened man can
suppose,) that we should be constrained to assert to the freedom
of our serfs and be obliged to dwell among them. They being
more numerous, would make our laws, and under such law what
protection would there be for their ancient masters? What white
man would stand up in competition with them? What mechanic
would enjoy equal employment with them? Our cities they would
occupy and the honors and profits of a social life would be in
their hands. But this picture is not possible. The races cannot
dwell together.^58
The black man had to be kept in bondage so that white supremacy could
be maintained.
The voices of the non-secessionist forces in Alabama were both
a reflection of and factors behind the States' moderation in the summer
of 1851.

William R. King wrote a public letter in the mid-summer in

which he stressed his opposition to California's statehood and to the
abolition features in the bill which ended the slave trade in the
District of Columbia.

The South was not excluded from the Southwest,

however, unless the inhabitants in applying for admission as a state
presented a free-soil constitution.

King opposed the formation of a

Union coalition since he held that the Democracy was the true Union
party.

Henry Hilliard, the long time foe of Yancey, was very critical

of Yancey's position on secession and defended the Compromise measures
while campaigning for James Abercrombie in the Montgomery District.
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In Huntsville, W. R. W. Cobb's opponent, Robert Murphy, held that
session was acceptable if the national government encroached upon the
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Montgomery Alabama Journal, July 17, 1851.

2C7

rights of sovereign states.

The Compromise was cause for complaint,

but Murphy did not believe that it justified secession;260
therefore willing to abide by its provisions provided they are observed
in good faith by the North; but that this will be done, I have reasons
to doubt:

for the Fugitive Slave Law has already been measurably

defeated in its objects, by the action of Northern Fanaticks [sic].'1^®^
The gubernatorial and Congressional election results indicate
a victory for moderation.

Collier was easily victorious in a race in

which he had no competition from Benjamin Shields, who had withdrawn
from the contest.

Collier's majority, 37,460 to 5,747, was a definite

signal that Alabama preferred the politics of evasion rather than
Shield's staunch Unionism.

In the Congressional races five men who may

generally be classified as Unionists were victorious, along with one
secessionist and one Southern Rights Unionist.^ 2

^he state had

endorsed the position of submitting to the Compromise of 1850:

"The

election on Monday, as we anticipated, was a 'Waterloo' affair
horse, foot and dragoons, all swept at one clash from the field. The
people have

been quiet and determined, and, aware of the nature of the

whole, they had no idea of dissolving the Union on account of the
Compromise acts."^^
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An analysis of the results shows the "anarchy" which existed in
Alabama politics during 1851.

Despite much concern about "Northern

aggressions" the people of Alabama were not committed to extremism in
1851.

The Southern rights camp was divided into several groups that

feared that the Compromise was a step toward abolition, but which
could never agree on one method of resistance.

No prominent state or

national officeholders were associated with the extreme wing of the
States Rights forces.

In contrast, the Unionists received capable

leadership from men like William R. King and were aided by the public
indifference to radicalism which was symbolized by the support for
Henry W. Collier.

Racial fears were evident in the appeals made in

districts like Mobile and in the Montgomery platform.

There were also

incidents which indicated the tension in Southern society over the
maintenance of white supremacy.

However, there was no focus for this

undercurrent of discontent since no prominent Fire-eater emerged to
lead the extremist forces in either the gubernatorial or Congressional
races.
Political parties in both Alabama and Florida went through
different processes of reunification before the presidential election
of 1852.

Democrats in Florida demonstrated their interest in presi

dential politics by their desire to be represented in the convention
at Baltimore.

At a state convention in Madison county in April 1852,

Florida Democrats chose James E. Broome as their candidate for the
office of governor while Augustus Maxwell was chosen to represent the
party in the Congressional race against Whig Unionist Edward Cabell.

209

A resolution was also passed which called for peace between the sections:

264

. . w e deprecate the agitation of all questions growing

out of the domestic institutions of the country, or the revival of
issue

already passed, with a view to such agitation, as mischievous

and unwise, and as calculated to introduce tensions among the people
and weaken the bonds of our political fraternity."265

gr0ome, who had

formerly been a determined opponent of the Omnibus bills, indicated
his acceptance of it as a final settlement by the summer of 1852.

How

ever, he did state that he was opposed to any attempt to extend the
abolition "principles" contained in the District of Columbia Slave
rp .
266
Trade Law.
The Whig party's divisions during the election of 1852 led to
a Democratic victory.

Many members of the party had supported Millard

Fillmore before the June convention in Baltimore as the most desirable
candidate for President.

Edward Cabell was a strong opponent of Scott

and had to agree to support him before the Whig gubernatorial candidate
George T. Ward agreed to run on the same ticket with him.

This con

tention within the party, coupled with losses in middle Florida, caused
the defeat of the entire Whig ticket--including Cabell, who lost by
twenty-two votes.

Florida reentered the Democratic column but she
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had accepted the Omnibus bills.
During the winter of 1851-52, Alabamians began the process of
political reunification and "final" acceptance of the Compromise of
1850.

Governor Collier, in his annual message to the legislature,

emphasized that there was still hostile forces in the North which
regarded slavery as an evil.266

He favored "a discriminatory tax upon

the products and manufactures of the states that have proved themselves
recreant to the performance of constitutional duty, whenever they
become subject to our revenue laws."269

This idea of economic retalia

tion was more in accord with the spirit of resistance expressed by the
Mobile Southern Rights Association than with the spirit of sectional
reconciliation which Senator Clemens desired.2^
Reorganization of the political parties began during the winter
of 1852.

A call was issued for a meeting of the Democratic party in

January 1852 to appoint delegates to the National Democratic convention.
tion:

271

'L

The statement included a plea for an end to sectional agita

"The people of the Southern states have decided to acquiesce in

the measures of compromise.

And it becomes every true Democrat, with

out regard to his individual opinions to cease opposition to the
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2 72
popular decision." '

The meeting of the Democratic party of Alabama

in Montgomery on January 19, 1851, selected delegates to the Demo
cratic convention while declaring that Alabamians submitted to the
Compromise of 1850 as a final settlement of the divisions over
slavery.

27T
Fire-eaters in Alabama maintained a separate identity during

the spring of 1852.

Fifty-two delegates from six counties met in con

vention at Montgomery on March 4, 1852.

Resolutions were passed that

emphasized that racial inequality was an established fact and that
slavery was beneficial to both races;2 74

"That this relation pro

motes equality among the free by dispensing with grades and casts [sic]
among them, and thereby preserves republican institutions; it presents
the degradation of the whites consequent upon equality with an
inferior race, and affords the African his only efficient school of
progress."
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This succinct defense of slavery was included with a

recommendation for Southern Rights party conventions on the state and
regional level.

Although Yancey was willing to accept the principles

of the George platform as the best safeguard for black slavery in 1852,
he was strongly opposed by local Fire-eaters who were not willing to
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compromise even temporarily on the issue of secession. 276
By the late spring of 1852 the Whigs were preparing to go to
the Baltimore convention.

A portion of the Whig party of Macon county

met in Montgomery on April 12, 1852 with Colonel W. W. Battle as
chairman.

They favored Fillmore’s candidacy and called for a state

convention in June 1852.

Meetings were held throughout the state in

Apri1-May to appoint delegates to the National convention while Henry
Hilliard called for Whigs to attend in order to work for Millard
Fillmore's candidacy.^77
Reaction to national politics and the presidential campaign
dominated the remainder of 1852.

Democrats generally accepted the

candidacy of Franklin Pierce while the Whigs were divided on Scott's
candidacy.

Hilliard, who had originally supported Fillmore, called

for party support of Scott who had accepted the national platform
supporting the Compromise.

Southern Rights men continued to maintain

a separate existence as a party during the entire year although
Yancey did announce that he could vote for Pierce in order to defeat
Scott.

The election results were 26,881 in favor of Pierce to

16,038 for Scott and 2,174 for the Southern Rights candidate George

276 Ibid., March 8, 1852; Montgomery Weekly Advertiser.
March 16, 1852.
277
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Troup of Georgia.

Alabama, like her sister state Florida, had re

entered national politics and accepted the

C o m p r o m i s e

.^8

278 ? to John Bragg, June 17, 1852, John Bragg Papers
(Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina); Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama. 76-81; Dubose,
The Life and Time of William Lowndes Yancey. 269-70, Huntsville
Southern Advocate, September 22, 1852; Montgomery Alabama Journa1,
June 25, July 9, 12, 1852; Montgomery Weekly Advertiser. June 30,
July 21, 1852.
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CHAPTER V

MISSISSIPPI:

STATE'S RIGHTS VERSUS THE UNION

The Magnolia state was the second most militant state in the
Lower South in the years 1850-1852.

Beginning during the 1840's white

citizens of Mississippi had reacted with marked bitterness to threats
to the institution of chattel slavery or to their "constitutional
rights."

Emancipation of black people in Mississippi was viewed as

a threat both to the white man's socio-economic and also to his
political hegemony.
Economically Mississippi was a state dependent upon its produc
tion of cotton.

Cotton growing had been a relatively minor economic

activity until the cotton gin was introduced into Natchez in 1795:
"Whitney's gin placed the inhabited area of Mississippi upon a sounder
economic footing than it had ever before enjoyed, for it reduced the
cost of raising cotton to the point where the white staple soon became
the standard crop of that section of the old Southwest."^

Plantation

and small-farm agriculture expanded during the seventeen-year period
from 1820-1837 as cotton sold for as much as sixteen cents a pound on

1 John Hebron Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), 13. The best account of
Mississippi slavery is Charles Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi (New
York: D. A. Appleton Century Company, 1933).
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the New Orleans market.

The slave population also grew rapidly as

Mississippi farmers produced over three hundred thousand bales of
cotton by 1836.^
From 1837-1850 Mississippi agriculture suffered from over
expansion and depressed economic conditions.

The farmer, in order to

alleviate his poverty, produced larger quantities of cotton, which con
flicted with the laws of supply and demand; cotton prices were gener
ally depressed in this period and it sold for as little as five cents
in 1845.

Prosperity returned in 1849-1850 because crop shortages caused

by severe weather had coincided with increased demand from cotton mills
in the northeastern United States and the British Isles.

Prices rose

to eleven cents in 1849 and averaged nearly twelve cents on the New
Orleans market in 1850-1851.

The high prices which produced a tremen

dous profit for the owners of the 484,292 bales of cotton may have
reinforced conservatism in the planter areas.^
Also promoting conservatism in western Mississippi was the
importance of the Mississippi River as a carrier of commerce.

Trade

up-river with the northwestern states increased in volume once the
depression of the 1840's ended.

Old river towns like Natchez had long

maintained trading ties with the Northwest which their economic

2

Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi. 37-69.

3

Ibid., 69.

4 Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi, 70-92, 179;
The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 (Washington, 1853),
447. Hereinafter cited as The Seventh Census.
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communities believed were valuable to the town's survival and growth.-*
Professor James has noted that the actual amounts of the Northwest
trade were at record levels in 1850 despite the fact that the growing
economic ties between the Northwest and New England were channeling
more trading goods from the former section to the East/* Thus, this
Mississippi river city, like her sister New Orleans, had an economi
cally significant interest in preserving the Union.
The eastern half of Mississippi was primarily populated by
yeoman farmers and men classified as poor whites.

In these counties

property values were low and there were few slaveholders.

The white

farmer in these areas, however, were certainly not as destitute as
the plantation myth has often depicted them.

Many were middle-class

farmers who owned their farms and also benefited from the growing
prosperity of the 1850's.^
Black slaves, however, helped condition the political reactions
of rural Mississippians during the slavery crisis.

Negroes had served

in bondage even before the state was admitted to the Union in 1817.
Despite an unequal concentration of blacks in certain western Missis
sippi counties, there was no significant division within the state on

5 D. Clayton James, Antebellum Natchez (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1965), 215; Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Be 1lum
Mississippi. 182.
6

James, Antebellum Natchez, 215.

^ Seventh Census, 456; Herbert Weaver, Mississippi Farmers
1850-1860 (Nashville: The Vanderbilt University Press, 1945), 63-126.
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the question of slavery.

Men living in the predominantly white eastern

counties of Mississippi were also ardent defenders of a system which
guaranteed their white supremacy.®

In the 1840's the most radical

leaders of the Southern Right's movement in Mississippi had been mem
bers of the state Democratic party.

The Mississippi Democracy had

grown up in response to Andrew Jackson's political appeal.

His policy

of Indian removal forced the Mississippi tribes to vacate their lands
and migrate west of the river into Indian territory.

The opening of

Indian territory in Mississippi to the land hungry white settlers
helped bring many white Mississippians permanently into the Democratic
9
fold.
Mississippi Whigs who lived in the districts around the affluent
river towns of Natchez and Vicksburg were a definite minority in
Mississippi politics.

They had not been able to win many elections in

the 1840's because of the political effectiveness of the Democracy.
Whigs were a politically isolated group who mainly attracted support in

8 Cleo Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850
(Volume XIV of Mississippi Historical Society Publications. Univer
sity Miss.: Mississippi Historical Society, 1914), 9-13; Seventh
Census, 447. Race as a factor in Mississippi politics is complicated
by the fact that the counties where blacks outnumbered whites were
largely the areas which supported the Union in 1850-1852. Racial
fears of lower class whites in eastern Mississippi were an important
force in politics in this period.
9 Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 24-71.
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the areas of Mississippi which were rich in both cotton and enslaved
blacks.
Democrats were politically unified by the mid-1840's and were
thus able to control most political offices in Mississippi.

The party

had been divided into two factions during the early 1830’s because of
the nullification crisis in South Carolina.

John Anthony Quitman

headed a states rights, pro-nullification group which was opposed by
a pro-Jackson, Unionist branch of the state Democratic party.

These

two wings of the party had finally united in 1839 as the predominantly
white, eastern half of Mississippi moved permanently into the Democratic
column.

This new alliance resulted in a major change of. allegiance by

white Democrats.

One part of the Democratic party which had repudiated

the right of nullification in the 1830's moved away from its strong,
blind loyalty to the Union during the forties.**
Beginning in 1844 tension between the major sections over
slavery caused a sharp rise in the defense of Southern rights in
Mississippi.

Both Whigs and Democrats supported the annexation of the

Republic of Texas.

They opposed the Wilmot Proviso while reacting

very favorably to the pro-Southern Virginia Resolutions of 1847 which

10 Donald Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi 1850-1860,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1964), 2-9;
Seventh Census, 447-56; David Young, "The Mississippi Whigs, 18341860" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968),
49-51.
11 Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, 70-171;
Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 9-11, 17-19.
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condemned all attempts to exclude slavery in the territories.^

Albert

Gallatin Brown, a pro-Southern Mississippi leader, wrote Governor
William Smith of Virginia that the entire South was determined "first
to exhaust all the resources of reason and argument in exhorting our
northern bretheren to let us alone . . . then as deplorable as may be
the consequences we feel prepared having exhausted every fraternal
1^
remedy to become enemies and defend our rights." J
In 1848 politicians in Mississippi prepared the populace for
the Presidential campaign.

Democrats in 1847 had agreed to support

only a Presidential nominee who was opposed to the Wilmot Proviso while
Mississippi Whigs were organizing behind Taylor.

Lewis Cass's doctrine

of popular sovereignty apparently soothed the Democratic electorate,
since he carried the state after an extremely partisan Southern-oriented
campaign; white Mississippians were thus prepared for their rights to
be defended by both the Democracy and the new Whig President.^
The leadership of Mississippi played an important role in
determining the fate of the Compromise of 1850.

Politicians in Missis

sippi had generally supported the Southern Address. and the entire Con
gressional delegation had endorsed it by their signatures.

The

12 Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850. 14, 23;
Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 20-27.
13

Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850. 23.

14

Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 20-22.
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political elite, drawn mainly from the plantation society, enthusi
astically supported Southern rights; however, there were differences
in their political and personal backgrounds which determined the degree
of loyalty to the Union and the solutions which they advocated in
1850-1852.
Mississippi had two able defenders of the Southern way of life
in the United States Senate.

Both men, Henry Stuart Foote and

Jefferson Davis, were from the rich river counties.

These two power

ful Democrats would provide leadership for opposing parties during
1850-1852 as the state decided to accept or reject the Compromise of
1850.
Senator Foote's political career extended back a decade into
the 1830's before his elevation to the Senate in 1847.*"*

Foote had had

a checkered political career which Professor Miles thus describes:
"The volatile Henry S. Foote--'General Weathercock,' according to his
detractors was a Democrat in 1834, a Whig in 1835, a Democrat in 1836,
a Whig in 1837, and a Democrat in 1840.'"^

He did have a reputation

as a Jacksonian but was probably influenced by the philosophical shift
of the Democratic party into the states rights camp by the early
1840's.

By 1847 he had become Jefferson Davis's personal enemy and was

a well-known exponent of Southern rights.

He lent his support to the

15 Charles S. Sydnor, "Henry Stuart Foote," in Allen Jackson
and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography (11 vols.,
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-1958), III, P t . 2, 500-501.
Hereinafter cited as DAB.
16

Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi. 164.
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Clayton Compromise and had proposed that the Missouri Compromise line
be extended to the Pacific coast.

Although Foote wanted equality for

the South in the territories, he was willing to work for Southern
rights within the Union--rather than favoring secession.*^
Jefferson Davis, Foote's colleague in the Senate, was a repre
sentative of the planter class in Mississippi's Democratic party.

Davis

had spent most of the early 1840's at his family plantation before
entering the House of Representatives in 1845.

After leaving this post,

he served as a military leader during the Mexican War before being
elected to the Senate in December 1847.*®
Although Davis was a leader in the Southern Rights Movement in
Mississippi, his politics were not completely sectional in nature.

He

had a desire for national rather than sectional politics, but was
always ready to defend the interests of his South against any attacks
from the N o r t h . In the debate over the Oregon question in the Senate,
Davis stated that Congress had no power to exclude a slaveholder's
black property from the territories:

"The fact that the slave is

17 John E. Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote,
1804-1880," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North
Carolina, 1957), 43-49; James Woodrow Parkerson, "Henry Stuart Foote of
Mississippi: A Rhetorical Analysis of His Speeches in Behalf of the
Union, 1849-1852," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University, 1971), 201-204.

18 Nathaniel Wright Stephenson, "Jefferson Davis," D A B . Ill,
Pt. 1, 123-126.
19 Kathleen Bailey Davis, "Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi
Gubernatorial Contest of 1851 with Selected Letters and Speeches Con
cerning the Campaign," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Rice University,
1971), 4-5.
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property, which his owner may carry into any part of the Union was
what they were desirous to see recognized.

. . .

Congress had no

power to change the condition of slavery, or to strip the master of his
right in his property.

Entering a territory with this property, the

citizen has a right to its protection."^®

He was willing to agree to

the Missouri Compromise line but realized that dangers existed because
some Northerners insisted upon the total exclusion of slavery from the
West.

21

But Northern Democrats were more likely to support the South

than their Whig counterparts:

". . ., so far as fraternal feelings are

manifested by the nonslave holding states, it was found in the ranks of
the democracy.

Denounced and divided at home because of their support

of the constitutional rights of the South shall, shall they be suspected
oo

and repulsed by us?
In contrast to Davis was Albert Gallatin Brown, the spokesman
of the lower-class, white population from the piney woods, of southern
Mississippi.

Brown had been active in politics since 1839 when he was

elected to Congress from the state's fourth district.

In 1843 he

became governor for a term before returning to the House of Representatives.

2i

His career as a sectional leader began when he condemned the

20 Dunbar H. Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist;
His Letters, Papers, and Speeches (Jackson: Mississippi Department of
Archives and History, 1923), I, 211. Hereinafter cited as Jefferson
Davis.
21

Ibid.

22

Ibid., 216.

23

James B. Ranck, Albert Gal latin Brown: Radical Southern
Nationalist (New York: D. A. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1937),

1-60.
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Wilmot Proviso:

"The vote by which this foul wrong is consumated will

unhinge the Constitution . . . Mississippi never will submit to a wrong
like this."

24

He was so completely identified in the public mind as a

Southern right's advocate that a newspaper concluded that he was "more
jealously devoted to the interest of the South and southern institutions
than any man in the House of Representatives."^
On the state level in 1849-1850 John Anthony Quitman re-emerged
as the most single minded exponent of the ultimate radical posit ion-secession.

Quitman, a Northerner who migrated into the South during

the early 1820's, had become "impressed" with the planter elite in
Mississippi.

He used his skills as a lawyer to help him move into the

planter class and politics by the 1830's.

During this decade he had

been a state rights leader and was an attractive political figure by the
1840's.

Since Quitman had served in the Mexican War, he was considered

for a position in the Senate in 1847 and was mentioned as a possible
Vice-Presidential candidate in 1848.

His quest for an important

political office was finally satisfied in 1849 when he was elected
governor by a 11,000 margin over a weak Whig candidate, Luke L e a . ^
John Quitman was now "the recognized leader of the State's Rights

24

Ibid., 55.

25

Ibid .. 60.

26 William L. Barney, The Road to Secession: A New Perspec
tive on the Old South (New York: Praeger, 1972), 86-87; James H.
McLendon, "John A. Quitman," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer
sity of Texas, 1949), 1-280; Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi,
63-69, 126, 134, 147, 152, 158.
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faction of the Mississippi Democracy . . ."27
Preparations for the defense of Mississippi in the crisis over
slavery had begun in 1849.

The famous meeting in October 1849 which

called for the Nashville Convention also established limits on Northern
aggressions.

Resolutions which the Convention adopted announced that

Mississippians would not tolerate:

1) interference with slavery in the

South, 2) attempts to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, 3)
interference with the interstate slave trade, and 4) passage of the
Wilmot Proviso.

Black slavery was so vital to Mississippians that the

Convention members would not tolerate hostile laws passed by Congress
on these subjects.28
During early 1850 retiring Governor Joseph Matthews gave his
final speech before the state legislature.

In this address Governor

Matthews warned against the admission of California to the Union.
Admittance of this former Mexican land was more appalling than passage
of the odious Wilmot Proviso; California's statehood would be a victory
for the Wilmot free-soil principle, but achieved by a subtle, hypo
critical method rather than by a declaration of actual exclusion of
2Q

slavery. 7
Governor John Quitman's inaugural address, delivered on January
14, 1850, showed an acute awareness of the problems dividing the sections.

27

Barney, The Road to Secession, 87.

28

Jackson Mississippian, October 5, 1849.

29

Kawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 29.
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Although he did not comment directly on the problem of California, he
dealt at length with the problem of slavery and a b o l i t i o n . H e
declared:

‘'One half of the sovereign states of this glorious con

federacy, in the exercise of the undoubted right of self government,
have chosen to retain as part of their elementary social system, the
institution of domestic slavery of an inferior race.

This institution

is entwined in our political system, and cannot be separated from it,
OI
without destruction to our social f a b r i c . Q u i t m a n then proceeded to
defend the peculiar institution:

"We do not regard it as an evil, on

the contrary, we think that our prosperity, our happiness, our very
political existence, is inseparably connected with it.

We.have a right

to it and under the constitution of the United States.

We cannot give

up that right. . . .

We will not yield it.

We have a right to the

12

quiet enjoyment of our slave property."-*^

Unfortunately, Quitman emphasized, the peculiar institution was
threatened by anti-slavery attacks.

Northern politicians opposed it in

their state legislatures and in the halls of Congress.

The Governor

feared that they were working progressively from exclusion of slaveholders in the territories toward eventual abolition.

33

The motives

30 Inaugura1 Address of Governor John A. Quitman, delivered
before both Houses of the Mississippi Legislature, January 10, 1850,
(pamphlet) John A. Quitman and Family Papers (Department of Archives
and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana).
31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.
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of the fanatics were numerous but the people of Mississippi would not
A /

be "robbed of their constitutional rights . . .

The time for tame

acceptance of Northern aggression had passed in Mississippi;
could be only one fate for acceptance of injustice:
36

degradation and ruin . . ."Ja

35

there

"Dishonor,

This forceful address, reprinted

throughout the state of Mississippi and the South, established
Quitman as a militant defender of his section and her institutions.
The issue of statehood for California which had receded
temporarily as a political question was raised again on January 21,
1850, when the entire Mississippi Congressional delegation addressed
a communication to Quitman.

The delegation knew that California

had formed a state constitution and felt that she would be admitted
as the Thirty-First state in the new session of Congress.

37

Since

the Congressmen regarded the admission of California as equivalent
to the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, they wanted "to have such
expression of opinion by the legislature, the Governor, and if
practicable the people . . .
Mississippi should adopt."

to indicate the position which

38

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

37

Mississippi House Journal (1850), 509.

38

Ibid.. 509-10.
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Quitman on February 11, 1850, forwarded the Congressional
letter to the Assembly with his own explanation about the crisis
in California.

He believed it had been precipitated by President

Taylor's actions in sending agents "to the unorganized community of
adventurers" on the Pacific coast.

He declared that no one in

Mississippi would deny the right of people in a territory to form
a state constitution when they had gone through the necessary
stage of pupilage.

But, California should be open to all citizens

in order to give Southerners an opportunity to settle there.
In conclusion he asked:

39

"Is it just that a handful of adventurers,

who shall first set foot upon any of our distant acquisitions,
shall be permitted virtually to exclude the citizens of one half
of the states of the Union from the privileges of settlement and
occupation?"

40

A reply to the Governor's message was composed by a joint
legislative committee.

Congress, according to the report, had a

duty to provide governments for the territories of California and
the Mexican cession.^

Since governments did not exist, Southern

citizens had been deterred from going into these areas with their
slaves and ". . . the cherished object of the abolitionists . . ."

39

Ibid.. 508.

40

Ibid., 509.

41

Laws of the State of Mississippi (1850), 526.

was thus being achieved.

An

The committee further recommended:

"That if our Senators and Representatives shall be satisfied, from
reliable evidence, that fraud has been practiced, or improper
influences used to stifle a full and fair expression of opinion
by the citizens of California, in reference to the formation of
their state constitution, they ought to oppose her admission.
The language in this report was stern, but the Committee did not
make a direct connection between California's admission and the
enactment of the Wilmot Proviso.

A final determination on this

question was to be referred to the Nashville Convention.^
Further action was also taken during the legislative session
concerning the Nashville Convention.

The legislature approved the

October Convention's resolutions and made an appropriation of
$220,000 to finance resistance to any future attacks by the North
upon the South's institutions.

Twenty thousand dollars would be

utilized to defray the expenses of delegates appointed by the
legislature to attend the Southern Convention.

These men were

to officially represent the state of Mississippi at this important
Convention.

45

42

Ibid.. 527.

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid.. 527-28.

45 McLendon, "John A. Quitman," 310; Troy B. Walkins, "John
A. Quitman Governor of Mississippi, 1850-1851," (unpublished M.A.
thesis, University of Mississippi, 1948), 98-107.
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Even while the legislature was preparing to send delegates
to Nashville in June 1850, questions were raised about the Southern
Convention.

A neutral attitude toward the Nashville Convention was

expressed in a column of the Columbus [Mississippi] Whig:

"We

regard it much less incapable of harm than its enemies apprehend,
and far less powerful for good than its friends imagine."

46

The

Vicksburg Whig opposed the Convention editorially, and one of the
leading conservatives in Mississippi had divided opinions about
the June meeting in Nashville.

Judge William L. Sharkey, who

later emerged as a prominent Unionist, did not interpret the
Southern Convention as a meeting of men determined to force
secession upon the South; he viewed it rather as a gathering of
Southern men who wanted to preserve both the Union and Southern
rights.

47

The future Chief Justice of Mississippi recognized,

however, the Convention's limitations:

"It is powerless for evil,

and I fear opposition to it has made it for good also."

48

On the national level in 1850 Senator Foote was the only
member of Congress from Mississippi who favored the Compromise
proposed by Henry Clay.

Foote, who had always been willing to

defend the South, had some specific objections to the Compromise:
1) Congress definitely had no power to legislate on slavery in the

46

Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi," 33-34.

47

Ibid.. 34-35.

48

Ibid.. 34.
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District of Columbia, 2) Mexican anti-slavery law was void, and
3) Texas' title to the New Mexican land was completely valid.
However, he did approve of the Fugitive Slave proposal, abolition
of the slave trade in Washington, creation of territorial governments
for the remainder of the Mexican cession without restricting
slavery, and admission of California above 36* 30'.

AQ

By May 1850 Foote had committed himself further to the
spirit of adjustment which emerged from the Committee of Thirteen.
In debate on the Senate floor he asked Southern Congressmen whether
they were ready to consider the results of the defeat of the
Compromise bills:

"I beg them to bear in mind that they must vote

for this compromise, or they must sustain the policy on nonaction.
They must agree to the admission of California, coupled with certain
compensatory advantages of inestimable value, or they must prepare
to see California come in alone; the territories without governments;
the Texas and New Mexico boundary line unsettled; and the fugitive
slave bill (the only truly efficient bill of that kind ever yet
devised) subjected to defeat.

Let me ask them if they are prepared

to contribute to this direful result?

Are they willing to mingle

their energies with the worst enemies of the South in bringing about
this state of things?"'*®

He accepted the Compromise measures and

proceeded to defend them during the summer of 1850.

49

Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., I Suss., 247.

50

Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix. 592.
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During the remainder of the Congressional session Foote
worked for the passage of the Compromise.

He engaged in debate with

leading radicals, and was very critical about the temporary defeat
of the Adjustment package on July 31.

Although he loved the Union,

he admitted, as did most Southern conservatives, that secession
might be justified if the institution of chattel slavery was harmed
by actions of the Federal government.

But he always stressed that

adjustments should be reached which would be acceptable to both
sections and that would not compromise the honor of either.

There

fore, he supported positions which he hoped would bring an end to
sectional strife.
Jefferson Davis expressed his. views on the subject of
slavery during mid-February.

He warned that the Northern states

were conducting a war against slavery and emphasized that black
bondage was protected by the Federal government--including its right
to expand.

Slavery was no longer forbidden by Mexican law which was

superseded by the Constitution, or barred by nature from entering
the West.

Southerners insisted that Texas retain the title to her

western boundary which was disputed by the United States and New
Mexico. 52

The South had furthermore been continually attacked by

the Nortli in such a way that war would have resulted if they were
foreign nations:

"And, for what end, sir, is alL this aggression?

51

Ibid., 1492-93, 1573.

52

Ibid., 149-156.
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They see that the slaves in their present condition in the South
are comfortable and happy; they see them advancing in intelligence;
they see the kindest relations exist between them and their masters;
they see them provided for in age and sickness,

. . . and . . . Let

them turn on the other hand, and they see the same race at the North
. . . with few exceptions, miserable, degraded, filling the
penitentiaries and poor-houses,

...

Do they there [Jamaica and

St. Domingo] find anything to stimulate them to future exertion in
the cause of abolition?

53

Davis thus hoped that the anti-slavery

agitation would end, and the sectional parties which he had always
feared prevented from coming into existence.^4
Representatives Albert Brown and William Feathers ton, were
also vitally concerned about the slavery question.
announced:

Brown proudly

"For myself, 1 regard slavery as a great moral, social,

political and religious blessing . . . slavery, African slavery,
was, as I religiously believe, planted in this country through the
providence of God."^^

Feathers ton was extremely concerned about

the agitation which had swept the nation over the question o£ the
rights of the South.

He could not support actions which were

53

Ibid.. 156.

54

Ibid., 156-57.

55

Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 258.
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designed to overthrow slavery below the Mason-Dixon line.5^

And,

he asked why the South was being attacked:
"Why is this unending war, made upon the institutions
of the South--this unholy crusade? What have been
her shortcomings, her dereliction, her high offending?
She holds in bondage three millions of slaves, we are
told, who should be free. . . . The free negroes of
the northern states are in an infinitely worse
condition than the slaves of the South. . . No part
of the African race upon the face of the globe,
enjoys freedom, is so well supplied with the
necessaries and comforts of life, so happy, so
intelligent as the slaves of the South. Why is this
so, Sir? Because he is in his natural— his proper
condition; one that is advantageous to his master,
and a great blessing to him."57
Both men stated that South would suffer a great financial loss by
emancipation and Featherston stressed that the Union had been
created for the benefit of both the North and S o u t h . B r o w n ,
however, recognized further "dangers" for Southerners in attacks
upon slavery which might force them to leave their homes, "or what
is ten thousand times worse than these, than all remain in a
country more prosperous and happy and see ourselves and our wives
and children, degraded to a social position with the black race."-^

56

Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 258-59.
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Ibid., 260.

58 Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 260;
Congressional Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 259.
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Brown, who would support disunion if Northern aggressions were not
stopped, represented lower class whites, who did not fear the
financial loss from possible emancipation, but more significantly
the psychological loss of status in a section which was determined
to remain a white man's country.^®
By the end of September 1850, despite protests by
Mississippi Congressmen, the Adjustment bills became law.

Both

Davis and Foote opposed the California bill, but Foote supported
the statehood bill during the next two years.

On the remaining

issues Davis supported the Fugitive Slave Act but voted negatively
on the remainder of the Compromise.

Foote supported the Texas

boundary bill, the Fugitive Slave Law, but was not recorded as
voting on the New Mexico or Slave Trade bills.

However, his early

acceptance of the idea of ending the slave depots in the District
fi1
of Columbia, indicates his support for this bill. 1
Members of the House of Representatives from Mississippi
voted like Jefferson Davis on the Compromise.

Representative Brown

repeated Davis's pattern exactly and the other two Representatives
adopted this position except on the Utah bill.

Territorial

government for Utah was evidently not considered vital by men in
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Mississippi who considered themselves soldiers of an aggrieved
South.

The entire Congressional membership had thus expressed

overwhelming dissatisfaction with the bills which Clay intended to
soothe sectional tensions.
By the fall of 1850, when Mississippians began their
struggle over the Compromise measures, two basic propaganda tactics
were used.

The Union party in Mississippi, which was gradually

forming, tried to create the impression that it was defending the
state against crafty secessionists who
of the Union.

wanted to destroy the bonds

In contrast, the States Rights men emphasized that

Southern Unionists would actually endanger slavery by their action
in acquiescing to the Adjustment bills.

White supremacy would be

threatened by submission which could only encourage the possibilities
of abolition.

Many Fire-eaters concluded that parts of the

Compromise "would unite and encourage further aggression from them
[free-soilers and

abolitionists], lead either to a speedy

dissolution of the Union, or the total destruction of slavery in
the South, or to a result still more appalling--a servile war and
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extermination of the white or black race throughout the South.
Therefore the non-rational images of "Unionism or white supremacy"
influenced the predominately rural electorate of Mississippi in
1850-1851.
During the summer of 1850 the Southern Rights movement
formed in Mississippi.

The study of local Southern Rights

associations is extremely important since Southern historians have
often concentrated on individual Fire-eaters rather than on groups.
Associations created on the local level were the vehicles through
which public opinion in Mississippi was organized.

They also formed

the base on which the new Democratic States Rights party was built.
A typical Southern Rights meeting was held in Clark county
on August 5, in order to ratify the propositions offered by the
Southern Convention.

John J. McRae spoke to these citizens of

southeast Mississippi about the aggressions which the North had
committed against their beloved South.

The members in attendance

at the meeting, in addition to ratifying the Nashville proposals,
declared that old party bonds had to be dissolved as long as the
rights of the South were endangered. ^
Similar meetings, led by the local elite, were held through
out the state until the more prominent radicals like John Quitman
took over leadership in the movement.

One of the earliest recorded
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meetings at which Quitman spoke was at Raymond in Hinds County on
September 2.

Radicals in the southwestern Mississippi county elected

Colonel William Smith of Clinton to preside over the meetings; they
resolved that friends of the South must be prepared to unite in a
common defensive effort.

Governor Quitman, the principal speaker,

defended the benefits of the peculiar institution;^ all
Mississippians were in debt to the institution of slavery "for the
great blessing of actual equality and the noblest freedom, and
above all, to exemption from white slavery and the anarchy it has
brought to Europe and is bringing to the northern s e c t i o n . A f t e r
the Governor's speech, resolutions were adopted which approved the
Nashville Convention and which declared that the admission of
California as a state was equivalent to the passage of the dreaded
Wilmot Proviso.

Additional resolutions were passed at the

afternoon session which advocated economic retaliation against the
/'Q
North and the creation of new economic strength for the South.
The South must be more economically independent of the North so
that it could "throw off its dependence upon a people who steal our
property, flece [sic] us out of our money and brand us as
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oppressors--who realize millions annually from the production
of slave labor, while they disparage the morals and impugn the
motive of slave

owners."^

Newspapers connected with the Democratic party moulded
public opinion in Mississippi.

The Mississippian. the leading

Democratic paper in the state, published materials on the dangers
to the South.

They reprinted a copy of Representative William

McWillie's address to his constituents.

In this letter McWillie

had condemned the efforts to formulate a compromise and stated
his own intention to oppose passage of the Omnibus bills which
would be a "yoke . . . upon the neck of the proud S o u t h . T e r s e
language was used, by the Natchez Free Trader which described the
danger of Northern power:

"The fruits of a dominant northern

majority will be to us worse than the doom of Jamaica and
M a r t i n i q u e . S u b m i s s i o n to this powerful majority would harm
the South because "as the conviction is disseminated that a
dominant northern majority has decreed the abolition of slaves,
the distance between us and our slave will be immeasurably lessened,
and that race, which has been content to serve a brave and gallant
people, will begin to look to the North, and partake of the loathing
and disgust which all men feel towards those who aspire to be
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master and have not the courage to resist being s l a v e s . E m o t i o n a l
language such as this was designed to appeal to the racism of the
common white man.
A most revealing discussion about the question of slavery
appeared in the columns of the Monroe Democrat.

This State Rights

paper recognized the danger to slavery from Northern attacks and the
need for white solidarity to preserve the peculiar institution.
Addressing his editorials to the planter class, the editor emphasized
that there was dissatisfaction among the mechanics in eastern
Mississippi which might cause

them to become indifferent to the

future of slavery.

laborer

The'white

was not being given enough

employment by the slaveholders who purchased their goods from the
North rather than from local craftsmen.

These local laborers also

had to compete with blacks for employment.

73

After mentioning the

weakness of the slaveholding class the editor stated the problem:
"It is a singular fact that many of our work-shops are filled with
negroes, and what is stranger, we find them elbowing the white man
at the work bench, and taking

from the white man those jobs no

negro has a right to contract

from in the absence of his master

legal agent."

74

or

This problem was caused by economic competition

between both free blacks and slaves and the white laboring class.
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It was causing alienation from the institution of slavery at a
time when it was under attack from those living above the MasonDixon line.

Black mechanics should be kept on the plantations and

patronage should be given to the white craftsmen in order to prevent
internal dissension which could be fatal in a struggle against the
Nort h : ^

"Should resistance to northern usurpation become necessary

and the better opinion is that but a span of time intervenes
between us and it, the slave owner may find that by useless
oppression he has driven from him the strong arm and the brave
heart, not only of the mechanic, but all others who have no interest
in preserving an institution that has been used tc> make slaves of
white men and their families beggars.
Governor Quitman, the most prominent state official opposed
to the Compromise of 1850 gave impetus to the resistance movement.
He was apparently in a state of depression about conditions in the
South, because he wrote his daughter that "whenever I indulge in a
reverie, my mind unconsciously falls into reflections on the
melancholy state of the [illegible], insulted and injured South."

77

Quitman believed that secession might be the only answer to the
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crisis over black slavery, and therefore called the state
legislature into session for late N o v e m b e r . ^

in this proclamation,

he stated his reason for wanting methods to stop Northern "attacks
on the South":

"the abolition, by Congress of the slave trade in

the District of Columbia, and other acts of the Federal government
done and threatened,

leave no reasonable hope that the aggression

upon the rights of the people of the slave-holding states will
cease until, by direct or indirect means,
are overthrown."

79

their domestic institutions

Although Quitman believed that secession was

probably inevitable he also thought that a meeting of the state
legislature might be able to provide other means of stopping
XT

.u
Northern
aggressions.

8 0

Support for the Governor's proclamation immediately came
from the Democratic press.

The Vicksburg Weekly Sentinel stated

that Quitman's message had startled the apathetic among the
Mississippi electorate:

"Let us then arouse, the listless to a

sense of their dangers, encourage the wavering; call the spirit of
the resolute and brave; and join one and all in a united effort to
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maintain the rights of the South,
Union."

81

in the Union or out of the

The Jackson Mississippian also approved the Governor's

message since "nearly every measure contemplated by the last
Legislature, as calculated to subvert the great objects of our
Constitutional Union, have been directly or indirectly adopted by
Congress.

...

We cannot submit

. .

OO

The Governor was also supported by local leaders in the
States Right's movement.

Charles D. Fontaine, a State Righter from

northern Mississippi, wrote a public letter which supported
Quitman's views.

He agreed that Mississippi

legislators should be

called into session so as to obtain an expression of the
electorate's feelings about Northern aggression.

Fontaine hoped

that the long hostility of the North would make the legislature
calculate the value of the Union to the South.

81

Fontaine argued that prevention of the expansion slavery by
the North could produce cataclysmic results.

There was a potential

population explosion among black slaves which made expansion
mandatory or slavery would become unprofitable.

Any large increase

in the Negro population would eventually cause lower-class whites
to migrate from the South unless the trend was reversed.
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solution for this problem--westward expansion of the peculiar
institution--however, was blocked by the North.

84

Therefore,

Fontaine predicted dire results if the North successfully achieved
this goal:

"If this cannot be done [slave expansion] the "sunny"

South . . . must surrender to the insensate Negro---or else
anticipating this sacrifice and harkening only to the instinct of
self protection and attatchment[sic]

to birthright and country,

regardless of the claims of humanity, we shall extinguish all
contest for its occupancy in the indiscriminate massacre of the
African race."

85

The slave population had to be allowed into the

territories or race war was the only alternative for the white
man in the South.

86

Fontaine did not believe that the remedy to the South's
problems could be found within the boundaries of the Union.
Northern men would not aid the South in transporting the "natural
increase" from the black population out of the restricted boundaries
of the cotton states.

Secession,

in his opinion, was the only

sensible alternative for the Southern white man to adopt.

It was

possible, that out of the Union, there might be better protection
for slave property through treaties with the North, use of armed
force, and "measures of reprisal" which were now forbidden to
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Southerners.

He concluded that the position of the South would

be more secure if she formed a Southern Confederacy which would be
prepared to defend itself against the hostility of the North.

This

new Southern nation could adopt free trade policies with Europe
which might hurt the Northern economy and cause her to petition for
the formation of a new Union; the South could then accept or reject

o7
this proposition on terms favorable to herself.
Albert G. Brown, an important States Righter, represented a
militant but less extreme point of view on the slavery crisis.

The

most important speech which Brown delivered was at Ellwood Spring
near Port Gibson on November 2, 1850.

In it he concentrated mainly

on specific objections to the Compromise.

He believed there had

been a definite effort to exclude the South's black property from
California by threat of emancipation and then by passage of the freeQO

soil constitution.

Congress bore responsibilities

actions in California by a group of "mere sojouners.

for these
OQ

California's

admission was followed by Northern effort "to wrest from the
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slaveholding state of Texas, one third of her rightful property
[Texas boundary dispute]."^0
dispute about Texas'
Slavery!!!"

91

The only reason that there was any

title to the land was:

"Slavery! Slavery!!

Brown pointed out that the North was determined that

no new slave states would enter the Union and that it hoped by
attaching this area to New Mexico to make it free.

He declared

further that Texas had no choice but to accept the ten million
dollars as compensation:

92

"The United States speaking through the

Executive and Congress says to Texas:

'We want this country, and we

mean to have it; you are weak, and we are strong.

Give up the

country quietly, and we will pay you ten millions of dollars;
refuse, and here is the army, the navy and the militia;'

. . . turn

your eyes toward Texas; see her feeble and weak, without money,
without arms;

in debt, and without credit; and tell me if it is

left to her free choice to determine whether she will accept or
refuse this proposition?"

93

Representative Brown was also critical of those parts of the
Compromise which dealt directly with slave property.

He objected

particularly to the law abolishing the slave trade in the nation's
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capital since it contained provisions which could emancipate
slaves:

"It was an act to punish the intentions of masters and to

emancipate their slaves.

...

It is to all intents and purposes an

94
act of abolition."

The Fugitive Slave Act, praised by Southern

Unionists, was not a real compromise since it merely enacted
legislation to enforce "constitutional" guarantees.

95

Despite strong objections to the Compromise, and his
reputation as a secessionist, Brown was not a John Quitman.

He was

not appalled by the cry of disunion, but he was still willing to
remain in the Union:

". . . but it must be a Union of equals.

. . .

I will not consent that the South shall become the Ireland of the
country.

Better far that we dissolve our political connection with

the North than live connected with her as her slaves or vassals."
Thus Southerners must resist the North which "will

96

inflict all that

the South will bear even to a final emancipation of the negro
race."97
Brown's concept of resistance was similar to that proposed by
Jefferson Davis.
North.

The South should present specific demands to the

These included:

94

Ibid., 253.

95

Ibid., 255.

96

Ibid., 256.

97

Ibi d.. 259.

1) the return of the disputed southwest
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land to Texas; 2) the right of slave owners to travel with their
property into the territories with federal protection; 3) an end
to Congressional interference with slavery; 4) the enactment of an
effective slave rendition law; and 5) the right of a pro-slavery
territory to be admitted to the Union.

98

If these were not met,

the South might be forced to secede but she would "be sustained by
God, and our own consciences."^
Fontaine and Brown were representative of two segments of
thought in the new party.

Fontaine represented a smaller part of the

States Rights party which believed, with Governor Quitman, that the
only answer to the South's problem was to leave the Union immediately-either separately or in cooperation with other Southern states.

In

contrast, Brown, like Jefferson Davis, was willing to remain within
the Union if the South could obtain certain guarantees from the
national government.

If these demands were not met,

believed that secession would inevitably follow.

then Brown

To put it

colloquially, Fontaine's wing of the party ran joyously toward
disunion while Brown's wing walked reluctantly.^*^
The Union forces had begun their campaign actively in
September with a rally for the Union held at the courthouse in
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Natchez.

One B. Pendleton presided over the meeting which passed

resolutions declaring loyalty to the Union, support for the
Compromise of 1850 and condemnation of the Nashville Resolutions.
Various speakers at the meeting expressed approval of the
Compromise and opposition to secession.
stated:
land.

"The Senate bills have passed, and are now the law of the
If constitutional, as a law-abiding people, we are bound to

sustain them;"
to disunion:
when?

Judge James H. Veazie

102

Colonel A. L. Bingaman declared his opposition

"Gain by the dissolution of the Union?

What and

There are none more free, more happy than ourselves."

103

The consensus of the meeting was that the Compromise had brought
peace to a troubled nation.

104

Judge William Sharkey, speaking at Vicksburg on October 8,
1850, maintained that Congress,

in passing the Adjustment bills,

had not violated Mississippi r i g h t s . H e
alternative to submission:

also presented the

"Now the question is what is to be done.

Shall we submit or secede from the Union?
that I can see in the present.

...

There is no middle ground

If there were, I might be
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content to take it.

...

To resist, is to dismember the Union.

He further held that he was willing to acquiesce on the issue of
California since "abridgement" of the interstate slave trade or
abolition itself had not o c c u r r e d . I n

concluding Sharkey stated

that he hoped "it would be a long time, ere a world was called
upon to groan the funeral dirge of this Republic."

108

Another prominent Union speaker was John D. Freeman, a
former Attorney General of Mississippi.

Speaking at Canton, on

November 6, 1850, he emphasized that Congress had not violated the
rights of Mississippi by passing the Adjustment bills.

These

bills did not transgress the limitations established by the
October 1849 meeting in Jackson on the slavery question.

This

meeting had not considered the admission of California to the Union
as sufficient cause for resistance by Mississippi.

Other provisions

of the Compromise were also just or constitutional; division of the
Mexican cession, for example, was equitable since it allowed
Southerners to migrate to Utah and New Mexico with their chattel
property.

Congress had sufficient police power to abolish the slave

trade in the District of Columbia just as Mississippi had done for
eleven years.
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Since the Compromise was legal, Mississippi would
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submit to it "as the supreme law of the land . . . she will never
be found in a state of rebellion against laws of this character.
Mississippi is a Union loving, law-abiding s t a t e . H o w e v e r ,
this moderate Mississippian did support economic retaliation against
the North as the best method of securing Southern rights.
By mid-November 1850 the States Right forces in Mississippi
supported the idea of a state convention.

Governor Quitman took

the lead when he addressed the state legislature which was
dominated by men who wanted Mississippi to resist actively the
Adjustment measures passed by the Thirty-First Congress.

He began

by stating that there was a natural conflict between the sections
which was exacerbated by the fact that most Northern parties were
anti-slavery.

The Compromise of 1850 had resulted in the exclusion

of the South from the West which hurt the financial value of slave
labor that was closely tied to the expansion of the peculiar institu
tion into new lands.

Quitman dealt at length with California's

admission which was virtually the same as passage of the Wilmot
Proviso.

The bill that ended the slave trade in the District of

Columbia also established a precedent for the abolition of the
peculiar institution itself.

Northerners had triumphed in the

sectional contest, and the Federal government was extremely hostile

11°
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to black bondage.

112

The "destruction of slavery" would not come

immediately unless all white Southerners were "murdered", but
Northerners were determined that slavery would perish even if the
South was harmed:

"The assumption by Congress of jurisdiction

over the subject of slavery, the constant evidences of growing
hostility to it, and more than all the declaration sent abroad, and
now received as inexorable law, that the area of slavery is never
to be extended--that whatever may be the wants of the country,
however the slavery district may be crowded with population, whatever
vices and evils may result from redundant population, or labor
unemployment, this doomed district is to be hedged in by a wall of
fire, and the common, natural and national right of expansion
to be denied to it, are startling f a c t s . I t

was mandatory

that the South resist, and the Governor congratulated Mississippians
for not being submissive.
He recommended that the legislature call for a primary
meeting which would begin to combat violations of Southern rights.
The Northern majority would probably not provide for the division
of California at the 36* 30' line or for the end of anti-slavery
agitation, but he believed that an attempt at reconcilation with

112 Jackson Mississippian, November 22, 1850; Rowland,
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the free-soil states had to be tried.

gut

concluded:

"[in] the event of refusal [to grant Southern demands], I do not
hesitate to express my decided opinion, that the only effectual
remedy to evils which must continue to grow from year to year, is
to be found in the prompt and peaceable secession of the aggrieved
states.Although

there was no way to predict the course

Mississippi would adopt, he felt that secession either— cooperative
or separate--"should be kept in view."^^
In response to the Governor's message the state began to
debate the question of calling a state convention.

The vast

majority of each legislative house favored the convention, but
there was opposition by individual members.

Representative Griffin

of Chickasaw County did not believe the legislature possessed the
power to call a convention.

There was also debate about whether

the holding of a convention itself should be submitted to a vote
of the people.

Both houses of the legislature, however, followed

Quitman's lead and voted to call a state convention to meet on the
second Monday in November 1851.

Elections for the convention would

be held on the first Monday in September 1851.
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Legislative members next expressed their hostility
towards Henry Stuart Foote and the Compromise of 1850.

In debate

Foote was generally critized, but he did have a few defenders.
Senator Stark stated that he was opposed to censuring Foote while
there was a sectional crisis in Washington.

It would only produce

"acrimonious feelings . . . " between Foote's friends and opponents.
Further opposition to censure came from representative Nabors,
who favored the Compromise, and asked whether the legislators had
the support of their constituents in voting to censure the Senator.
Resolutions were then passed overwhelmingly which praised everyone,
except Foote, in the Congressional delegation for their bold
opposition to the Compromise of 1850.

Foote was censored by the

legislature which declared that Mississippi's interests were not
"safe in his keeping."

120

To counter the effects of the Southern Rights-dominated
legislature, a Union meeting was held on November 18 in Jackson.
Prominent Unionists from both political parties attended this
meeting which was the decisive step in the formation of the Union
party.

Judge Sharkey was chosen president of the gathering and

Foote was the principal speaker.

These Union men praised Foote

and resolved that the Compromise of 1850 was consistent with the
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resolutions passed in October 1849.

121

But they also believed

that there were certain boundaries which must not be transgressed
by the Federal government:

"1. the interference by Congressional

legislation with the institution of slavery in the States;
2. interference in the trade in slaves between the States;
3. the abolition by Congress of slavery in the District of Columbia;
4. the refusal by Congress to admit a new State into the Union on
the grounds of her tolerating slavery.

. .; 5. the passage of any

law by Congress prohibiting slavery in any of the territories; and
6. the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law . . . "

122

A vigorous expression of States Right's opinion during the
winter of 1850-1851 came from a group of radical legislators.
These men revised a document which was written by Alexander M.
Clayton of Marshall and published as the "Address of the Committee
appointed by the Members of the Legislature Friendly to Southern
Rights to the People of Mississippi."

In the early years of the

United States problems of foreign affairs had kept the issue of
slavery dormant.

However, after the 1820 crisis over the

121 Jackson Flag of the Union. November 22, 1850, May 23,
1851. There was an address drawn up by a committee after the
meeting which discussed the Compromise of 1850 and implied criticism
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admission of Missouri to the Union and the exclusion of the South
from the Mexican cession, it was obvious that an anti-slavery
war was being actively waged.

Since political equilibrium between

the sections had been destroyed in 1850, it was necessary that the
state convention be convened to demand changes in the United States
Constitution.

These amendments would forbid unjust taxation,

require the return of escaped slaves, end all agitation on the
question of slavery in Congress, and extend the Missouri Compromise
line to the Pacific where it would be the southern boundary of
California.

If Southern grievances were redressed by the North,

the Union would survive.

But a rejection of Mississippi's demands

.J

would be met by calling a Southern convention which might even
recommend the creation of a new Southern nation.

123

In concluding,

the authors discussed the problem of preserving the Union and the
impossibility of emancipation:
We have no desire for a severance of this Union. Long
may it survive, if it can be brought back to its pristine
purity. . . .
We are ready much to preserve it. But we
could not get rid of slavery if we could. We have not
the means of selling them away, if we were willing to part
with them without compensation. And, let it be borne in
mind, that if a payment to us of anything like the value
of our slaves be made the condition of their removal, it
is simply impracticable. As it is evident upon the least
reflection, that the appropriation of a sufficient amount
of capital to this object and its consequent abstraction

123 Jackson Mississippian, December 20, 1850. The analysis
of this document was taken from the Mississippian although it was
widely circulated through the state in papers like the Natchez Free
Trader, January 8, 1851; Rawson, "Party Politics in Mississippi,"
53-58 discussed new evidence to establish the original authorship
of the document.
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from the commerce of the world, would derange every
branch of business, agricultural, commercial and
manufactural throughout Christendom. There can be no
equality of racees [sic]. They cannot live amongst us
except as our slaves, or as our masters.
The whole
history of the past proves this. One or the other must
have the ascendancy. We must maintain our superiority
or surrender the lands of our fathers.*^4
Colonization and any type of racial equality were impossible goals
for these white men who stood ready to defend the subordination of
black people.
Although these Mississippi radicals spoke boldly in their
manifesto, they were discouraged by the lack of militancy in the
other Southern states.

The upper South was apathetic, while all the

states of the lower South were divided on the course of action.
Georgians, though not totally happy about the Compromise, had
acquiesced in its passage at their December Convention.

Louisiana

was considered a lost cause, and radicals in Florida and Alabama
were struggling against strong pro-Union sentiments.

The only

state, in late 1850, which seemed to stand with the extremists of
Mississippi was South Carolina which itself was divided along the
lines of cooperation versus separate state action.
These outside forces were distressing to Southern Rights
forces, which also faced the temporary loss of John Quitman as their
leader.

Quitman had been involved in discussions with Narciso

Lopez over possible leadership of a filibustering expedition to

124

Jackson Mississippian, December 20, 1850.

Cuba in March 1850.

Although the Governor had declined to serve

as a leader for the expedition, he did recommend officers and may
have "helped supply the expedition with arms from the state
arsenal."125

jje was indicted in June 1850 by the Federal

government but claimed that as the head of a sovereign state "he
was immune from prosecution" until the end of his term.

A possible

confrontation between federal-state power was averted on
February 3, 1851 when Quitman resigned from office.

All charges

were dropped against him in mid-March 1851 but his predicament had
made the State's Rights Associations anxious about the future of
one of their most outspoken leaders.

126

Union men in Mississippi appeared confident during the winter
of 1850-1851.

One who was representative of them, D. J. Walworth of

Natchez, carried on extensive correspondence with his son in New
England.

The father was a Unionist who believed that the North

would "do us justice and carry out the Fugitive Slave bill and we
will settle the troubles in Mississippi and leave Genl Quitman
with not much more than a corporals guard."

127

In a letter in

125 Ray Broussard, "Governor John A. Quitman and the Lopez
Expeditions of 1851-1852," The Journal of Mississippi History.
XXVIII, (May, 1966), 112.
126

Ibid., 113-120.

127 D. J. Walworth to Son, Douglas, December 1, 1850,
Douglas Walworth and Family Papers (Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana).
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December 1850 Walworth commented on Henry Foote:
is not a great man I believe.

"Mr. Foote

But he is a very quick sprightly

gentleman and we have no reason to doubt his patriotism or charge
improper motives to his conduct . . .

he for the good of his

country--advocated them [Compromise bills] and had more influence
in the Senate to pass them than any other save the gentlemen
[Cass, Clay, Webster] before named and by that act periled his office
and high station to save his country . . . "

128

Mississippi Unionists continued to work actively to win
electoral support.

In Jackson the editors of the Flag of the Union

kept up a barrage of criticism against the Quitman forces who
appeared ready to move the state toward secession.

129

Union men in

contrast were protecting Southern rights "without a threatened
resort to disunion."

130

The editors also argued that the problem

of an excess slave population would not be solved by secession that
would only force the South to expand by force of arms into areas
where she already had a legal right to migrate with her black
131
property.
Local Union associations also tried to influence public
opinion.

A meeting of the association of Holmes County on

128

D. J. Walworth to Son, Douglas,

December 20,

129

Jackson Flag of the Union.January-June,

130

Ibid. , February 7, 1851.

131

Ibid. , February 14, 1851.
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January 8, 1851, was addressed by John J. Hooker who declared that
past wrongs did not justify a dissolution of the Union.

The Union

Association of Natchez planned to meet on February 22, Washington's
birthday, to renew their allegiance to the Union and elect delegates
to the nominating convention in May 1851.
at Tullula on February 10 resolved:

132

And a meeting held

". . . Secession, Disunion and

Revolution are, practically, the same thing; and whilst we assert
the right of revolution, if our government should become a source
of oppression . . . yet . . .

we hold ourselves bound . . .

to

sustain our whole system of Government against the machinations of
1 OO

all malcontents, who seek its overthrow.

.

On the national level Foote worked for the Union cause during
the winter of 1851.

He arrived back in Washington for the interim

session and presented his own censure resolutions.

134

He engaged in

speaking tours in the North, and called for sectional peace.
speech on Washington's birthday in New York Foote stated:

In a

"...

a

difficult and perilous crisis has arisen in our national affairs, . . .
and.

...

In spite of the solemn advice of Washington, in his

132 Ibid.. January 17, 1851; February 14, 1851, quoting
the Natchez Courier.
133

Jackson Flag of the Union. February 21, 1851.

134 Congressional Globe. 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 65-66.
Jackson Flag of the Union. January 24, 1851 quoting Washington
Union. March 14, 1851; Jackson Mississippian. March 21, 1851.

farewell address to his countrymen, parties characterized by
"geographic determinations" have of late sprung up among us.
Fanaticism, sectional jealousy, and lawless ambition, have, in the
last year or two, contrived most grieviously to inflame the public
mind of the nation, and to threaten the Union itself with sudden
disruption."

135

He wanted to end the divisions between the North

and South, which was being threatened by charges that the Fugitive
Slave Law was not being enforced.

Therefore Foote held that the

rendition law would be faithfully executed in the North even if
federal troops had to be utilized by President Fillmore.

This

positive language was in accord with his degire that the Union be
preserved and harmony between the sections restored.

1

At the end of the Senate session in March 1851 Foote
returned home to lead the Union party.

At Canton, Mississippi,

Foote and John Freeman engaged in a debate with Representative
William McWillie who represented the Southern Rights forces.

Foote

claimed that the entire South, except for South Carolina, was
submitting to the Compromise and that Mississippi would follow this
pattern.

Further speaking engagements made Foote the obvious

choice to lead the newly formed Union coalition.

On May 5, 1851,
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Jackson Flag of the Union. March 14, 1851.
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the Union party, meeting in the state House of Representatives,
nominated Henry Stuart Foote' as their standard bearer.

1 37

States Right's forces were laboring to maintain their
cohesiveness

while the Unionists appeared unified.

The editor of

the Monroe Democrat, J. H. F. Caldwell, resigned from the paper and
condemned the States Right camp as containing secessionists who
wanted to destroy the Union.

This former radical who had discussed

the dire consequences of emancipation could not accept the
extremism of the "ultras" like Quitman.

His resignation

demonstrates clearly the tension which always existed in the ante
bellum Southern mind between love of the Union and fear of
emancipation.

138

Caldwell's defection was not the only problem for the States
Rights forces.

Representative Jacob Thompson wrote a long letter to

the citizens of Mississippi in which he frankly admitted that
efforts at resistance were not possible.

Party leaders were also

trying to change the image of the party from that of a group of
extreme Fire-eaters to one of strong but responsible resistance men.

137

Jackson Flag of the Union, April 11, May 9, 1851.

138 Ibid ., February 14, 1851; Monroe Democrat, November 18,
1850. Caldwell had taken over the paper after the editorials and
reports had been written on race-class tension.
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These practical leaders did not believe that a radical like John
Quitman would be able to attract sufficient electoral support.1"*^
In order to boost their political fortunes, the States
Righters discussed violations of Southern rights and the problem of
abolition.

Representative William McWillie wrote his constituents

about the growing tendency toward emancipation especially among
Henry Clay's followers.^®

Abolition, he emphasized, meant "the

social and political equality of the negro and the white man."

141

His views were in accord with those expounded by Representative
Featherstone who denied that he was a disunionist while maintaining
that he was working to preserve the Union as it was created in 1787.
The Compromise bills, which were a "scheme of plunder," had been
resisted because slavery was not allowed in free-soil California.
The belief that the Mexican anti-slavery laws were still valid in
the southwest also kept Southerners from migrating with their black
slaves into these territories.

142

The conversion of Texas into

free-soil would be paid for with Southern money while the
emancipation features in the Slave Trade Law for the nation's capital

139 Columbus Southern Standard. April 5, May 3, 1851;
Jackson Mississippian. March 21, 1851; Ranck, Albert Gallatin Brown.

86, 88.
140
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was "the entering wedge to the assumption of jurisdiction over
slavery within the district, and to general abolition."143
Featherstone believed that resistance to the Compromise was
vital to the South.
American Ireland.

Submission would only convert the South into an
In order to prevent this calamity he wanted a

Southern convention to demand the right of slaveholders to take
black property into Utah and New Mexico.

144

California should be

divided at the 36° 30' line and the Convention should insist that
Northerners recognize their "rights" in any territories of the
United States:
This latter demand is a point of vital importance to the
institution of the South--If no more slave territory is
to be acquired, and no more slave States admitted to the
Union, the overthrow of the institution of slavery is not
only certain in the States where it now exists, but the
day is not very distant when it will be done. Localize
it, confine it within its present boundaries, and the
finale will be a war of extermination between the races
of the South. They can never live on terms of social
and political equality there. And I do not hesitate to
say that I will prefer seeing the Union dissolve a
thousand times over, or the South filling one common
but honorable grave, rather than the whites and blacks
living on terms of social and political equality in the
Southern States.
Mississippi should also convene a state convention to consider means
of preserving white supremacy; it should create a program of

143

Ibid.
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non-intercourse with the North that would strengthen the state's
economy in case secession became necessary.
The necessity of protecting the South against Northern
attacks was emphasized in an editorial in the Columbus Southern
Standard. There was an increasing tendency toward "centralism" in
the United States which was dangerous to the slaveholding minority
section.

Northerners who had always sought to dominate the

Federal government, had achieved this purpose when the political
equilibrium between the sections was destroyed with California's
admission as a state.

147

The North would continue its drive for

power which had already stopped the expansion of slavery:
". . . the north is gradually walling the slave states in, and ____
in a few decades, will be able to harass the upholders of the
institution by the evils growing out of overpopulation to an extent
that may render them desirous of abolishing it,--or what is the
more probable,--wring from the slaveholder a TRIBUTE IN THE WAY OF
TAXATION FOR SUFFERING IT TO EXIST!

The North do not desire the

abolition of slavery-- . . . she desires to make it more subservient
to her interests . . . with a hope of gaining a concession not for
humanities sake, but her own gain in dollars and cents."

148

146 Ibid.. see the Columbus Southern Standard, May 3, 1851
for a discussion of this suggestion.
147
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Overpopulation by the rapid increase in the slave community would
also cause the South to conquer an area in the Pacific west for
herself, which would end the Union.

The editor wanted the South to

unite in order to stop the national government which was controlled
by a Northern majority.

149

By March 1851 the States Rights forces in Mississippi were
calling for a gubernatorial convention.

The Mississippian praised

the Southern Rights forces for not striving for political offices
during the winter of 1850-51, but the editors felt it was time to
begin preparing for the political canvass of 1851.

Other States

Right papers supported the call for a convention of the States
Rights Democratic party which included both Southern Rights
Democrats and their allies, the State Rights Whigs.

These forces,

according to the Mississippian had to resist the Union-Whig party
which endangered the South's institutions:

"Let meetings be held,

and let faithful and true men be appointed in all parts of the
state to meet together . . . and select our standard bearers in the
contest we are about to wage with Federal Whiggery with its
deceptive guise of "Unionism."
the majority of her strength.
heard.

The game is up!

Let the North come forward in all
Let the voice of the great east be

The wolf of Whiggery, guant, famished

149

Ibid.
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malignant, exterminating is o n the walk.

The demon of Abolition,

too, which submission encourages, must be met.

It now looks upon

the South and meditates her destruction, . . . Let us, then
press forward to the work before us, determined never to permit
the strong-hold of Democracy to fall into the hands of the e n e m y . *
Thus, the Southern Rights forces pressured for a campaign based on
racism.and the traditional loyalty of the white masses to the
state's Democratic party.
On June 15, 1851 two hundred and fifty Southern Rights
delegates assembled to choose their candidates in this critical
contest.

The assemblage, nominated John A. Quitman as their

gubernatorial candidate despite some factionalism.

Some convention

members apparently wanted Jefferson Davis as their nominee, but
he declined to seek the office.

152

The party also adopted a

platform which reaffirmed state control over slavery:
"That the institution of slavery is left by
the Constitution exclusively under the control
of the State in which it exists, as a part of
their domestic policy, which they, and they
only, have the right to regulate, abolish or
perpetuate, as they may severally judge expedient
and that all attempts on the part of Congress
or others, to interfere with the subject, either

151
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152 Rueben Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and
Mississippians (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891),
315-17; McLendon, John A. Quitman, 348; Jackson Mississippian,
June 20, 1851.
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directly or indirectly are in violation of the
constitution, dangerous to the rights and safety
of the South, and ought to be promptly resisted."153
There was a call for the legislature to encourage migration to the
Southwest and opposition to the Compromise of 1850; they upheld the
right of peaceful secession, but stated that it's "exercise by the
state of Mississippi, under existing circumstances, would be
inexpedient and is a proposition which does not meet the approbation
of this C o n v e n t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y for the Southern Righters
in Mississippi, this somewhat moderate platform did not dispell
their image as a party of crafty secessionists lead by Fire-eater
Quitman.
On June 26, 1851 Quitman wrote Governor Whitemarsh B.
Seabrook about the problems of the radicals in Mississippi.

He

recognized that Foote was a "wily and adroit opponent," and that
he would have to campaign vigorously in order to win the election;
the results of the gubernatorial contest would determine whether
Mississippi choose the path of submission or resistance to the
Compromise of 1850.

155

Mississippi was prepared to join a

Southern Confederacy, but she did not have the military capacity,
internal unity, or trading outlets to function as a separate

153

Jackson Mississippian, June 20, 1851.

154 Ibid. It is apparent that there was a division within
the States Rights party between "true" secessionists and more
practical politicians who wanted to win offices in the 1851 elections.
155 John A. Quitman to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, June 26, 1851
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
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nation:

"We can however prepare to take position promptly when

other states move.

Thus far I think this state will go if the

Southern rights party succeed, of which there is scarcely a doubt."*'**’
Quitman stressed that he maintained the right of secession and had not
retreated from any of the previous positions which he had held.^--^
However, he believed that South Carolina would have to take the
initiative in awakening a sleepy, apathetic South:

"Nowhere but in

this state is there any authoritative action proposed and here it
requires a mighty struggle to over come the [illegible] inertia of
a people living in comfort.

Moral influences have never produced

revolutions without an exciting cause--."

158

Southerners, he

concluded, were apathetic even though their equality was destroyed
and black slavery threatened.

159

During the remainder of the summer an exciting campaign
was carried on for seats in the state convention and various
political offices.

The chief issue was the Compromise of 1850, with

popular interest focusing on the canvass conducted by John Quitman
and Henry Foote.

It was generally conceded by knowledgeable

politicians that Foote was a more attractive campaigner than
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Ibid.
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Ibid.

158

Ibid.

159

Ibid.

Quitman.

He had a superior ability to communicate with the white

yeoman of Mississippi.

His vigorous debating style which was not

particularly appropriate for the chamber of the United States Senate
was most effective when campaigning.
The two candidates agreed to a joint canvass which was
characterized by optimism and violence.

In early July Foote gave

a favorable evaluation of Unionism in Mississippi:

"I have told

you that Mississippi was one of the most reliable Union states in
the Confederacy.
September.

We will prove this to be literally true in

Quitman and Quitmanism are dead in Mississippi."161

This prediction was partially the result of Foote's tactics which
identified Quitman with immediate secession.

After Foote took to

taunting the governor during his speeches, a fight finally broke
out at Sledgeville which Quitman described:

"While thus speaking

I was several times interrupted by Senator Foote, and at length I

160 Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians.
315-17; Gonzalez, "The Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote," 319;
Parkerson, "Henry Stuart Foote of Mississippi," 177, 340; Rawson,
Party Politics in Mississippi," 71. Parkerson concluded that Foote
was a very effective campaigner in 1851: "In summary, Foote aroused
strong emotional responses in his audiences, made up of a mixture
of Whigs and Democrats, who like him, and with generous assistance
from him had come to fear for the Union. They applauded, loudly and
vociferously. The crowds appeared to grow larger as the campaign
drew to an end."
161 Henry S. Foote to Howell Cobb, July 9, 1851, Ulrich
Bonnell Phillips (ed.), The Correspondence of Robert Toombs.
Alexander H. Stephens. and Howe11 Cobb in Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for the Year 1911 (Washington, 1913),
II, 242; Jackson Mississippian, July 18, August 1, 1851.
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heard his voice near me on my right, exclaim you are a liar, and
turning toward him I saw him advancing and aiming a blow at me,
which slightly grazed my person.

Before I could turn upon him, he

quickly glided back out of the reach of my arm, and as I sprang
towards him a number of gentlemen rushed in and protected him from
merited chastisement, but not until I had dealt him a blow with my
fist, and one with my foote [sic] ."162

stopped the joint

canvass, and both men proceeded to justify their actions.

Newspapers

defended their particular candidate, but the evaluation of the
Jackson Mississippian may be substantially correct; the paper concluded
that the fight was the result of Foote's love of conflict.
In this period of crisis for the radical forces, the
Mississippian. discussed the issues which might motivate the
electorate.

The national government, in the editor's opinion, was

controlled by abolition forces which could turn the South into
another "St. Domingo"— with all the horrors of emancipation.

164

Southerners were faced with a crisis that was the result of the
passage of a Compromise that was the virtual enactment of the
Wilmot Proviso:

162
"To the People of Mississippi,"
July 19, 1851
(broadside)
John A. Quitman and Family Papers; See also Gonzalez, "The
Public Career of Henry Stuart Foote", 102-106 for a more detailed
account of this event.
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"The Wilmot Proviso is, in effect, the law of land.
The South has been excluded from the territories.
Abolition states are being formed all around u s .
and the extreme Southern States, which, but a few years
ago, imagined themselves entirely secure will be
sub jected to the same border encroachments, and
intrigues with their slaves, which have made
Delaware an abolition State, depreciated the value
of slaves in Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky, and
are causing them to send that kind of property South
that it may be disposed of before it is utterly
valueless."i5?
Since slavery property could not expand westward it also meant that
an increasing number of free-soil states would enter the Union;
these "Northern states would gradually provide the necessary
majority to amend the United States Constitution so that Congress
would have "the power to abolish slavery.11

Therefore the

editor called upon Mississippians who might be wavering in their
support of the States Rights party to reject both the Compromise
and submission to Northern aggressions:

". . . you can refrain

from lauding these measures as constitutional and just . . .
You can refrain from voting your approval of them at the ballot
box.

You can mark with deep and ineffaceable brand, the Southern

traitors who assisted the Northern fanatics in palming them upon
you.

You can keep from licking the hand that smites y o u . " ^ ^

165
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The leaders of the States Rights party also tried to
influence the electorate by publicly expressing their opinions on
the issues.

Quitman continued his speaking tour and Jefferson

Davis wrote a group of Mississippi radicals that the expanding
power of the Federal government had to be restrained:
"Usurpation has marked the history of all limited governments, and
unless the states have the capacity to restrain this tendency in our
federal government, its history must add another to the many
instances in which power has trampled upon right,

..."

169

Congressman Brown, speaking in Pascagoula in early August, stated
the Compromise of 1850 had violated the "constitutional" rights of
the South:

". . . it established precepts and principles dangerous

and destructive to the interests of the Southern people, and
tending either to the ultimate overthrow of slavery, or the
extinguishment of the white race."^^
Senator Davis also traveled to small towns like Aberdeen
where he delivered detailed attacks on the Compromise.

He

168 Jefferson Davis to J. H. Robinson and others, July 18,
1851, Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 82; Jackson
Mississippian, July 25, August 15, 1851.
169 Jefferson Davis to J. H. Robinson and others, July 18,
1851, Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 82.

170

Jackson Mississippian, August 29, 1851.
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emphasized that he had voted against the Adjustment bills in
accordance with the state legislature's instructions, and because
he believed them harmful to the South's domestic institution.

The

Senator also noted that reports were circulating that lower-class
white men, who did not own slaves, would support the Union party.
Poor whites, Davis believed, could not "be so blind to their own
interests, as to be thus cheated out of their privileges.

. . .

That now they stand upon the broad level of equality with the rich
man.

Equal to him in everything, save that they did not own so

much property . . .

no white man, in a slaveholding community, was

the menial servant of any one."

172

The white man's status as a

superior to the Negro was guaranteed because "the distinction
between the classes throughout the slaveholding states, is a
distinction of color."

1 73

Emancipation of the black man would directly harm the
interests of yeoman in Mississippi.

Their destiny would be the

same as white men in the North where distinction between social
classes was based on wealth--not c o l o r . T h e

lower class white

171 Rowland, Jefferson Davis. II, 70-73; Jackson
Mississippian, July 25, 1851.
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"would become a menial for the rich, and be by him reduced to an
equality with the free blacks.’'175

a

common white man would have

to compete with the black man on terms which would reduce his
chance of escaping poverty.

Thus, the poor whites' position in

society was directly dependent "upon their superiority to the
blacks . .

To prevent this destruction of their economic

interests, the yeoman farmers must not cooperate with the
submissionists whose actions would harm the South.

177

In answering a series of questions Davis discussed the
problem of disunion.

He did not support immediate secession by

South Carolina or Mississippi, but upheld the abstract right of a
state to leave the Union.

178

It was inexpedient for Mississippi

to secede in 1851, and the Senator stressed that "secession
should be looked to, only as a last resort, when all other remedies
fail, . . ."

179

If South Carolina decided on a course of disunion,

however, Davis stated that Mississippi should support her militarily
if the national government tried to force her back into the Union.
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By September 1851 the Mississippi electorate had been
thoroughly exposed to the views of both parties.

When they voted

in the elections for the state convention, the Unionists carried
two thirds of the counties.

It seemed apparent that white

Mississippi had decided to acquiesce to the Compromise of 1850.
The total vote for Unionist candidates outnumbered that of their
State Rights opponents by seven thousand; States Righters received
their support mainly from the Fourth Congressional district in
southwest Mississippi.

Unionists claimed that Mississippi was

firmly in the Union camp.

181

Editors supporting the States Rights party generally conceded
that Mississippi had submitted to the Adjustment bills.
Democrat, however, editorialized:

The Yazoo

"We affirm that, because the

people have decided to acquiesce in the Compromise, it does not
follow that they approve that compromise, or the conduct of those
who helped pass it.

This proposition is clear.

. . .

The people

may well 'bear1 the ills they have, rather than flee to those
they know not of without endorsing the conduct of those who
brought these ills upon them."

182

The Jackson and Mississippi

Gazette*s editor astutely concluded that the margin of victory of
the Unionist party was approximately equal to the number of voters

181 Davis, "Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi Gubernatorial
Contest of 1851," 59-60; Jackson Mississippian. September 12, 19,
1851.
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who did not participate in the delegate election.18^

There

evidently were many apathetic voters as Ethelbert Barksdale noted
in a letter to Jefferson Davis:

"Thousands of Democrats not fully

understanding the object of the Convention, nor seeing the propriety
of holding it refused to go to the polls . . .18^
After the September elections, Jefferson Davis replaced
Quitman as the gubernatorial candidate of the States Rights party.
Quitman, believing that the overwhelming Union victory was a
repudiation of the positions he had advocated while governor,
submitted his resignation to the party.

185

To replace him the

state convention felt, as did the Mississippi Palladium, that there
was only one choice:

"COL JEFFERS(X) DAVIS."186

After Davis's

nomination, Barksdale urged that he start to campaign as quickly
as possible; he believed it would be successful because:

"there

are many Democrats who voted the Union ticket, and would not
sustain Gen. Quitman, but give you a hearty support."

187
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185

Yazoo Democrat. September 17, 1851.

186

Holly Springs Mississippi Palladium. September 12, 1851.

187 Ethelbert Barksdale to Jefferson Davis, September 19,
1851, Jefferson Davis Papers.

277

Union elation after the convention was high.

D. J.

Walworth, a Unionist in Natchez, wrote his son Douglas:

"By the

Courier you will have seen and learned of the [illegible]

overthrow

of the disunion party in this state such triumph of good principles
188
I have never witnessed before." 00

This Unionist enthusiasm was

common, but the Flag of the Union, warned that there was still the
gubernatorial and Congressional elections to be fought in
November.189
Senator Davis, beginning to campaign in mid-September, was
operating at a disadvantage.

In his address to the Mississippi

public Senator Davis presented an able history of Northern
aggressions against the South; this Northern hostility which
resulted in California's admittance to the Union had upset the
political equality between the two sections.

Furthermore he

emphasized the abolition features of the Compromise of 1850 which
190
would appeal to all white Mississippians.
During the fall Foote continued to promote himself as the
safe, conservative candidate.

In a speech in Natchez he declared

that Union loving Mississippians were partially responsible for

188 D. J. Walworth to son Douglas, September 11, 1851,
Douglas Walworth and Family Papers.
189

Jackson Flag of the Union. September 12, 1851.

190

Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II, 88-107.

saving the Union:
been saved.

"By the elections of September, this Union has

It was not the act of one man or the other, of one

party or the other, but of the people who dared to act in open
disregard of mere party tactics, and to devote themselves to the
course of a common country."

191

This strategy was accompanied by

his strong declaration that secession was not a constitutional
right, and that there was no need to adopt extreme measures since
the slave states were safe.

Foote also defended the Compromise

measures while declaring that he was a good Democrat who had
followed the course of the national Democracy; the Union party in
Mississippi was a reaction to the activities of the disunionist
faction which might have caused secession and civil war.

Therefore,

the Senator appealed to the masses love for the Union and party
in his bid to be elected governor.

192

On November 3-4, 1851, the election was held, and Foote
defeated Davis by the narrow margin of 999 votes.

This victory

was especially marginal when compared with the 7,000 vote lead the
Unionists had amassed in September.

Davis also carried several

areas which had previously gone for the Unionists.

However, the

191 Jackson Flag of the Union. October 3, 1851 quoting
Natchez Courier.
192 Jackson Flag of the Union. September 17, October 3,
1851, October 24, 1851 quoting New Orleans True Delta.
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Union party won a majority in the Mississippi House of
Representatives and all but one of the Congressional seats--that
held by Albert G. Brown.
The results of the election raised several important
questions:

1.

How were the States Rights forces able to close the

seven thousand vote gap between September and November 1851?
2.

What characteristics did the counties have which voted for each

party?

3.

What factors may account for voter attraction to a

particular party?
Union forces in Mississippi, as the Flag of the Union had
warned in September 1851 would have to canvass diligently even
after their overwhelming convention victory.

Professor Gonzalez

emphasizes that they were confronting a well-known Mississippian
who had the ability to attract Whig support and won the confidence
of portions of the electorate which would never support Quitman or
Foote.

The first point in his analysis is somewhat tenuous since

the States Rights papers constantly branded the Whigs as Unionists
and emphasized their own Democratic origins.

However, Davis could,

as delegate Reuben Davis had noted, pick up support which would not
go to Quitman.

In fact, this contemporary States Righter thought

193 Davis, "Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi Gubernatorial
Contest of 1851," 71-72; Jackson Flag of the Union. November 21,
1851; Mississippi House Journal (1852), 255-56; D. J. Walworth to
Douglas Walworth, November 3, 1851, Douglas Walworth and Family
Papers.
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that if Senator Davis had been nominated in June 1851 he would
have carried the election.

Nominated late in the campaign his

bad health had kept him from waging a vigorous campaign which might
conceivably have changed the results.
Union strength in Mississippi was centered in the
traditionally Whig western half of the state— especially along the
river.

These counties were characterized by heavy concentrations

of blacks and high property values.
by a margin of four to one.

They voted for the Union party

In contrast the counties which

supported the States Rights Democracy were located in the south
and eastern parts of Mississippi.

Counties in these areas had a

tradition of voting Democratic, lower property values, and a lower
proportion of Negroes in their population.

Their ratio of support

for the States Rights forces was also four to one.

Certain

counties, of course, did not follow this pattern, but there were
obvious differences between the centers of support for the two
195
parties.

194 Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians,
315, 317; John Edmund Gonzalez, "Flush Times, Depression, War and
Compromise," in Richard A. McLemore (ed.) A History of Mississippi
(Hattiesburg: University and College Press of Mississippi, 1973), I,
306; Jackson Flag of the Union. September 12, 1851; Jackson
Mississippian, July 25, August 29, November 14, 1851; Woodville
Republican. June 24, 1851.
195
49, 51.

Seventh Census. 447-58; Young, "The Mississippi Whigs,"
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The wealthy river counties, bastions of Unionism, were an
enigma.

Men in this area were probably alarmed by the apparent

threat of secession which John Quitman had represented and by the
association of Davis with the radical wing of the Democratic States
Rights party through Unionist propaganda.

Even though loyalty to

the Union was dependent upon a cessation of sectional aggressions,
conservatives in Mississippi may have been alarmed by the
discussions of secession which most conservatives labeled as a right
of revolution--not an exercise of constitutional power.

Moderates

were also influenced by the relative affluence which existed in
1850-1851.

However, the most important factor may have been the

past habit in the western part of the state of voting Whig which
was reinforced by the Whig press which presented Foote as the
safe, Union loving candidate .
People in eastern Mississippi were extremely loyal to the
Democratic party and apparently followed established patterns in
voting for the States Rights Democracy.

Since early 1851 States

Righters had called for all Democrats to support their party and
had emphasized that they were not disunionists.

Personality may

have also been important since Albert G. Brown was a very popular
politician in the southeast counties.

He was viewed as a tribune

of the lower classes and his image may have helped carry counties

196 Jackson Flag of the Union. 1850-1851; McLendon, "John
A. McLendon," passim; Moore, Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi.
179; Natchez Courier, 1850-1851, passim.
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in his Congressional district for the States Rights forces.
Brown and Davis did not retain complete identification with the
extreme, pro-secessionist wing of the party and may have thus
picked up doubtful Democratic support.
influenced by the States Rights press.

197

The yeoman were also

As Henry S. Foote noted

they "had been deceived by the most corrupt press that had ever
cursed Christendom."

198

It is not possible to assess accurately the role of race
in this election, but it was evidently a factor which favored the
States Rights party.

Accounts in the newspapers and political

speeches emphasized the racial problems that would follow the
emancipation that many white Mississippians believed was the
inevitable result of the Compromise.

Jefferson Davis utilized

the tactic of appealing directly to the non-rational racial
prejudice of lower class whites, and there is no reason to suppose
that he would adopt an ineffective campaign tactic.

Racial fears

may have underlined the voting of many Democrats who were already
conditioned by their party's history of strong defense of Southern
"rights."

Although racism was a significant factor in Mississippi

197 Jackson Mississippian, 1851, passim; Monroe Democrat,
1851, passim; Ranck, Albert Gallatin Brown, 10-100; Woodville
Republican, 1851, passim.
198

Jackson Flag of the Union, October 3, 1851.
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politics in 1850-1851, there was not the overwhelming
fear of emancipation which existed in South Carolina during the
nullification crisis.

199

On November 10, 1851 the state convention convened with
an overwhelming pro-Union majority.

Cornelius Cormack of

Tishomingo county was selected president of the convention, and a
committee of thirteen was appointed to consider suggestions offered
by the members of the convention.

The committee report, with minor

amendments, was adopted as the preamble and resolutions of the
c o n v e n t i o n . T h e preamble declared that, while the people of
Mississippi did not approve of all parts of the Compromise, they
would accept it "as a permanent adjustment of this sectional
controversy, so long as the same in all its features shall be
adhered to and enforced."

201

A declaration of loyalty to the

Union was then made and the constitutional right of secession
denied.

202

But the convention also listed aggressions which

Mississippians would not tolerate:

199 Columbus Southern Standard, August 23, 1851; William
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South
Carolina 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), 49361, passim; Oxford Constitution, May 17, July 12, 1851.
200 Journal of the Convention of Mississippi and the Act
Calling the Same (Jackson: Thomas Palmer, Convention Printer, 1851),
3-45. Hereinafter cited as Journal of the Convention.
201

Ibid., 47.

202
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1st. The interference by Congressional Legislation
with the Institution of Slavery in the States.
2d. Interference with the trade in Slaves between
the States. 3d. Any action of Congress on the subject
of slavery in the District of Columbia . . . incompatible
with the safety and domestic tranquility--the rights
and honor of the slave-holding States. 4th. The
refusal by Congress to admit a new State into the Union
on the ground of her tolerating slavery within her
limits. 5th. The passage of any law by Congress
prohibiting slavery in any of the territories.
6th. The
Repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, and the neglect or
refusal by the General Government, to enforce the
Constitutional provisions for the reclamation of Fugitive
Slaves.203
After these boundaries were established, the convention members
declared that the call of the convention itself "was an unwarranted
assumption of power by the Legislature."

204

Even though the resolutions were overwhelmingly adopted,
there was a minority report which represented the opinion of a
significant number of Mississippians.

20S

The minority members

recognized that Mississippi had acquiesced to the Compromise of
1850 but could not regard the September vote as more than "a
reluctant consent to them [Compromise bills]

. . ,"200

This idea

was embodied in resolutions which held that the people had adopted
the Compromise rather than a course which might endanger the Union.20?

203

Ibid., 48.

204

Ibid.
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206
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After the Convention, the Mississippian called for a
meeting of both wings of the Mississippi Democracy.

The Southern

Sentinel urged the Democratic party to reunite, and an official
call for a Democratic State Convention was issued on November 21,
1851.

208

The Convention which met in Jackson on January 8 , 1852,

was addressed by President Powhatton Ellis:

"Since the expression

of the will of the people of this state, through their late
convention, in reference to what is generally known as the
compromise bills, there seems to be no further cause for
disagreement for separation among the Democrats of the State.

We

acquiesce in those laws, provided they are carried out in good
faith."209
In the state legislature there was much division between
the States Rights-oriented Senate and the Unionist-dominated
House.

House members wanted to meet in a joint session to select

men for the Senate vacancies left by the resignations of Foote
and Davis.

They also hoped to select men to serve for the new

terms beginning in March 1853.

This latter request was resisted

by the Senate since it was likely that the next legislature would
be dominated by the Democracy.

210

208 Jackson Mississippian, November 14, 1851; Rawson, "Party
Politics in Mississippi," 96-98; Woodville Republican, January 27,
1852.
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By early 1852 many Democratic leaders were advocating
that the party must be reunified in this Presidential election
year.
branch.

But some Unionists were adverse to extending the olive
In Congress the issue of who was loyal to the national

Democracy was raised in sharp debate between Union Congressmen from
Mississippi and Albert Gallatin Brown.

John D. Freeman, in a

speech in the House of Representatives on March 18, 1852, condemned
the State Righters in Mississippi for abandoning the principles of
the national Democracy by advocating extreme measures of resistance.
He maintained that radicals like Albert Gallatin Brown were trying
"to beg" their way back into the national party.

211

Freeman contended that Unionist Democrats had saved the
Compromise, and that these men held the key for success of the
Democracy in the Presidential election; such conservatives required
"the Baltimore Convention to give them nominees for President
and Vice President, free alike from the sin of secession and
abolition--men whose past lives and public services will personify
the great principle of the integrity of the Union, and the equal
rights of the states."

212

Freeman also warned that the Democratic

convention had to help establish peace on the slavery question or
their "nominees will fail to be elected."

213
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Brown, speaking for Democratic radicals in Mississippi,
replied on March 30, 1852.

The fiery speaker defended his own

course of action in 1850-1851 and that of men connected with his
party.

He emphasized his own ties with the Democratic party while

maintaining that the national party did not control the positions
0 1 /

a state should adopt on national affairs.

The convention held

in Mississippi "which appointed delegates to the Baltimore
Convention was called a Democratic convention and not as a so
called Democratic States-Right Convention."

215

These barbed

exchanges in Congress were omens of the coming destruction of the
temporary parties in 1852.
The Union party's death was de facto by mid-1852 as old
party organizations were reestablished.

A large meeting was held

in Jackson on June 9, 1852 to ratify the nominations of Franklin
Pierce as the Democratic candidate for president.^16
Tarpley, who presided over the meeting, stated:

Judge C. S.

"The unfortunate

divisions amongst ourselves, that have caused the banner of
Democracy to trail in the dust, may now be healed; Union Democrats
and State Rights Democrats may again . . . shake hands, and

214

Ibid., 355-59.

215

Ibid., 359.

216 Jackson Flag of the Union, April-May, 1852; Jackson
Mississippian, June 11, 1852.

fraternize around the fires of the great Democratic party,

. . ."217

The Whigs also recognized and supported their national candidate,
Winfield Scott, who had to struggle against charges that he was an
abolitionist.

Both parties conducted vigorous campaigns, but the

Democracy carried the state for Pierce by nine thousand votes.
Henry Foote claimed that Pierce won because he had supported the
Compromise of 1850.

Although the Unionist party died in 1852,

it had a significance beyond its brief life.

It had been the

principal instrument that persuaded the people of Mississippi to
accept Compromise and peace in the great crisis of mid-century.

217

218

Jackson Mississippian, June 11, 1852.

218 Jackson Flag of the Union, July 2, 1852; Jackson
Mississippian, July 2, 1852; Rawson, "Party Politics in
Mississippi," 100-18. Although both parties had endorsed the
Compromise, the approval of the Democrats was voiced more strongly
than that of the Whigs.
Consequently Pierce was more closely
associated in the popular mind with support of the Compromise than
Scott was.

CHAPTER VI
SOUTH CAROLINA: HOME OF SEPARATE AND
COOPERATIVE SECESSIONISTS
By 1850 South Carolina had adopted secession as its main solu
tion to the problem of sectional confrontation.

In this militantly

pro-Southern society, leading politicians were ready to begin a revo
lution in order to maintain black slavery which they viewed as a
necessary part of white psychological and economic dominance.

Since

there were few Unionists in the state, the main conflict was between
cooperative and separate state secessionists.
Plantation agriculture, which had been established in the 1740's,
was the basis for the state's wealth.*

Its initial affluence was based

on the growing of rice, which was the dominant crop by 1770, and was
such as it gave the state the reputation of "being in wealth, and every
other advantage, one of the most important provinces of America."
During the 1780's South Carolina encountered an economic decline but
recovered during the next decade to begin a thirty-year period of pros
perity; wealth was based partially on the commerce which flourished
during the European war, and cotton prices which reached a postwar level
of thirty-seven cents a pound.

3

1 Marjorie S. Mendenhall, "A History of Agriculture in South
Carolina 1790 to 1860: An Economic and Social Study" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1940), 1-16. Hereinafter
cited as "A History of Agriculture in South Carolina."
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1— 166, passim; Al fred Glaze Smith, Economic Read justinenL of an 0 Id Cotton
State (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1958), 1-19, 45-111,
passim.
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Fanning in the Palmetto state was dominated by the growth of
rice and sea island and short staple cotton.

The first two crops grown

along the Atlantic coast, were important to the state's wealth.

How

ever, the economic expansion which occurred between 1790-1826, was
based primarily on the introduction of short staple cotton into the
backcountry, the new staple bringing good prices during the first
quarter of the nineteenth century.

The state's economy was very depen

dent on the prices which could be obtained in European and Northern
markets for these three agricultural products.

4

From 1820-1850 South Carolina planters and yeoman suffered a
prolonged economic decline despite attempts at diversification.

Although

rice planting "was almost continuously profitable," the cotton planters
had a number of serious problems.

Evidence indicates that after 1826,

agriculture suffered seriously from soil depletion, outward migration
(of yeomen, planters, and blacks), and competition from new lands being
opened in the Gulf South.
economically by the 1840's.

However, South Carolina began to recover
Cotton prices, which had reached a low of

six cents a pound in the mid-forties, climbed back to an acceptable
minimum by 1850.

Professor Smith suggests that any political radical

ism caused by economic forces was not the result of "the fact that
agriculture in South Carolina was a losing proposition but that it was

4 Mendenhall, "A History of Agriculture in South Carolina,"
17-166; Smith, Economic Readjustment of an Old Cotton State, 45-112.
5 Smith, Economic Readjustment of an Old Cotton State, 19-45,
59-60, 69.
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not as profitable as it was in other parts of the country at that time,
and had been in South Carolina in previous times.
Charleston, the Queen City, had also suffered from economic
problems during the nineteenth century.

Her decline as a port and

center of trade was a fait accompli by the 1820's; she never again
achieved the pre-eminence of earlier decades.

A combination of forces,

including plunging cotton prices and competition from trading cities in
the interior of the state as well as along the Atlantic seaboard was
responsible for her decline.

Her leaders were naturally concerned

about this change, and there were continued efforts to establish direct
trading ties with Europe which ended in failure because the shipping
connections through New York were less expensive.

This economic

reality, however, as Professor Van Deusen stresses, did not prevent
the leaders of South Carolina from constantly complaining that the North
was an economic octupus choking Charleston's growth.

This belief, which

was not actually rooted in fact, tended to exacerbate the state's
reaction to sectional problems.^
The most important factor in conditioning South Carolina's
response to sectional problems was the presence of large numbers of
black slaves within the state.

There were approximately 274,000 white

citizens and 394,000 Negroes in 1850.

6
7

In twenty districts blacks

Ibid., 105.

John G. Van Deusen, Economic Bases of Disunion in South
Carolina (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), 182-216;
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outnumbered whites, and in thirteen the slave population ranged from
sixty to ninety percent of the total population.

Concentrations of

blacks in these districts— especially along the sea coast— was a fact
with which all white men in the Palmetto state were familiar.

South

Carolinians wanted the peculiar institution maintained because of their
economic investment in slavery and because of their fear about the
problems in a post-abolition society.

This attitude, which was, of

course, present throughout the entire South, had been important in
O
South Carolina politics since the 1820's.
Economic grievances and racial fears were the most important
factors conditioning South Carolina politics from 1820-1836.

The

state's elite was aware of the drop in cotton prices and blamed the
national protective tariffs for the decline.

During the decade, the

hostility to the tariff was increased by planter guilt about the
peculiar institution and by concern over the servile insurrections
9

led

by Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner.

As Professor Freehling puts

it;

"In view of the fear and guilt which plagued slaveholders, there

seemed substantial doubt in the 1820's whether the South could muster
up a defense against anti-slavery onslaughts.

Under the circumstances,

the style of the proslavery response--proud, haughty, exploding at the

8 The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850
(Washington, 1853), 334-47. Hereinafter cited as The Seventh Census.
9 William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil W a r : The Nullifica
tion Crisis in South Carolina 1816-1836 (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1965), 7-381. Hereinafter cited as Prelude to Civil W a r .

293

slightest hint of outside meddling--was only to be expected."10
The aggressive spirit in South Carolina caused strong resis
tance to the Tariffof Abominations passed in 1828.
South Carolina's elite, like Thomas Cooper,

Some members of

believed that the only

remedy to the situation was secession from the Union; John C. Calhoun
proposed nullification as an alternative to Cooper's revolutionary
idea.

Even though the state remained in a period of crisis from 1828-

1833, it found no formula on which to oppose the national government.
The Compromise Tariff of 1833 was enacted in Washington and Andrew
Jackson stood firm as the defender of national unity.

None of the

other slave states joined South Carolina in testing nullification and
Calhoun now preached that separate state resistance to the national
government was f u t i l e " h e

[Calhoun] spent his remaining years in

an effort to unite the whole South into a political bloc. . .
Calhoun and
alliances after the

his quarreling apostles passed through several
defeat of nullification in 1833.

He first led his

followers into the newly formed Whig party which also included Jackson's
inveterate enemies Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.

This alignment

proved only temporary, and by the late 1830's Calhoun had reentered the
Democratic fold.

He maintained ties with the national Democracy while

10 William W. Freehling (ed.) The Nullification Era: A
Documentary Record (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 12.
11 Freehling, Prelude to Civil W a r , 89-307; Robert Remini,
Andrew Jackson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), 106-40.
12 Gerald Capers, John C. Calhoun; Opportunist (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1969), L64. Hereinafter cited as John C. Calhoun.
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trying to keep enough autonomy to protect Southern interests and
further his own Presidential ambitions.1-^
At the same time political divisions within South Carolina were
healed as the previous factions drew together.

There had been important

politicians in South Carolina who had been supporters of the Jackson
administration as well as firebrands during the nullification crisis.
These old antagonists were gradually reunited because of the Northern
attacks against slavery.

14

In 1839 Robert Barnwell Rhett and

Franklin Elmore, two prominent Southern ultras, "engineered a recon
ciliation movement backed by a large portion of the financial and
landed wealth of the State."

1s

Despite strong objections from James

Hammond, an important nullifier, they were able to secure the election
of Unionist J. P. Richardson as governor in 1840.

Calhoun thus had a
■I £

secure base at home from which he tried to build a Southern party.
In 1843 Calhoun decided to run again for the Presidency.

His

candidacy precipitated a struggle with the Van Buren forces which
wanted to prevent his nomination.

By the spring of 1844 Calhoun had

temporarily abandoned his drive for the nomination; he was willing

13 Capers, John C. Calhoun, 169-209; Daniel Wallace, South
Carolina: A Short History (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1961), 419-33; Charles Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist
1840-1850 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1951), 50-59.
Hereinafter cited as John C. Calhoun.
14

Freehling, Prelude to the Civil Wa r , 87-360, passim.

15

Wallace, South Carolina. 422.

16

Ibid.; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, 50-59.
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instead to accept Tennessee's James K. Polk as the Democratic
standard bearer.*^
Even though Calhoun submitted to national political realities,
Robert Barnwell Rhett, a leading Fire-eater, wanted strong resistance
to the national government.

This Southern "hotspur" was most con

cerned about the proposed annexation of Texas and the passage of the
Tariff of 1842 which he believed was harmful to South Carolina's
economy.

Calhoun encouraged Rhett's agitation on the Texas question

but did not want any radical statements issued about the tariff.

At

the end of the 1844 Congressional session Rhett published an Address
to his constituents in which he discussed the dangers of anti-slavery
agitation, the annexation of Texas, and the Tariff of 1842.

He called

for a state convention to be convened in 1845 to nullify the tariff
if the 1842 law was not repealed.

By mid-July Rhett had assumed

leadership of the "Bluffton Movement" which advocated either nullifiestion or secession as ways to resist the tariff.

1ft

During the remainder of 1844 the Calhoun forces had to contend
with the "Bluffton Boys."

Rhett received temporary support from the

Charleston Mercury and from Langdon Cheves, an elder statesman, who
wrote a letter advocating long-range preparation for a Southern

17

Capers, John C. Calhoun, 204-25; Wiltse, John C. Calhoun,

134-98.
18 Chauncey S. Boucher, "Annexation of Texas and the
Bluffton Movement," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI (June,
1919), 3-33; Laura White, Robert Barnwell Rhett; Father of
Secession (New York: The Century Company, 1931), 51-84; Wiltse,
John C. Calhoun, 187-98.

Confederacy in order to ensure the protection of slavery.

After Calhoun

returned home, he won back control of the Mercury while effectively
silencing the extremists.

The contest was renewed, however, by

Governor James Hammond's call for South Carolina to vigorously resist
the tariff in late 1844.

19

Hammond also warned about the dangers of

emancipation which made the protection of white supremacy necessary:
"See as we of the South do, the naked impossibility of emancipation,
without the extermination of one race or the other, . . .--I cannot
doubt that you will be justified by God and future generations, in
adopting any measures, that will place your rights and property exclu
sively under your own control, and . . .--I believe you will be equally
justified in taking these measures as early and decisively as in your
judgement you may deem proper."

20

Although extreme action was defeated

in the state legislature, Joel Poinsett correctly noted that the
Bluffton Movement had trained young Carolinians "to the work of
agitation."

21

The Mexican War heightened concern in South Carolina about
Southern rights.

Political leaders recognized that the Wilmot Proviso

was a potential threat to Negro slavery.

In the House of Representa

tives Congressman Armistead Burt spoke for the Palmetto state when he

19 Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina
1843-1845 (1844), 15-18; White, Robert Barnwell Rhett, 81-84; Wiltse,
John C. Calhoun, 190-98.
20 Journa1 of the Senate of the State of South Carolina
1843-1845 (1844), 19.
21

White, Robert Barnwell Rhett. 84.

297

introduced an amendment to the territorial bill for Oregon which
applied the Missouri Compromise line to the territory.
the South that no new slave territory

22

He warned

would be admitted into the Union,

and that the 36° 30' line would not be extended because of Northern
opposition:

"If with these facts before their eyes; if, with these

threats ringing in their ears, the Southern states do not break the
spell that benumbs the spirit and paralyzes the energy of their
people—

. . . they are destined to be the scenes of a conflict of the

races, whose atrocities and horrors will find no parallel in the bloody
and servile drama of St. Domingo."

This awareness of the race prob

lem, which was echoed by Robert Barnwell Rhett and other Carolinians,
was also forcefully expressed in John Calhoun's resolutions against
the Wilmot Proviso.

The Congressional elite from this South Atlantic

state was prepared to preserve white supremacy.

24

In 1848 South Carolinians prepared for the Presidential elec
tion.

Although Calhoun favored Levi Woodbury, as the Democratic

nominee, he would not commit himself to any particular man.

But other

state politicians leaned to Lewis Cass, and by the fall Fire-eaters
like Rhett were endorsing the Michigan Senator's candidacy.^

The

state legislature, in the Presidential balloting, supported Cass by a

22
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24 Philip Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina
1847-1852 (Allentown, Pa., H. R. Haas & Co., 1918), 1-30; Wiltse, John
C. Calhoun, 293-300.
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margin of 102 votes:

"The Democracy had carried South Carolina without

aid or comfort from Calhoun.
During the winter of 1848-49 Calhoun gave impetus to South
Carolina’s militancy with the publication of the Southern Address.
He warned that the attacks on slavery would bring about emancipation
which would create an alliance between freed blacks and Northern
whites who would dominate and degrade the South:
We would, in a word, change conditions with them
[Negroes]--a degradation greater than has ever yet
fallen to the lot of a free and enlightened people, and
from which we could not escape, should emancipation take
place (which it certainly will if not prevented) but by
fleeing the homes of ourselves and ancestors, and by
abandoning our country to our former slaves, to become the
permanent abode of disorder, anarchy, poverty, misery and
wretchedness.^7
In May 1849 members of the newly formed Committee of Safety met in
Columbia to consider a plan of action by the State.

These delegates

praised the Southern Address and requested the governor to call the
legislature into special session if the Wilmot Proviso became law or
if Congress threatened to harm the peculiar institution or the slave
trade within the boundaries of the national capitol.^®
By the end of the summer, slavery had again emerged as the most
important political issue in South Carolina.

At a meeting in Bishop-

ville, the local inhabitants demanded "constitutional" protection for

26
27
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28
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black slavery.

Radicals condemned those Southern men who favored

emancipation and expressed concern about future passage of Federal
legislation which might end slavery in places which the national
government controlled.

OQ

J

They called for "strict vigilance to be

exercised over all among us whose principles are adverse to ours,
. . .

30

Representative Daniel Wallace, speaking at the courthouse in

Chester, warned about a "cordon of Free States" which might be created
around the slave South; there was even danger that the border states
would eventually abandon the peculiar institution which would further
decrease the area where black people were held in bondage.

31

By the end of 1849 the men who would provide leadership in the
Palmetto state during the crisis over slavery had emerged.

Although

there were a minority of Unionists within the state, most political
leaders were committed to either cooperative or separate state
resistance to Northern aggressions.

Since their positions were not

inflexible, it is necessary to survey the backgrounds of individual
leaders in order to understand their roles during the sectional crisis
of the following two years.
Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville provided leadership for the
small Unionist faction in South Carolina.

After preparing for a career

in journalism and law, he became a well known opponent of nullification

29
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quoting Chester Observer.

300
during that first period of conflict with the national government.
From 1835-1850 he lived quietly in Greenville, engaging in the practice
of law, and was a member of the state legislature before being defeated
by James L. Orr for a seat in Congress during 1848.

32

Although Perry

was a strong defender of the institution of slavery, he also sought
to preserve the Union:

"I love the Union of these states, and look

upon their dissolution with horror approaching despair.

Nor have I

much dread of a dissolution even on the subject of slavery--It will be
settled like all great questions have since the organization of our
government."33
Leadership in Congress was provided by Representatives
Armistead Burt, James L. Orr, Daniel Weilace, John McQueen, C. F.
Colcock and Senator Andrew P. Butler.

Burt, elected to Congress from

South Carolina's Edgefield District, had been a prominent spokesman for
Southern rights since the 1830's.

He had served in the Nullification

Convention of 1832 and entered Congress in 1843.

His younger colleague,

James L. Orr, had served in the South Carolina legislature before being
elected to Congress in 1848.

Although he believed in the right of

secession, he became a cooperationist leader by 1851.

Daniel Wallace,

a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives from 18441848, also entered Congress in the year of Taylor's election to the

32 Lillian Adele Kibler, Benjamin F. Perry: South Carolina
Unionist (Durham: Duke University Press, 1946), 3-239.
33

Ibid., 240.
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Presidency.

Wallace supported separate secession by South Carolina and

was an extremist on the race question.

John McQueen, who had been a

practicing attorney, was elected to the Thirtieth Congress and held
views similar to Wallace.
who was elected in 1849.

He served with W. F. Colcock, an extremist
Andrew P. Butler, a protege of Calhoun, had

risen quickly in the Upper Chamber of Congress after his election in
1846.

34

His political career extended back into the 1830's when "he

became recognized as a leader of the Calhoun faction and a champion
of nullification."

35

During his career he served in the state legisla

ture and as an appeals court judge.

Although Butler was a proud

defender of the "rights" of the South, he did not want the Palmetto
state to adopt a position which would isolaLe her from the rest of the
South .^
Another prominent state politician was Robert Barnwell Rhett,
a son of an aristocratic lowland family.

After entering politics in

the 1820's as an opponent of the Tariff of 1828, Rhett was always ready

34 Benjamin F. Perry, Reminiscences of Public Men with Speeches
and Addresses (Greenville: Shannon and Company, 1889), 5-12; Francis
Butler Simkins, "James Lawrence Orr," in Allen Johnson and Dumas
Malone (eds.) Dictionary of American Biography (11 vols., New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-58), VII, Pt. 2, 59-60; hereinafter
cited as DAB; Francis Pendleton Gaines, "Andrew Pickens Butler,"
Ibid., II, Pt. 1, 355; U. S. Congress, House, Biographical Directory
of the American Congress 1774-1961, (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), 635, 638, 718, 1314, 1410, 1763; hereinafter
cited as BDAC.
35 Francis Pendleton Gaines, "Andrew Pickens Butler," DAB,
II, Pt. 1, 355.
36
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to adopt a more radical position than C a l h o u n . B y

1848 he had lost

faith in the Democratic party and emphasized his long standing opposi
tion to federal power:

"In 1828 I declared . . . that the General

Government must be driven back to its legitimate limitations in the
Constitution.

That if we yielded on the taxing power, the next

stride would be against our slave institutions; and that I was for
fighting on the Tariff the battle that must otherwise be fought on
slavery. I said the same thing in 1844, after witnessing in Congress
my anticipations but too truly realized.

Now you have this great quesr

tion of Slavery upon you; and my counsel is, as of yore--meet the
question at once, and forever."

38

He was at the forefront of the

.

movement for separate secession even though he desired cooperation
with the rest of the South if it could be obtained.

39

A number of the elite in 1850 wanted cooperation by the entire
South in resisting the attacks on slavery.

Two of the leaders of the

cooperative movement were Christopher Memminger and Robert W. Barnwell.
Memminger, a graduate of South Carolina College and an excellent
lawyer, had been an opponent of nullification in the 1830 's;^® he
had written "a satirical booklet in biblical style, called the Book of
Nullification (1830) against the leaders of that m o v e m e n t . B y

37
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1840's Memminger was a member of the state legislature, and though
against Northern attacks on slavery he opposed separate action on the
part of his state as "dangerous and fruitless . .

Another exponent

of practical resistance was Robert W. Barnwell, who had been a United
States Representative in the twenties and had signed the nullification
ordinance passed in 1832.

After a long retirement in the 1840's,

Barnwell reentered national politics to fill part of Calhoun's un
expired term.

His strong opposition to Northern aggressions was

tempered by a belief in the necessity of united action by the South.^
Radicals on the state level were well represented by Maxcy
Gregg, James Henry Hammond, Francis W. Pickens, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook,
and John H. Means.

Gregg, a young man with little practical experience

emerged as an exponent of separate state action.

Hammond's political

career, in contrast, extended back into the 1830's, when he had been
an active participant in the military preparations that some South
Carolinians made against the Federal government.

He had served in the

House of Representatives and as governor of the state in the 1840's.
Although he had been an exponent of disunion for thirty years, Hammond
was not an advocate of separate secession in 1850-1851.

Francis W.

Pickens, who was related to Calhoun by family ties, had been a sup
porter of nullification in the thirties.

42

By the 1840's he emerged as
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a leader in the South Carolina Senate and had become a separate state
secessionist by 1850.

The last two men, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook and John

H. Means, were governors of the state during the crisis of 1850-1852
and were recognized by the state press as extremists who wanted the
state to act in order to protect slavery.

44

Calhoun and Seabrook were important catalysts behind the move
ment for a Southern Convention in 1849-1850.

Calhoun corresponded

with men in Mississippi who were working for a convention, and Seabrook
apparently encouraged Southern governors that such a meeting was a
necessity .^

Daniel Wallace, who was appointed the governor's special

representative to the meeting at Jackson, Mississippi expressed his
opinion in a letter to the governor:
your confidential letter . . .

"I had the honor to receive

in which you assign to me the discharge

of certain duties in relation to the aggressions upon the rights of the
South by our Sister communities of the N o r t h . W a l l a c e ' s enthusiasm
for his task was muted by the resistance he met in Mississippi to the
radicalism of the Palmetto State .^

He was able to talk privately

44 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian. December 18, 1850;
Francis Butler Simkins, "Francis Wilkinson Pickens," DAB. VII, Pt. 2,
559-61; J. G. de R. Hamilton, "James Henry Hammond," ibid.. Pt. 2,
207-08; S. S. McKay, "Maxcy Gregg," ibid.. Pt. 1, 598-99; Whitemarsh
B. Seabrook Papers, 1849-51, (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
45 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 39-42;
Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, June 8 , 1849, Whitemarsh B.
Seabrook Papers.
46 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, June 8 , 1849,
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
47
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with Governor John Matthews about the problems of Southern rights,
and with Quitman who he considered "a politician of the South Carolina
AQ

School."^0

Although there were limitations in his mission to Missis

sippi, because of the hostility of the Whigs and the gubernatorial
contest within the state, Wallace was optimistic that Mississippi
would stand firm if the rights of the South were t h r e a t e n e d a l 
though he did not obtain a written assurance from Matthews or Quitman
about the slavery question, Wallace believed "that the action of the
Convention was strong and decided--going perhaps farther than any
other state has gone,--and the record of this action is public property,
upon which you are at liberty to draw, . .
After the General Assembly of South Carolina convened in late
November 1849, Governor Seabrook issued a strong statement about the
sectional crisis.

He emphasized that in the conflict between the

sections that the South was finding less support from above the MasonDixon line for its struggle against the power of the national govern
ment;"^

the Federal government's actions threatened Southern property

and wealth:

"If masters, in violation of the Federal Constitution and

48 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, October 20, 1849,
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
49 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, October 20,
November 7, 1849, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers; Hamer, The Secession
Movement in South Carolina, 41-42.
50 Daniel Wallace to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, November 7, 1849,
Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
51 Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina at Its
Annua 1 Session, Commencing November 2 6 , 1849 (Columbia: A. S. Johnson,
Printer to the Senate, 1849), 11-14. Hereinafter cited as Journal of
the Senate of the State of South Carolina.
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laws, may be prevented from recovering their fugitive or stolen slaves;
if the transfer of persons and property, except under degrading circum
stances be denied them; what protection for their rights will remain,
when the Northern states by territorial aggrandizement, unwarrantably
acquired, shall have secured an undisputed ascendancy in the councils
of the n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e he announced his support for the call for
the Nashville Convention, and wanted power to call a convention or the
state legislature into session in case the Wilmot Proviso or other
hostile legislation were enacted by the United States Congress.

53

Seabrook also emphasized the need for military preparations
in South Carolina.

After mentioning that the "martial ardor" of South

Carolinians had declined, the Governor stated the rationale for mili
tary preparedness in a slave c o m m u n i t y " I t

is perhaps unnecessary

to assure you that South Carolina must, hereafter, exist as a military
people.

The history of our country for the past ten years affords

abundant proof that, as long as the Union endures, there is to be no
peace for the slaveholder.

An eternal warfare against his rights of

person and property, under the associated influence of the people and
states of the North, and the central power, has been solemnly and
deliberately decreed.

For this reason, it is essential that the

community of which he is a member should be prepared, at any moment,

52
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for every e m e r g e n c y T h e r e f o r e Seabrook called for specific mili
tary legislation which was only partially implemented by the State
Assembly
In response to this address the legislature endorsed the pro
posed Nashville Convention and passed other legislation which the
Governor had recommended.

An unofficial meeting of the legislative

members was held in December 1849 to call for South Carolina's par
ticipation at the Southern Convention.

It was decided that the

citizens from each Congressional district in South Carolina should
select two men to represent them in addition to the four men whom the
legislature designated as delegates at large.

This action was

accompanied by a declaration agreeing to call a special session of
the legislature in case the Wilmot Proviso became Jaw, and approval
of the strong fight for Southern rights which South Carolina's dele
gation was trying to protect .^
Reaction to the growing sectional crisis and demands for
Southern action was expressed by South Carolinians in public meetings
and private correspondence.

One of the earliest recorded meetings to

discuss the proposed Southern Convention was held by the citizens of

55
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Christ Church Parish on January 1, 1850.

John Hamlin presided over the

meeting which approved the action of the legislature in calling for
South Carolina's attendance at Nashville.

Members at a similar

gathering held in the Darlington District in March 1850 resolved that
Northern attacks on the South were straining the bonds of the Union.-*®
Important meetings were also held at Orangesburg Court House
and in the Barnwell District.

The former group was addressed by L. M.

Keith who argued that action must be taken by the South to protect
herself against the North which would otherwise flank her with free-soil
states;-*^ the danger of this action was expressed in a resolution which
stated:

"The object of our enemies is to surround the Slaveholding

States, and strangle slavery, by circumscribments[sic] its limits, or
by increased political power, to amend the constitution and abolish the
Institution.

The accomplishment of either must seal our utter ruin;"®^

The benefits of the enslavement of black people was expressed clearly
in a meeting held in Barnwell District on April 1, 1 8 5 0 . Members
approved the selection of the four appointed delegates to Nashville and
defended black bondages as a positive good:

"That so far from slavery

being an evil, it has done much to ameliorate the condition of mankind
than any other relation of life; it has advanced immeasurably the

58

Charleston Mercury, January 4, March 21, 1850.

59

Ibid., March 27, 1850.

60

Ibid.

61

Ibid., April 18, 1850.

309

condition of the negro; rescued thousands, perhaps millions of white
operatives from pauperism and starvation, and has proven itself to be
the chief cornerstone of our Republican

edifice."^

These meetings

illustrate the central role which slavery played in the mind of white
men in South Carolina.
Discussion about Southern rights and Henry Clay's proposals for
adjustment were prominent in the press in the Palmetto state.

The South

Carolinian, in announcing its approval of the Southern Convention,
emphasized that there was a national crisis over "States Rights . . .
This, then, is the true question.

It is not whether the institution

of slavery is in the abstract right or wrong--the time for discussing
that is past; it is whether fifteen states will yield their equality
and rights of sovereignty."^

The Mercury was critical of the Omnibus

bill which included a proposal to abolish the slave trade within
Washington, D. C., that might give impetus to federal abolition of

f\LL
slavery in other areas controlled by the national government. H The
editors also discussed the problem of Texas and California:

"On the

one hand, we have the north urging the dismemberment of a State of
Union, for the sake of augmenting the Free Soil territory; and on the
other, struggling to drag into the Union, against all usages and funda
mental principles of the Government, a district nearly as large as
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Texas, for the sake of increasing the Free-Soil power in Congress."

6S

The Edgefield Advertiser believed that attendance at the Nashville
Convention might be a good method of preventing further Northern
hostilities:

"Shall we not prepare our system of defense?

Danger is

often best averted by preparing well to meet it."^^
South Carolina's elite also engaged in correspondence about
the sectional crisis.

Edward Noble, apparently a business associate

of Representative Armistead Burt in Abbeville wrote that everyone was
very concerned about Calhoun's health .^
sectional issues dominated the news.

He was also worried that

"I ardently hope there may be a

compromise effected that will not be to the South what all others have
been a surrender."^®

Burt himself had earlier written to Unionist

Benjamin F. Perry about the sectional crisis which was giving impetus
to Southern resistance: • "Southern members, are unanimous, or so nearly
unanimous, as not to mar their moral force, in a determination to
resist all further aggression by the north, and my own opinion is,
that the north cannot and will not, either retrace their steps, or
repair from further assaults."

69

Therefore he believed that collision

65

Ibid.

66

Edgefield Advertiser. February 13, 1850.

67 Edward Noble to Armistead Burt, February 28, 1850 (Armistead
Burt Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina).
68

Ibid.

69 Armistead Burt to Benjamin F. Perry, January 16, 1850,
Benjamin F. Perry Papers (Alabama State Department of Archives and
History, Montgomery, Alabama).

311

between the two major sections was inevitable.^®

James Henry Hammond, a leading Fire-eater, was concerned about
the future of the South.

He carried on an extensive correspondence

with other Southern "ultras" about the attacks upon his beloved South
land.

During the spring of 1850 he wrote Calhoun about the possible

dangers of statehood for California which would begin the increase in
the number of free s t a t e s t h e

North "will ride over us rough shod--

proclaiming freedom or something equivalent to it to our slaves and
reduce us to the [illegible] condition of Hayti.

...

If we do not

act now we deliberately consign our children, not our posterity, but
our children to the flames."

72

Calhoun's own pessimism in 1850 was expressed in his famous
speech in which he demanded that Northern assaults against the South
be terminated; there had to be specific amendments to the United States
Constitution which would ensure Southern political equality with the
70
North and West. J
stated:

The dying statesman, who still loved the Union,

"I have now Senators done my duty in expressing my opinions

fully, freely, and candidly, on this solemn occasion.

In doing so, I

have been governed by the motives which have governed me in all stages
of the slavery question since its commencement.

70

I have exerted myself
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during the whole period, to arrest it, with the intention of saving
the Union, if it could be done; and, if it could not, to save the
section where it has pleased Providence to cast my lot, and which I
sincerely believe has justice and the Constitution of its side."

74

After Calhoun's death, South Carolinians did not provide sig
nificant leadership in either the House or Senate.

Congressional

leaders from the Palmetto state were chiefly concerned with resisting
passage of the Omnibus bills and warning their constituents about the
perils of abolition.

The appointment of Robert W. Barnwell to

Calhoun's seat did not fill the void.

Although he and Butler united

with men like Jefferson Davis in the Senate, they did not provide the
central leadership in the Southern resistance movement in Congress.

75

Congressman Colcock, in discussing the slavery question in
early June, was very critical of the false "compromises" which did
not protect slavery.

The peculiar institution, which Northerners

condemned, was under attack from men who wanted to divide masters from
the yeoman on the question of black bondage.^

They attacked the South

which was actually united on the need for Negroes to remain in servi
tude :
And here, let me say, in passing, that this attempt to create
hostile relations between our citizens is as wicked as it is
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futile, for 1 tell you that if it should ever become necessary
to defend our rights by arms, there is no portion of our
people who will be found more ready to obey the call than the
non-slaveholders of our community. They understand this
question well. They know that the liberation of the slave
will bring neither honor nor profit to them. They never will
consent to elevate the negro to an equality with themselves;
and thus, whilst they reject your sympathies, they know and
despise your purpose. This sir, is a white man's government
. . . and all history attests that no son of Ham [blacks]
ever shook a sceptre over the head of Japheth. 77
Slavery had been a blessing for the South that condemned the Clay
Compromise which did not protect Southern rights or result in any real
adjustment of the differences between the sections.78
excluded from the West, and Colcock concluded:

The South was

"We shall never con

sent that this Government shall destroy our property, and degrade us
from our equality.

...

If you are resolved to make this a question

of subjugation or separation, we will not hesitate which to choose;
and if our Union shall be dissolved, upon you, not upon us, must
rest the responsibility."
Colcock's colleague, in South Carolina's first Congressional
district, Daniel Wallace, was extremely concerned about the problems
caused by the growth of Northern abolitionism which had its origins in

80

England; u

the idea of racial equality was dangerous to the white

South:
The creed of these fanatics involves the distinct proposition,
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that Inasmuch as the black race at the South cannot be raised
up to the level of the white race, the white race must be
pulled down to the level of the negro, and that all must stand
together in the same political and social rank. And instead
of the negro being subject to the white man, the negro by his
right of suffrage at the ballot box, must make laws for the
white man. The progress then which is demanded, is not
upwards but downwards. At the North, this downwards ten
dency cannot go lower than the lowest white man; at the
South, it must go to the level of the lowest negro.
This militant Congressman emphasized that the abolitionists controlled
Congress which was assuming more control over the South's peculiar
institution.

Clay's Adjustment bills gave nothing to the South and

the Kentucky Senator admitted that the Mexican cession would enter
the Union as free-soil states.

The purchase of land from the state of

Texas would establish a precedent for Federal funds being used to
"bribe a state to give up the institution, . . . "

82

Furthermore, he

emphasized that the Texas debt "is a direct attempt to bribe every
Texas bondholder in the United States to the whole scheme of adjustment
as a unit."®®

Fugitive Slave bill provided an escaped slave with

protection which he found objectionable and expensive to the master.
Therefore Wallace wanted strong Southern resistance against the central
government.®^
In Congress John McQueen denounced the Compromise proposals.
Abolitionist strength, in his opinion, was increasing in the North and
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endangered black slavery.

Presidential candidates had to straddle the

issue, and he had warned that the goal of the entire North was to
abolish slavery even if it harmed Southern whites.

This end would be

accomplished by creating "an abolition girdle" around the Southern
states; the plan, which he believed was exposed in abolition literature,
would involve servile insurrection and equality for the black man.
This latter goal was impossible since it was not intended by God and
was not a reality anywhere on earth--including the North.

85

Southern "rights" McQueen continued, would be violated in the
proposed plans of adjustment.

He opposed the Taylor plan for the

admission of California and strongly denounced the Report of the
Committee of Thirteen:
I am opposed to it, because it proposes to admit California with
all its enormities. I am opposed to it because it proposes to
purchase nearly one-third of Texas (acknowledged by Mr. Webster
himself to be slave territory) with our own money, to become
ultimately subject to some of the new fangled non-interventions
or provisos of free-soilism.
I am opposed to it, because the
report expresses the existence of the Mexican [anti-slavery]
laws in the territories; because it proposes to insert the
entering wedge in the abolition of slavery in this District;
because it proposes to legislate in fact for the negro, instead
of the master, in the States. And above all, I am opposed to
it, because, in my estimation it would amount to an entire
surrender of the rights and honor of the South, and instead of
allaying the aggressions regularly going on against us, it
would give new zeal and confidence to our enemies, very soon to
show itself in this District, the dock-yards and arsenals, and
before many years, in the States.®^
The South was not responsible for the aggressions against her, and she
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would have to defend herself in the Union if she was able,"out of it,
if she must."®^
His colleague James L. Orr had spoken on May 8 about the perils
to the Union.

Abolitionism was a significant force in Northern society

as demonstrated by the creation of large numbers of anti-slavery socie-

88

ties and by the elevation to Congress of men like William H„ Seward..
There were men from the North who wanted to emancipate the Negro and
give him full equality:

"The aim of the Abolitionists looks first to

the emancipation of our slaves throughout the South, and then is to
follow their elevation to all the social and political privileges of the
white man.

The thick-lipped African is to march up to the same ballot

box, eat at the same table, and sit in the same parlor with the white
m a n . "89

orr then turned to the proposed admission of California which

was pushed by the North because it had a free-soil constitution.

How

ever, if the former Bear Flag Republic had applied for statehood with
a provision favoring black slavery, her application would have been
opposed by the states in the North.

The majority section, which was

attacking the foundations of slavery, must be defied by the entire South
which wanted to live in peace with its black bondsmen.

90

If agitation

against slavery was not ended, both sections would be faced with hard
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choices:

"I tell northern gentlemen to-day, that five years will not

elapse before they will be required to make the choice between no n 
intervention and non-agitation through Congress on the one hand, and a
dissolution of this Government on the other; and I tell the Southern
people, if this agitation is continued during that time, then peace and
personal security will require them to choose between secession and
negro emancipation.”^

Orr therefore supported the Nashville Convention

which he believed was called to preserve the Union and Constitution
rather than to plan d i s u nion.^
In these addresses and speeches there is one common thread-concern about emancipation.

Each man was worried about the future of

the peculiar institution, and each one revealed his own fear or those
of his constituents about a post-abolition period in which white and
black people would be equal under the law.

Their sense of outrage at

the danger to Carolina's most vital domestic institution increased
during the rest of the year.
The Nashville Convention provided a forum for Robert Barnwell
Rhett.

This extreme Fire-eater, the principle author of the Conven

tion's Address, stressed that the South had been under seige from the
North for sixteen years.

Northerners had begun their attack on slavery

by using the right of the people to petition as a first step in
attacking the institution of slavery in the South.
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The agitation had

93 Condensed Statement of the Proceed]ngs of the Nashvi Ile Con
vention (Jackson: Fall & Marsha 1I, Printers, 1850), 5-16, passim.
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extended into religious bodies, and "became the grand topic of interest
and discussion in Congress and out of Congress, and one of the most
important elements of politics in the

U n i o n . " ^

Hostility to black

bondage in the North had so increased that peace between the sections
no longer existed.

States north of the Mason-Dixon line were prepared

to gradually abolish slavery by first stopping the expansion of
slavery into the territories as a step toward ending it in the states.
The Northern section, which dominated in Washington was thus not
sympathetic to the South's interests and treated her as a colony;

95

but

Rhett stated the South must control her own affairs to prevent aboli
tion:

"they [the North] do not practically recognise [sic] the

inferiority of the African to the Caucasian races.

They do not

realise [sic], because the circumstances of their condition do not
compel them to realise [sic], the impossibility of an amalgamation
between the races.

Exempt from the institution of slavery, it is not

surprising that their sympathies should be against us, . . ."96

since

the North had gained control of the national government, they would
push to end "African Slavery" in "the broad and fertile South."^7
Rhett continued the denunciation of the North by attacking the
proposed Compromise in detail.
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The South was excluded from California
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by a free-soil constitution, while slave territory was taken from her
in the Texas boundary settlement.

98

This action would limit the expan

sion of slavery to the western edges of Missouri and Arkansas:

"Thus

the Southern states will be hemmed in by the non-slaveholding states on
their whole western border--a policy which they have declared essential
to the end of abolishing slavery in the Southern states."

99

Southerners

had further to suffer from the demand that the slave trade be ended in
the District of Columbia, and from the proposal that the master would
be required to prove ownership of the slave in the c o u r t s . R h e t t
found this provision of the proposed Fugitive Slave bills particularly
objectionable:

"If Congress can legislate at all between the master

and slave in a state, where can its power be stayed?
slavery in the s t a t e s . T h e r e f o r e ,

It can abolish

the fear of abolition ran

through this analysis of Clay's proposals by this South Carolina Fireeater,
Opinions about the sectional crisis were expressed at public
meetings and in private correspondence.

At the courthouse in Darling

ton, resolutions were passed which condemned the Omnibus bill while the
proceedings of the Nashville Convention were approved.

These sentiments

were in accord with the thoughts of Fire-eaters in Edgefield who
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approved the Nashville proposals and heard John K. Johnson warn that
submission to "wrongs" suffered by the South would only encourage
greater aggression.

a

spirit of resistance was expressed in a letter

from one of Congressman Burt's constituents:
Being one of your constituents--. . . it may not be amiss for
you to know--our opinions as regards the great Southern
question, but this is scarcely necessary as you well know
that Carolinians will goe [sic] as far as the farthest in
establishing our rights . . .103
James Hammond believed that after the Nashville Convention the South
would resist Northern attacks:
But I am also convinced that the struggle to prevent submission
will be almost as arduous as that in the State from 1828 to
1832 & probably of longer duration--unless the north assists
us by increasing and repeated outrages.
Unionist sentiment was expressed in a letter written to
Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville.

Richard Yeadon, a moderate Charles

tonian stressed his pleasure that Perry was still holding to Unionist
principles despite the loss of support from many former Union men:
"I am delighted to find you still reasonable 6c firm, patriotic to the
nation, as well as true to the South--for the two are perfectly com
patible."^'*

However, he could support disunion if a fair adjustment

102 Charleston Mercury, August 29, 1850; Edgefield Advertiser,
August 12. 1850.
103 Jacob Ginges to Armistead Burt, June 28, 1850, Armistead
Burt Papers.
104 James Hammond to H. W. Connor, July 11, 1850, James Henry
Hammond Papers.
105 Richard Yeadon to Benjamin F. Perry, June 4, 1850, Benja
min F. Perry Papers.
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was not achieved.

But Yeadon stated:

"I unhesitatingly prefer Clay's

compromise to disunion & will resolutely stand to that m a r k."*^
On the Congressional level, the entire delegation battled for
Southern rights.

Senator Barnwell, in a short but bitter statement,

spoke about Southern political equality and slavery.

The South was

being branded as an inferior and had to have the right to take black
property into the S o u t h w e s t . S o u t h e r n e r s no longer believed that
slavery was an evil because religious men in the South, driven by
abolitionist attacks "were compelled to investigate, and have been
very generally brought to the conclusion that there is nothing in the
word of God which forbids or condemns this relation but on the con
trary, much that justifies and sustains it.

So that they may with all

good conscience, hold and govern as slaves the people committed to
their charge."

108

Southerners were also convinced that slave labor

was profitable and that not all men were fit to govern themselves as
the example of St. Domingo and Jamaica "proved."109

passage of the

Missouri Compromise line would settle the question of slavery in the
territories, but Barnwell believed that continued attacks on the South
would make adjustment impossible.
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During the late summer the entire Congressional delegation
fought against passage of the Compromise.

The two Senators helped

kill the Compromise as a package on July 31, and then worked against
Douglas’ efforts to revive the bills.

Butler declared that statehood

for California ensured Northern supremacy in the Federal government
and gave the North greater control over the extension of slavery.

The

delegation opposed all of the Compromise except for the Fugitive Slave
Law although Butler voted yes on the question of territorial govern
ment for U t a h . m
By September 1850 South Carolinians were being prepared for
further resistance by Governor Seabrook.

He corresponded with several

Southern executives about the need to resist the growing power of the
national government;

112

it had degraded the South through such actions

as the admission of California to the Union;

"The aggravating circum

stances under which California has been admitted into the Union, and
the certain determination of the North and Congress, the executor of
its will, practically to change the form of our government, demand of
the slave-holding states prompt and effective resistance.
occupy a position of degradation and unequality.

They now

Submission will con

stitute them forever mere dependencies of a great Central Head."^^
This fear of a strong central government was coupled with his

111 Ibid., 1547; Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict
(New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1964), 191-200.
112
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113 Confidential letter to Governors of Alabama, Virginia and
Mississippi, September 20, 1850, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers.
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recognition of the realities of Southern Politics.

Seabrook realized

that South Carolina's tradition for radicalism meant that she could
not

effectively lead such a movement. Thus, he stopped

the

South Carolina legislature into an

efforts to call

early session.

South Carolina's elite created organizations to
population's "natural" opposition to the North.

further the

On September 18 a

meeting held at the courthouse in Georgetown, established a Southern
Rights Association.

R. A. Allston, the chairman of the meeting,

appointed a committee which drew up resolutions announcing that viola
tions of states rights "have dissolved the bonds which held the Con
federacy together, and that all that remains for the State to do, is
to resume these powers of government which granted for our benefit,
have been grossly abused to our manifest injury and wrong."H5

jn

Richland district W. F. DeSaussure led a meeting which resolved that
the "opponents of slavery are driving the slaveholding states from
the protection and sanctuary of the constitution, and fast reducing
them to a condition of vassalage . . .

DeSaussure recognized that

Northern power was expanding rapidly while the South was becoming an
impotent minority in Congress with "only the privilege of witnessing

114 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 69-72;
John Quitman to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, September 29, 1850, Whitemarsh
B. Seabrook Papers; Whitemarsh B. Seabrook to George Towns, October 8 ,
1850, ibid.; Whitemarsh B. Seabrook to John Leland, September 18, 21,
1850, ibid.
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the edicts recorded, by which she is immolated ."H ?

in order

to prevent the South's destruction, he was ready to resist "even
to a disruption of the Union" if it became necessary.

118

A

meeting in Abbeville, called to form a Southern Rights Association,
was addressed by Drayton Nance, a delegate to the Nashville
Convention, who wanted South Carolina to secede alone if no state
would join her

Francis W. Pickens warned about the Northern

desire for black emancipation.

Armstead Burt declared that the

Union was already dissolved; South Carolina should secede to
protect her way of life:

119

If we remain in the Union we must give up our property
. . .
we must choose which we would make our antagonist, the
white man of the North, or the negro of the South; for one
he preferred to fight the unnatural monsters who were ready
to incite our slaves to promiscuous
^0
c a r n a g e

.

A report drawn up at the meeting stressed that the South had to
choose between seceding from the Union and acquiescing to Northern
oppressors; Southerners were not allowed to expand westward with
slaves and were thus confronted with the problem of a growing
black population.

This situation would force white men to engage

in a race war or leave the South.

1p 1
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Speeches, pamphlets and editorials were widely
disseminated before the convening of the legislature in late
November.

Christopher Memminger delivered an.emotional speech

at Pendleton on October 1 in which he charged that the Federal
government had become "a mere machine for carrying out the
fanatic spirit of abolition."

122

The anti-slavery party wanted

to emancipate all blacks and achieve political supremacy.

Wilmot's

hated Proviso had been applied to former Mexican territory with
California's admission as a state; the phrase "no law in respect
to slavery," which was included in the Utah and New Mexico laws,
was designed to prevent the passage of laws protecting a slave
holder's black property in the Southwest.

The land taken from

Texas would also help stop the expansion of the peculiar
institution.

123

California's admission to the Union, according to
Memminger, was the key to the South's potential racial problems.
If the state had been opened to slavery, the value of slaves in
South Carolina would have increased by five million dollars because
black labor could have been used in the gold mines.

1o t

But a

free California actually secured the political ascendancy of the
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North which would be able to amend the national constitution
in order to abolish slavery and establish black equality:
. • . with emancipation must come civil rights, and your
next neighbor in every jury box and every muster field,
will be a negro. Nay as they are the majority, you may
think yourselves fortunate if you are permitted the
privilege of elbowing them in the crowd. Then too, all
experience has proved that without the control of the
white man the negro will not work and will relapse into
semibarbarism. And when the rice fields below, shall
have become a desolution, like the sugar fields of St.
Domingo, rest assured that the half-starved savages will
find their way among your farm houses and your granaries,
and you must exterminate them or abandon the county to
them.125
Southerners must meet in a "congress" to demand that the national
government protect their "rights."

If certain conditions were not

met by the Federal government, the South should secede together
or South Carolina alone.
Francis Pickens delivered a strong defense of the South
which was reprinted in the state newspapers.

Pickens believed that

if the South opposed the attacks of slavery--even to the point of
armed resistence--the North would "pause and reconsider the
consequences of their mad and fatal policy."

1 97

Emancipation of

black people would affect all classes in the South:

1850.
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It is a great mistake to suppose the poor man is not as
deeply interested as the rich man [in the abolition question].
Independent of his honor, his feeling for his State, her
rights and independence, he would be more deeply prostrated by
emancipation than any other man. Suppose these 3,000,000 of
black laborers were thrown free upon society. They would come
immediately into competition with all white mechanics, artisans
and laborers, and white labor would have to contend with
vagrant and vagabond labor which would drag them down also to
misery and want.
Instead of having the proud conscientiousness,
with the rank of freemen, and an inferior caste beneath them,
they would then have to struggle with this licentious and
vagrant mob labor, with no law to control or principle to
govern it.128
A wealthy man might be able to escape the problem of a
post-emancipation society, but lower class whites would be
directly affected.
to any degradations.

Therefore, South Carolina should not submit
129

In a private letter to abolitionist Lewis Tappan, James
Henry Hammond discussed the race problem and secession.

The

letter, apparently written in response to a series of questions
which Tappan had addressed to him, defended slavery on racial
grounds;

130

black bondage was necessary because distinct racial

characteristics prevented blacks from living in society as the
white man's equal:
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328

"I see and all observant persons well acquainted with
negroes can see, that in their men tal [sic] structure
they differ from us almost as much as in color and
features. Amalgamation or equality of any kind between
these two races are on account of these circumstances,
utterly & forever out of the question. They cannot exist
together on the same soil except as master and slave."131
If abolition ever became a reality in the South Hammond stressed
that "it will only be for a short

6c

turbulent period . . .

6e

inevitably [illegible] in the subjugation or extermination of one
race or the other."

132

The South, however, could support a black

population of one hundred and fifty million bondsmen because their
maintenance was inexpensive.

And, in a spirit of bravado, Hammond

claimed that slavery would expand into California within fifty
years and would go with "the Saxon race to Mexico
America."

133

6c

South

This glowing prediction, was coupled with Hammond's

statement that disunion was inevitable:
"You [Northerners] will dissolve the Union.
It will be
but knocking off a heavy fetter of the system [slavery].
All the discussion of it [emancipation in the Caribbean
Islands] has served to strengthen it in our opinions,
while God has taken care to interweave it with our whole
social, political, industrial, 6c financial organization,
that we are sure to give up life before we surrender it
and he [sic] has also taken care to stave off the crisis
untill [sic] we are strong enough to see the Union severed
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without a quivering nerve, & so maintain our institutions
against the World."134
South Carolinians, in this brooding planter's opinion, would
eventually see the rest of the South sever the bonds of the Union
because white supremacy was threatened by the Northern attacks
on slavery.

135

Pamphleteers were active in the fall of 1850 as the state
was inundated with statements expressing both radical and moderate
viewpoints.

One booklet entitled "The Southern States, Their

Present Peril, and Their Certain Remedy" was circulated in
Charleston.

The author John Townsend stated that there were two

groups in the South who took positions on the sectional crisis:
one group believed that the Compromise of 1850 was a serious
aggression against the South but held that it could be solved
by compromise "with our enemies.

The other class,

. . . view

the measures, as part of a regular system of operations, the
object, intention, and inevitable tendency of which, is, to
abolish slavery entirely in the States, and to degrade the South
into a tribute-paying colony to the rest of the Union."

1

The

134 Ibid133

Ibid-

136 John Townsend, The Southern States, Their Present
Peril, and Their Certain Remedy: Why do They Not Right Themselves
and So Fulfil Their Glorious Destiny. (Charleston: Printed by
Edward C. Councell 1850) 5.
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dangers of abolition had been present since 1835, and when the
North had the power to amend the Constitution it would either
emancipate all slaves or allow the institution to exist "upon the
condition only, that the South, with her slaves, shall become the
IO7

slaves of the North,

. .

If blacks were actually freed

Townsend listed six "terrible" consequences:
First - The elevating of our slaves to a political equality
with ourselves in the making of our laws, and in the government
of the country; which will soon be followed by the degradation,
(as in the British and French West Indies) - of the claims of a
vulgar and upstart race, to social equality with ourselves, and
families, in all domestic relations of life. 2d - The over
running of our country with swarms of an indolent, vicious, and
unthrifty species of Lazaroni, instead of the best agricultural
population in the world such as we now have them. 3d - As a
consequence of their release from the control of their masters,
the abandonment of the cultivation of all the great agricultural
staples of the South, . . . 4th - The loss of fifteen hundred
millions of our capital in the loss of property in our slaves,
and in the labour which are derived from them.
5th - The
depreciation of other fifteen hundred millions of our capital in
land, which would become comparatively valueless after our
labour capital was destroyed; and 6 th - Our political annihila
tion among the nations of the earth;
After describing the "results" of abolition for white
Southerners, Townsend outlined a means of defense.

There could be

no political compromises with Northern fanatics who had violated all
previous attempts at adjustment between the major sections.
Northerners were not content with adjustments, and there would be
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a battle over who would control the destiny of the black slave-the white man of the South or of the North.

He favored fighting

the "battle" between the sections even if it lead to disunion
or civil war.

The South possessed the resources to survive as a

separate nation, and would be able to maintain herself in a war
with the North.

139

Disunion would "be followed by infinite

distress and disaster to the North . . . the Union is of vastly
more value to them, than it is to us; and that it is for them,
and not for us, to make sacrifices and concessions to maintain
it "140

Secession was probably the only way of protecting Southern

rights since the North would not "sacrifice" to preserve the
Union unless she was actually "persuaded that disunion will be the
inevitable consequence."141
Unionist sentiment was expressed in a private letter by a
Carolina conservative.

James L. Petigru of Charleston concluded

that there was a definite disunion feeling in the Queen City:
"It really does seem that the atmosphere is infested, and reason
driven from men's minds by an epidemic.

The readiness to break

up the Confederacy could not have been expected of persons who have
practical illustrations of its benefits."

139
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142 James Petigru to Benjamin F. Perry, November 18, 1850,
Benjamin F. Perry Papers.
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believed that the populaces' anger against the North would
decline and "that a [conservative] reaction will take place,

. .

On November 26, 1850, Governor Seabrook delivered a message
to the South Carolina assembly.

He considered the Omnibus bills as

"another triumph over the South by the fell spirit of
abolitionism."^^

The grant of statehood to California was a

violation of constitutional power, and the law abolishing the slave
trade in Washington included provisions for the emancipation of
Negro slaves which might be expanded.

145

Since the sections were

vastly unequal in power, there could be a final "emancipation of
the negro throughout the region in which he is constitutionally
held as property, although its execution may consign to the same
grave the master and slave, and spread desolation over their
common home."^^

The national government wanted to reduce the

state "to colonial vassalage" rather than protect her rights.

147

Although Seabrook upheld the right of secession and wanted South
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Carolina to cooperate with the entire South, he stated:

"I

beseech you to remember, that no conjuncture of events ought to
induce us to abandon the right of deciding ultimately on our own
destiny."^-4®

In concluding, the Governor called for a day of

prayer for the security of the state and for the return to
peaceful relations with the North.

149

The state assembly engaged in extensive debate in an
attempt to provide means for redressing Southern grievances.

A

day of prayer was designated for December 6 , 1850, but a dispute
occurred over whether the state should call a separate South
Carolina convention, provide for a Southern Congress, and elect
a successor to John C. Calhoun.

These issues were debated in both

legislative houses until a compromise was worked out before
Christmas.

Representative Josiah B. Perry introduced resolutions

which stated that South Carolina should not fill Calhoun's vacant
seat and "That our present Senator, The Hon. A. P. Butler be,
and he is hereby instructed, and our Representatives be and they are
hereby requested not to reoccupy their seats [in Congress in
preparation for secession], . .

148
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There was also extensive
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discussion about the question of the state convention which
produced conflict between secessionists and cooperationists.
Representative James Chesnut of Kershaw spoke in favor of
cooperation while emphasizing that South Carolina did not stand
alone; she should definitely not adopt "the mad policy of separate
action."

1S1

The state was not faced with a policy of submission

or secession, and should unite internally along with the rest of
the South:

"Let us be prudent--unite our own people--and unite

with our Sister States--prepare for the contest by making
adequate appropriations of money for such objects as will prove
to them and the North that we are in earnest."

152

Representative

J. A. Dargan favored the calling of a state convention in the
spring of 1851 to consider the action of the Palmetto state in
the slavery crisis, and to provide for the state's attendance
at a Southern Congress.

If neither of these two Conventions

secured Southern rights, then "South Carolina would interpose her
honor to redeem her sovereignity."

153

Representative Lyles stated

that he was willing to wait a reasonable length of time for
cooperation but not for another decade:
se.

"He was a disunionist per

He would sink it [Union] tomorrow if he could.
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Race was recognized as the key issue in the speech of
Assemblyman Lewis M. Ayer.

Although Ayer considered himself a

moderate he wanted to hold a convention and favored the calling
home of all South Carolina Congressmen from Washington.

The

state convention would consider South Carolina's attendance at a
Southern Congress and act as a medium to educate the nonslaveholding masses on the advantages of s l a v e r y . S l a v e r y
existed in all parts of the world, but in the Northern section
of the United States an especially odious bondage existed:
"There a portion of the white population, as intelligent and as
virtuous as any, from want and sheer necessity, are compelled
to discharge these menial offices which the negro slaves perform
in the South, . .

White men in the South had to be shown

that nowhere else, except in a country holding African
slaves, is the poor man regarded or treated by the rich
as a gentleman.
For in a county of African slavery, few
very few, whites need descend so low as to embrace those low and
menial occupations which in the course of a few generations
must debase and enslave the mind as well as the b o d y . 1^7
If the abolitionists successfully freed the slaves, lower class
whites would eventually lose their land and be forced to labor for
the rich or migrate westward.
same fate as St. Domingo.

Thus the South would suffer the
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A similar recognition of the racial problem emerged in
the speech of representative Hunt.

He believed "that the time had

come for the States who acknowledged the white man as alone as [sic]
constituting the body politic, to act in union to protect
themselves, in all time to come from the unprincipled aggressions
I C Q

of the States north of the Potomac."

Hunt held that black

people could not have national citizenship and that there was a
division between "the free white states" [South] and the "free
negro states" [North].

Bondage was the black man's natural

condition and there was nowhere in the world--including the
North--where racial equality existed.

Slavery was mandatory

for the South's survival and the white man below the Mason-Dixon
line would fight to maintain it:
Our domestic institutions are our own, . . . We inherited
them; we feel they are consistent with the ordinations of
Providence. We find them essential to our prosperty as a
people. We will perpetuate them, and we and our children,
will fight for them. . . . Necessity is admitted by all as
paramount to all other motives, and we know that unless the
African laborer is compelled to labor, he will only toil, of
his own motion, for a bare existence. . . . The soil of the
South white men cannot till. Our experience is conclusive.
The African race can endure the congenial sun. The union of
the white man's head and the negro's arm, has reclaimed the
fens and marches of the South. Without this Union, they must
return and become the abodes of their aborigines and occupants.
Who has the authority to require this sacrifice?
^
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Hunt favored cooperation by the South to preserve the
white man's land against Northern encroachments.

1 62

The major exponent of the Unionist position was Benjamin
F. Perry.

His views, expressed in the assembly during early

December, represented a call for sanity after the extreme statements
of radicalism.

He emphasized his loyalty to South Carolina, but

did not want her to adopt any extreme "course which must
inevitably prove disastrous to her, and ruinous to the cause of
1 z:O

the South."

The United States had brought prosperity and

expansion for the slave states from the Louisiana Purchase to the
entrance of Texas into the Union.

And, even though the South no

longer controlled the national government, Perry denied that there
was sufficient cause to abolish the Union.

164

Slavery, according to this conservative, was very safe in
the Union.

The peculiar institution had actually been strengthened

by Northern attacks which had ended the potential spirit of
emancipation in the border states.

There had been no attempts

to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and secession would
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be extremely dangerous for the institution's survival:

"I

regard the dissolution of the Union as the most fatal blow which
slavery could receive.

Nothing could gratify the abolitionists

more, or tend more to the accomplishments of their wicked purposes.
We now have the protection of a great and powerful nation.

. .

We should then have a weak and petty government, incapable of
defending our rights against foreign aggressions, and the
sympathies of the whole civilized world against us."

16 5

If war

broke out after secession, military forces would have to control
the black population which might be motivated by the revolutionary
potential which was common in armed conflicts.
Perry wanted South Carolina to adopt a conservative
position which involved practical resistance against the North.

If South Carolina seceded, as had been proposed in assembly
debate, she would probably be isolated as in the 1830's.

The

Federal government would not allow her to secede peacefully and
Perry called for a meeting of a Southern Congress which could
provide for unity within the slave states.

167

Practical

resistance, which he stressed, included economic retaliation
against the North:

"I am in favor of taxing Northern
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goods, . . .

I will go for nonintercourse with those cities

16S
where this abolition movement is kept up, . . .

Thus Perry,

adopting the strategy of John Macpherson Berrien, called for
economic resistance--rather than secession--as the most effective
means of preserving Southern rights.
Compromise between the various positions expressed in
resolutions and debate was finally achieved in late December 1850.
Congressmen from South Carolina were not directed to stay at
home, and Robert Barnwell Rhett was sent as the state's champion
to the United States Senate.

After several mishaps a compromise

[omnibus bill] was reached between the two houses of the
legislature which provided for both a Southern Congress and a
state convention.

Elections for the state convention were to take

place in February 1851 with membership equal to the total South
Carolina Assembly.

The legislature also elected radical John 11.

Means as governor to lead the state during the critical years
1851-52.169
John Means, a Fire-eater, delivered his inaugural address
in the latter part of December.

168

The United States government which
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had been created to protect property--including Negro slaves--was
actually threatening to destroy i t . ^ ®

Emancipation was a

potential terror for all white people in the state:
Who can contemplate without a shudder the consequences of the
abolition of slavery in the states. Their terrors are not
alone to be seen in the misery caused to the slaveholder by
stripping him of his property, bought and honestly paid for by
a life of industry--not in starvation and the ruin of the
merchant and mechanic, by the prostration of those who buy his
merchandise, or pay for his labor--not in deserted fields, and
decaying towns and villages; but in the still more direful
consequences, resulting from the commingling of two races so
entirely distinct in their genius and character. One or the
other of them must be annihalated [sic], and that amid scenes of
anarchy and blood, greater than any which history records on
her darkest and bloodiest page.l^l
There was no constitutional way to stop the attacks by the majority
section.

Therefore South Carolina should meet with other Southern

states in a Congress:
But if all our honest exertions to unite the South should
fail, and South Carolina should stand alone, then, solitary
and alone, let her throw her banner to the breeze, and leave
the consequences to God. Common interests and common dangers
will rally the other Southern states to our
1^2
s t a n d a r d .

By the end of 1850 Carolinians stood ready to defend the.
peculiar institution and preserve a society dominated by white men.
They had consistently stressed the fact that the key issue in the
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struggle over the Compromise was the threatened abolition of
black people.

The horrors of a post-emancipation society

were emphasized in speeches.

Public opinion makers appealed to the

base emotions of the white population who felt the neeid for the
peculiar institution as a way to maintain their own psychological
and social status.

Secessionists newspapers like the Edgefield

Advertiser even played up the danger of white-black sexual unions
afer emancipation in order to frighten lower-class whites into
adopting a radical position; the paper predicted intermarriage
if the abolitionists were successful in establishing their goals
of freedom and equality; there would be an acceptance of
miscegenation in the next generation.

173

A lower-class white

should be appalled by the idea of black blood
coursing in the veins of his grand-children--that his grand
daughter will be the mother, or his grand-son the father of a
motley group of mulattoes, the offspring of lawful wedlock-lawful according to the laws of the degenerate descendants of
the present generation, but repugnant, as we believe, to the
laws of nature; for God never intended that races so dissimilar,
physically, morally and intellectually, should amalgamate. We
shudder, our blood all but curdles, at the prospect of any such
degradation of the white race . ^ ^
All white men had to resist the "horrible" future which was waiting
for the South if anti-slavery egalitarians were successful.
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equality was thus combined with the most base appeal to white men-protection of racial and sexual purity.

175

During the early months of 1851 South Carolina prepared
for the elections to the state convention.

There was apparently

little interest in the contest which did not coincide with a
national e l e c t i o n . A

feeling of alienation existed, however,

as one Carolinian noted in a letter from Charleston:
I deeply regret to inform you that it is my thorough [sic]
conviction that Charleston is wholly alienated from the
Union & that a long list of Union-regarding citizens
cannot be found within her limits.
I believe that a
majority of her citizens are at present opposed to separate
State action, but I equally believe that with a near
approach to unanimity, she is for a Southern Confederacy
or disunion per se.
This view was reaffirmed partially by a meeting in South
Carolina's Union district which stated that citizens would require
delegates to the state convention to support secession
"simultaneously with such other states as may express an intention
170
to do so, £r alone if the other states refuse to join her.11
Robert Henry, a candidate for the state convention, wanted to
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obtain reform within the Union.

South Carolina's separate

secession would leave her isolated with no outlet for her black
property;

17Q

after secession was announced the only area open

to slavery "will be the space included between the Savannah and
the Atlantic."

180

The people of South Carolina did not understand

the issues or see the need for the convention, however, because
the turnout at the polls was minimal.

But an apathetic public

acquiesced to radical action by allowing election

of members to a

convention which could take the state out of the Union.

181

After the elections discussion on the issues of cooperation,
separate secession and the Union dominated the news.

In March 1851

Reverend J. C. Coit of Chesterfield District, spoke about the
sectional problems.

The Compromise of 1850 was "a triumph of the

abolition and free-soil policy, . .

182

in a rambling discourse,

with lengthy digressions on the rights of sovereigns, Coit
declared that all of California, the Southwest and part of Texas
had been lost to the North which had not even agreed to the
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Fugitive Slave Law.

There were few friends of the South north

of the Potomac, and the elite in these areas had not prevented
attacks upon the South by men who stole Southern slaves, tried to
foment slave rebellions, and maintain a high protective tariff.
The North's goal was to dominate the institutions and people of the
South:
The North will never disturb slavery in the states, if she can
control it. That will neutralize all its moral, social and
political evils. They can so adjust and compromise tariffs,
finances and disbursements, as to clip the wings of Southern
pride, ambition and prosperty; . . . they can so reduce the
profits of slave labor to the people here, that the Southern
planter will become a mere negro-driver and overseer for his
Northern brethren. Between the East and West, the South
will be crushed.
There must be an immediate declaration of independence by South
Carolina over the issue of equal utilization of the land in the West.
South Carolina would either be conquered with honor or receive the
aid of Southern people who could not "cooly look on and see us
immolated upon the bloody altar of abolition."

185

Dr. John H. Blackwell wrote about the question of secession
and the dangers of emancipation.

He believed that the South had the

resources to sustain herself in a contest with the North.

Since

Blackwell favored secession, he did not believe that cooperation
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should be used as an excuse to postpone separate state action.
Separate secession would give impetus to union in the South.

His

concern about lower class white devotion to slavery led him to defend
it as a necessity to the yeoman whose taxes were lower since most
government expenses were derived from assessments on black
slaves.

186

Furthermore a hardworking member of the lower classes

could acquire slave property, and, as Blackwell stressed in an
impassioned statement, emancipation was a danger to all men:
It is impossible for the two races (the white and the black) to
live together on terms of equality. Suppose that the thousands
and tens of thousands of your negroes were turned loose upon
you without money or credit, and what think you of the security
of your property? What kind of locks think you would secure
your barns and smokehouses against these indolent perishing
creatures? Not only our property but our persons, the persons
of our wives and children would be insecure. All forms of
government would be subverted. Riots, thefts, robberies, and
massacres would be of every day occurrence, . .
This South Carolinian appealed to the American desire for protection
of property as well as security of family from barbarous hordes of
shiftless blacks.

Violence would be common in a post-abolition

South and could be prevented by secession which would preserve the
institution of chattel slavery.
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Unionists forces were active in the spring of 1851 with
the establishment of a new paper, the Southern Patriot owned by
Benjamin F. Perry.

Richard Yeadon praised it in a letter from

Charleston:
You richly deserve the thanks of your country for your
manly & independent efforts to breast the torrents of the
times.
I believe with you that separate secession is
suicidal folly; and that in the Union of the South will be
found the safety of the South and very probably that of the
Union also.189
Perry's newspaper became a forum for Union and cooperation sentiment
as he kept up an editorial barrage against the Fire-eaters.

In one

editorial, for example, he discussed the problems of separate state
action by South Carolina:
Every man capable of bearing arms, will have to abandon his
business and repair to the tented fields. The property of the
state will have to be consumed in taxes or driven out of the
state. Thousands and tens of thousands of our citizens would
leave the state with their families and property. Business
of every kind would be interrupted. The present high prosperity
and happy condition of South Carolina would vanish . . . [and]
. . . Instead of exciting the sympathy of the other Southern
states, we should incur their displeasure and hatred.190
Perry also appealed to the elite while criticizing the yeoman who he
believed were responsible for much of the agitation in 1851.

South

Carolinians must instruct their delegates to the state convention

189 Richard Yeadon to B. F. Perry, March 7, 1851,
Benjamin F. Perry Papers.
190 Greenville

Southern Patriot, April 25, 1851.
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against secession and the results of the convention itself should be
submitted in a referendum to the people.
A meeting of the Southern Rights Association in Charleston
opened in May with John P. Richardson chosen as its president.

It

was dominated by radicals like Seabrook, who wanted separate state
secession since there was very little chance of any aid for the
Palmetto state--except from Mississippi.

1Q9

There were dramatic

speeches from leaders of both parties including A. P. Butler, and
W. F. Colcock.

Butler, who received praise from the Carolina press

in 1850 for his strong stand in favor of Southern rights, spoke
for cooperative resistance by the entire South.

He believed that

the purpose of the convention's address "is not only to put the
state on the track of separate secessions, but by measures
contemplated to commit the state now to that determination."

193

He upheld the right of secession but did not believe that a
separate South Carolina nation was viable.

194

The Federal

government would retaliate against the state "by a war of dollars
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and cents~-a war of customs houses, and embargoes or of
blockade."

195

Despite having these misgivings, Butler emphasized

that the existing United States could not survive and had to be
either radically reformed or replaced by a new Southern nation.
The views of the separate state secessionists were ably
presented in a speech by W. F. Colcock and in an address issued by
the convention.

Colcock believed that Southern cooperation was

impossible because the national government was not likely to
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia or repeal the Fugitive
Slave law.

These were the only "aggressions" which might arouse

the other Southern states from their lethargy.

197

Therefore it

was his judgement that "co-operation is submission to the compromise-submission to the past with no hope for the future."

198

Secession would never take place unless it was to preserve slavery,
and its exercise by a single state would be the first step in
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the inevitable conflict between the peculiar institution and
the anti-slavery goal of emancipation.

199

South Carolina would be able to sustain herself as a
separate state.

She could survive "a war of customs-houses" if

she was willing to create an inexpensive market for the entire
world.And,

her growing slave population would not present an

insurmountable problem as some cooperationists argued:
Long before the day could come when we would voluntarily
give up our territory to our slaves, and "runaway" from
them, or they could conquer it from us, our neighbors would
find means to relieve us as well as themselves from such
dire calamities, by giving them much better employment in
their rice and cotton fields.
South Carolina will never be
permitted to become a St. Domingo in the bosom of the South.^01
Separate secession would therefore prevent gradual abolition in the
state and degradation of the South's "rights."

202

The address which the convention adopted was a strong
statement of Southern "rights" and the need for separate
secession.^®^

It announced that the South was endangered by

attacks which would result in black emancipation and decline of
the South:
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That end is the abolition of negro slavery in the Southern
states, and the lowering of the white population of the South
to the same level with that agrarian rabble, which, already
strong and dangerous, seems destined before very long, to be
the controlling power in the Northern states. We see no
remedy and no safety for the South in the present Union.^04
The Palmetto state wanted to have the support of the other states of
the South, but she could no longer wait for them to join her.

The

convention members realized that there were dangers in disunion,
and yet they emphasized that the state had a perfect right to
secede.

205

They hoped that separate secession would not become

necessary, but "we have come to the deliberate conclusion, that if
it be our fate to be left alone in the struggle, alone we must
vindicate our liberty by secession."206

fhe address and a set of

resolution which affirmed this position were adopted by the
convention and became the platform for the secessionists in the
struggle with the cooperation-Union forces in the summer and fall
of 1851.207
Following the May convention of the Southern Rights
Associations in Charleston, there was frantic debate about the
proper course of action for South Carolina to adopt.

She had

seemingly committed herself to an extreme policy by the election
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of radicals in the February elections and by the address of the
convention itself.

This apparent militancy was countered by

several realities which the state's elite had to face.
Mississippi was the only other state which might join rank with
South Carolina and there was a growing fear among practical
politicians that their community would be isolated as in 1832.
W. F. Colcock had admitted that South Carolina was in advance of
other Southern states because of her large black population and
lack of national party ties.
Discussion by the secessionists began in June 1851 when
state legislators and Congressmen expressed their views on the
crisis.

Allen Robertson, a member of the state assembly, declared

that the free-soil states had acquired all of the former Mexican
lands and a portion of Texas.^09

After these "aggressions" they

were prepared to adopt a gradual attack policy against the South
so that she would not unite to demand her rights:
Their policy is now to detach as many of the border states as
they can from us, and admit new Freesoil states into the Union
as rapidly as possible, . . . And, as soon as they have
secured a Constitutional majority, (which may be in from six
to twelve years) they will alter the Constitution— take away
the right of representation for slave population, and give
Congress power to manumit slaves.
It will then be too late for
the South to act, when she is bound in, and surrounded by
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Freesoil states governed by unscrupulous fanatics; and has a
domestic enemy around her own hearths, and in her own bosom,
ready to re-enact the scenes of St. D o m i n g o . 210
The North would not act until she was ready to complete her plans
so that the South would never act as a resistance unit.

The

secession of one state would serve as the catalyst for Southern
unity which was necessary to prevent abolition.

211

An emotional appeal was evident in the tone of a meeting
at Edgefield in July which resulted in conflict between several
secessionists and one cooperationist speaker.

N. L. Griffin spoke

in favor of separate action but was countered by Captain P. S.
Brooks, a cooperationist who admitted that his opinion was in a
minority at the gathering.

Brooks doubted that separate secession

would induce the rest of the Southern states to act with South
Carolina.

Francis W. Pickens, who also spoke, emphasized that

there must be unity at home in order to insure preservation of the
South's domestic institution.

212

He stated emphatically that he

wanted cooperation with other slave states:

"But it may become

our sacred duty to act alone and if so we must walk the plank
alone like men, although the plank may lead over a gulf of
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frightful dangers."

21 *1
J Southern property had been excluded

from the territories, and the final result of the national
government's action would be to abolish slavery or render it
financially unprofitable.

91 A
^

After tracing the history of

abolition, Pickens cried out:
Mr. Chairman: has any man thought seriously of the terrible
effects of abolition when brought to our homes and to our
fire-sides. Three millions of black slaves, turned loose
upon the community, would present such a scene as the world
has never conceived. They would come directly into conflict
with the white mechanics, artizans and common laborers of the
whole county . . . what would become of the free artizans,
enterprising mechanics, and industrious laborers of our
county? Brought down to a degraded competition with three
millions of slaves made free?2 !3
Upper-class whites would be able to escape from these problems but
lower-class whites would have to deal with them.

The "fanatical"

schemes of the Northern abolitionist would lead to race war and
desolation in the South.

There might be a possibility of

cooperation with Georgia and Mississippi, but South Carolina would
probably have to act alone.

21 f
%

By late August Congressman McQueen admitted that the
attacks upon the South were partially the result of her refusal
to be vigilant.

Everyone was aware of the "wrongs" that the South
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had suffered, and the fact that they could have been prevented
if the South had been unified.

However, McQueen believed that

there was little chance that the South would unite with the
Palmetto state to stop the evil of emancipation:

"The great and

startling matter which we must meet, is that a sentiment pervades
the North (and they have now all the power of the Government)
that is rapidly progressing to the abolition of slavery, which in
my opinion, will never be checked within the present Union; and
unless we move, and move before long, the institution will be gone
from us forever, and our sunny South will, in a few years, become
a barren waste, and a struggle, the most awful which we can
conceive, will take place between the white man and the black, . . .
Under these circumstances shall we fail to act?

Shall we fail

to exercise a clear and unquestionable right, and withdraw ourselves
from a Union of death to our every prospect of peace and safety."
And although McQueen still hoped for cooperation, this Fire-eater
evidently expected that South Carolina would have to separately
secede from the Union.
Cooperationists and their Union allies prepared
counterattacks during the summer of 1851.

James Orr, in a letter

to a cooperation meeting in Yorkville, held that separate
secession could be achieved by patience:

217

"The state is not
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pledged to secession, nor have her people ever decided upon
that issue--our allies are bravely meeting and overcoming every
obstacle on their march to Southern independence, they will soon
be up with us, let us stand upon our arms till they arrive."

218

Armistead Burt, who had made some fairly radical statements in
1850 opposed separate state secession because it would not provide
protection for Negro slavery.

South Carolina would have

difficulty in obtaining the return of fugitive slaves since she
would be

id as a foreign nation by the United States.

Her

expanding brack population could not be sold to other Southern
states because of the constitutional provision against importing
African slaves; anti-slavery agitation would not be ended.
Burt summarized his feelings in one brief sentence:

But

"I hold that

the slaves of South Carolina are of infinitely more value to her
than this Union or any Union."

219

A more moderate opinion was expressed in the pages of the
Southern Patriot, which did not believe that cooperationists
could form an alliance with secessionists.

The Union editor

of the Patriot favored a "Southern Co-operation and a Southern
Congress; not to dissolve the Union and form a

218 James L. Orr to the Committee of Invitation of the
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Southern confederacy, but to defend the constitutional rights
of the South, protect the institution of slavery, and preserve
the Federal Union."

220

And he emphasized that neither the Union

nor the peculiar institution would be destroyed.

221

William Boyce, an opponent of separate state secession,
wrote to J. P. Richardson, president of the Southern Rights
meeting held in Charleston.

South Carolina's goal of protecting

black slavery could be accomplished only by creating Southern
unity.

There was no real danger to slavery in postponing a

confrontation with the free states from twenty-five to fifty
years.

9 0 9

The North was not totally unified and "has an

intestine disease preying on its vitals--socialism, that will
prevent it as it becomes densely populated from being very
dangerous except to itself."

223

State secession would not

create a Southern nation and would be extremely expensive.

There

would be an out migration of people while property values in land
and slaves declined.

Therefore it was not an effective means of

resistance to the Compromise of 1850 and merely restricted slavery
to the boundaries of South Carolina— a de facto accomplishment of
goal of the Wilmot Proviso.
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The Charleston Mercury, in an attempt to bolster the
secessionists forces printed a letter from John Cunningham a
delegate to the state convention in mid-August.

Cunningham

deplored the factionalism which had emerged in the state, and
declared that disunion was a necessity:
"I am free to admit, my fellow-citizens, that my deep
conviction is, that if the State does not secede, then
inclusive of her, the whole South will sink into
absolute submission to past wrongs and injuries, and
will become lethargic in that degradation, even under
all future impositions short of that terrible event,
which may come upon us as a "thief in the night" emancipation and its desolating horrors: and that
therefore we should reserve to ourselves [a] determination
or freedom to secede as the final act of the Convention."225
It was mandatory that South Carolina choose between submission in
the Union and possible safety out of it.

Separate secession was,

in this Fire-eater's opinion, the only way to bring the entire
South to active resistance.
Cunningham argued that radical action was necessary because
of the problem of emancipation.

He believed that the North would

gradually abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and the
border states.

The Constitution would be slowly altered until

Congress would have the power to end the peculiar institution within
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the states themselves.227

And, he held that if the North stopped

all further aggressions, the South would still be seriously
endangered:
"Are you prepared, fellow-citizens, to abide the results
of our present position? What will they be? That we
stand insulted, wronged, and degraded; that our
property has been lessened in value; that our share of
the territories has been taken from us; and that
slavery is hemmed in by limits too narrow, and cir
cumscribed by borders too dangerous, are already fixed
facts. Experience has taught us that slavery, to be
prosperous and safe, must have confidence of ownership,
certainty of subordination, limits to expand in area
for tilling and production, pari passu with numbers for
consumption and competition, and an outlet to throw off
any surplus labor, vicious characters, and starveling
[sic] masses. These are essential to both races in the
South, white and black: and are more so from the nature
of their productions, Cotton, Rice, Sugar and Tobaccocrops that require extensive ar[ea]s, and that steadily
exhaust those long occupied. Yet the above fixed
causes and facts will, with fatal certainty, deprive us
of these essentials and benefits, and insure [sic] for us
the consequent disasters, unless slaveholders secure
the one and avert the other by the most determined
efforts."228
All segments of the white population would be affected by the
negative changes in the South; white yeoman would suffer from the
general decline of the South's most vital institution:

"The

general ruin of the South will effect his ruin, and finally leave
him a poor wretch, engaged in the miserable destiny of struggling
on a loathsome equality with the very slave race he may now deem
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to be in his

w a y .

"^9

Secession, which would bring prosperity to

both rural and urban Carolinians, would prevent the crisis.^30
By the fall of 1851 South Carolinians had been exposed to an
extended debate over the Compromise of 1850 and the dangers of
abolition.

Her citizens had been treated to long discourses on

the dangers of emancipation which appealed to a fear which existed
among all social classes.

The elite had tried to exploit the

yeoman's fear of miscegenation and the dangers of economic
competition with black labor; both cooperationists and
secessionists were trying to protect white supremacy, although
their method of achieving this goal differed.
In September 1851 South Carolina's electorate recognized
that the elections for the proposed Southern Congress would serve
as the true test of public opinion.

State elections in February

had resulted in mass apathy which the cooperationists did not
consider as a valid test of either philosophy.

Therefore the

October elections were decisive in determining South Carolina's
future.
Governor John Means continued to advocate secession as the
means of protecting South Carolina.

She was threatened by denial

of her equality in the Union and with the death of her institutions.
Therefore Means stated:
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by this time we must all be convinced that if we wait
for a simultaneous move on the part of our co-aggrieved
sister states, we must wait forever. If, therefore, we
intend to act up to the expectations excited by our oft
repeated declarations, we must act a l o n e . 231
He did not fear this possibility if the state was united and
hence he encouraged citizens to work toward internal unity.

2 op

Debates occurred in several districts before the October
elections.

In Georgetown on October 8 , an estimated seven

hundred people attended a mass meeting, chaired by state senator
R. F. W. Alston.

They heard an address by H. B. Wilson in favor

of separate secession;
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his ideas were countered by M. E.

Waterman who spoke in favor of cooperation and offered a
resolution declaring "that separate state action is an error, and
will not be tolerated by this meeting."234

Opposing resolutions

adopted at the meeting by a vote of 400 to 15 declared that all
bonds with the North were severed, and that after attempts at
cooperation were made by the state convention, it should
"declare South Carolina no longer a member of the Confederacy."235
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In Cashville on September 20, pre-election tensions were
demonstrated at an anti-secession rally.

General Wallace, a

secessionist, was not allowed to speak by the meeting's organizers
who were determined that the crowd would hear James Orr and
Benjamin F. Perry oppose separate secession.

After Orr had

completed his speech, the secessionists demanded that Wallace be
allowed to talk to the crowd.

Since the Fire-eater's request was

refused, they left the crowd and placed Wallace in a buggy where
he and Perry spoke simultaneously.
On election day in October 1851 the cooperationists
carried six of the state's seven Congressional districts.

The

only areas of the state which remained in the Fire-eater's
camp were the planter parishes with large concentrations of Negro
slaves and high property values.

These areas had been centers

of radicalism since the 1820's, and unlike similar areas
such as in Mississippi, they lacked direct economic ties with
any part of the North or the conservatism of the Whig party
with its national political ties.

The upcounty areas were

apparently not sufficiently influenced by the racial rhetoric
to secede without the support of other Southern states.

But it

must be emphasized that these areas still supported men who would

236
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Greenville Southern Patriot, September 26, October 16,
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have seceded if given a practical alternative.

The electorate of

South Carolina had followed the advice of her more realistic
statesmen who did not want to see the state isolated as in
1828-33.

237
Press reaction around the state varied from deep

discouragement at the cooperationist victory to a mild elation in
Greenville.

The editor of the Georgetown Winyah Observer stated:

"Unmoved by the deep degradation heaped upon her, unawed by the
howl of abolition coming from the entire North and East, and
unstirred by the rapid strides of consolidation, South Carolina
stands calm and firm in the Union, . . ."
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She would remain

within the United States, and it was the duty of the
cooperationist party to see that she did not suffer.

^

Another

leading radical paper declared that South Carolina had acquiesced
to Northern aggression:

"The vote of the co-operation party is

to be a demonstration against secession - against action in any
form by South Carolina.

It will be so regarded here, and it

will be regarded as submission among our co-states and at the
O / A

North."

Benjamin F. Perry, however, was elated by the

results:

237 Georgetown Winyah Observer, October 27, 1851; Greenville
Southern Patriot, November 6 , 1851; Seventh Census, 334-47.
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The effort to destroy the Union, and form a Southern
Confederacy, by appealing to the fears of the slaveholders,
and telling them that their property is in danger, has
signally failed, and they never can be excited to the same
madness a g a i n . ^
After the secessionist defeat in the October elections,
radicals felt they had to be active in combating a growing sense
of hopelessness.

Fire-eaters were concerned that the state

legislature might not actually call the South Carolina convention
into session.

The Darlington Flag, a pro-secessionist paper in

the 1851 campaign, decided to oppose the calling of the state
convention which would only destroy the Palmetto state's internal
unity by continuing party strife; the Flag's editor announced his
submission to the will of the people who had decided against
seceding from the U n i o n . T h e

editor of the South Carolinian,

however, favored the holding of the state convention and stated
in an editorial directed to state legislators:

"You are bound to

call the convention; and that convention unless specifically
f)/

o

instructed otherwise by the people . . . must secede."
Debate in the state legislature began in early December
and aroused strong emotions.

Representative Wilker, a

secessionist, was unwilling to call the convention into session

241

Greenville Southern Patriot, October 23, 1851.
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because it was apparently against the will of the people.
Representative Tucker, who had become a separate state secessionist
during 1850-51, was also

opposed to the bill since the electorate

had not approved that course of action.

An impassioned defense

of the state convention

came in a speech by James Abney of

Edgefield.

not understand that Christopher Memminger

Abney could

could argue against holding the convention when he had favored the
omnibus bill during the previous session of the legislature.^^
The convention could produce "sure measures of practical resistance-and some certain means of preventing future insult and aggression."
Abney used extremely emotional language to urge action:

"In the

name of God something must be done; I cannot realize the fact that,
in the face of all our oppressions,

. . . wc are tamely preparing

the minds of our people for the humble lot of slavery and
infamy."

246

Arguments such as these convinced the legislature to
0 / 7

call for the state convention to meet in April 1852.
Since November 1851 there had been quiet efforts by Maxcy
Gregg and James Henry Hammond to work out a solution to the problem
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of resistance which would not involve secession.

Hammond's plan

called for the end of all political connections with the Federal
government--including a refusal to send men to Congress or select
Presidential elections.

Unfortunately for secessionists, it made

little progress with co-operationists who were not interested
in unity with the Fire-eating faction.

248

From January to April 1852 there was very little activity
among the political elite of South Carolina.

The papers discussed

local events and even the radical Edgefield Advertiser announced
that it submitted to the people's decision not to secede.

Leading

Carolinians hoped that the convention would harmonize the state,
but there was little apparent public interest.

249

The convention opened on April 26, 1852, for a brief
four-day session.

Governor John H. Means, chosen president of

the convention, emphasized that there were dangers in the internal
party divisions within South Carolina while "the fiendish fanaticism
of an abolition spirit, which tramples all law, both human and
divine under foot, is steadily moving forward toward the
accomplishment of its ends."

2 SO

Therefore the convention should

unite the state so South Carolina would be ready to protect itself

248 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina,
129-140; Harold S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in South
Carolina 1852-1860: A Study of the Movement for Southern Indepen
dence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), 31-32.
249

Edgefield Advertiser, February 12, April 15, 22, 1852.

250 Journal of the State Convention, together with the
Resolution and Ordinance (Columbia, 1852), 9-10.
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against any dangers.

251

After several perfunctory days of debate

the convention adopted a brief statement which declared that the
frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States
by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the
reserved rights of the sovereign states of this Union,
especially in relation to slavery, amply justify this state,
so fat as any duty or obligation to her Confederates is
involved, in dissolving at once all political connections
with her co-states; and that she forbears the exercise of
this manifest right of self-government from consideration
of expediency alone.252
This succinct statement of cooperationist principles did not please
either B. F. Perry or Maxcy Gregg who issued minority protests.
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After the convention sectional politics temporarily
disappeared in South Carolina as Presidential politics emerged.
James L. Orr delivered a speech in Congress in June 1852 in which
he discussed the Democratic ticket of Franklin Pierce and William
R. King.

Orr emphasized that the failure of South Carolina to be

represented at the Baltimore Convention did not mean that she
would not support Franklin P i e r c e . H e

also had special praise

for the Democratic nominee who had supposedly supported the South
against the abolition tendencies which had swept the North:

658-60.
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"When state after state deserted and embraced abolitionism and
freesoilism, and madness ruled the hour, he calmly surveyed the
impending ruin, sounded the alarm, and rallied his native state
on the side of reason and justice."255

pierce's record of

fairness to the South and general soundness on the question of
state's rights would insure his election and support in the home
of secession.
Unionists, in Benjamin F. Perry's Greenville district,
were extremely estatic about Pierce's nomination and the
conservative spirit which was being exhibited nationally.

257

They

instructed their members of the state assembly to pressure the
electors in South Carolina into voting for the Democratic nominee
who had a national orientation:

"Resolved that in the election

of General Franklin Pierce to the Presidency . . . the American
people will have the consolation of knowing that the Chief
Magistracy of the Republic is in the Hands of a statesman . . .
devoted to his country, and his whole country, knowing in his own
emphatic language, no North, no South, no East, no West, nothing
but the Union and the Constitution."

258

These conservative
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sentiments also included a clear statement that they
acquiesced to the Compromise's passage.
In August 1852 Senator Andrew P. Butler wrote a public
letter which gives insight into the thinking of practical
Carolinians.

He announced his continued opposition to the Compromise

bills that "afford no security to the South on the slavery
question.

That agitation doing its work every day [sic]

. . . not

only unchecked and uncontrolled, by compromises and platforms,
but, in every successive state of its aggressions, is ratified
OfLfl

and sanctioned by them [Northern institutions]."

Although he

was not enthusiastic about either of the tickets, Butler believed
that Pierce was preferable to General Winfield Scott.

However,

he did not want South Carolina to become absorbed in Presidential
politics:

"I do not desire to see South Carolina absorbed in any

organization looking to a Presidential contest.

If she cannot

be the champion of the whole South let her assume the humbler
and more unpretending office of being sentinel of her own land and
interests, and the firm and consistent friend of her natural

,, . 1,261
allies."
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Although the vote of the Palmetto state was cast for
Pierce, radicals were not reconciled to the conservative spirit
which had earlier swept across Georgia and Louisiana.

Her

leaders were still concerned about the necessity of maintaining
slavery in order to ensure white supremacy.

Governor John Means

expressed the mood of the state in his speech to the legislature
in 1852.

He stated that the convention, which had met to provide

protection for South Carolina's institutions had been frustrated
by party conflict:

"Thus did our state present the spectacle

of a people, whom common wrongs and common dangers should have
united in closest bonds, completely prostrated and paralyzed,
not by the force and power of the enemy, but by their own
internal strifes."

262

Means congratulated the convention members

for reuniting the state, and held that South Carolina's destiny
was firmly tied with the rest of the South.

Thus, the

Palmetto state, though not seceding in 1851-52, would wait
for the rest of the South to join her in protecting slavery as
the best method of preserving white supremacy.

262 Journal of the Senate of South Carolina, Being the
Extra and Annual Sessions of 1852 (Columbia: Johnston and Cavis,
Printers to the Senate, 1852), 29.
263
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CONCLUSION

The Compromise of 1850 presented one of the last
opportunities for conservative politicians in the Deep South to
control those sectional forces that were threatening the Union.
Since passage of the Compromise was an important link in the
chain of events that led eventually to secession in 1860-61, the
Compromise has been extensively studied by historians.

Their

examination of primary and secondary sources generally convinces
them that political and economic forces were at the core of the
conflict between the two sections.

Although historians have

generally--and correctly--concluded that party loyalties and
the disorganization of the radical forces were important causes
of the South's moderation, they have not recognized the importance
of other forces in the tangled situation--the racism of the whites,
and counteracting this, their love of the Union, nor do we
have a detailed synthesis of the struggles which engulfed the
Lower South from 1850 to 1852.
One of the earliest accounts of the sectional conflict
was James Ford Rhodes' History of the United States (1895-1906)
which covered the period 1850-1909.

Rhodes, unlike other

nineteenth century historians, did not express animosity toward
the South in his writings.

Even though he condemned slavery on
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moral grounds, this "semi-objective" scholar believed that the
peculiar institution had been firmly fixed as a Southern
institution because of the profitability of cotton growing which
was the result of a fortunate event--Eli Whitney's invention of
the cotton gin.

Although Rhodes recognized that the protection

of chattel slavery was a goal of the South, he did not discuss
the underlying racial problems connected with the peculiar
institution.

Calhoun, in his opinion, spoke for Southern Fire-

eaters in 1850, but the possibility of secession was minimal
unless Congress had passed the Wilmot Proviso or abolished
slavery in the District of Columbia.

Rhodes held that Unionism

had emerged as a factor within the South after the introduction
of the Compromise bills by Henry Clay.

A majority of Southerners

were therefore "satisfied" with the Adjustment bills by the end
of 1850 - except for the radicals in South Carolina and
Mississippi.

After noting the radicalism in the two states,

Rhodes failed to alnalyze the causes of extremism or to stress the
tension between racism and Unionism during the period 1850-1852.*
Another nineteenth century writer, New Englander James
Schouler, wrote a detailed account of the slavery controversy.

1 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the
Compromise of 1850 to the End of the Roosevelt Administration
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), 1-99, passim.
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Schouler thought that Southern planters wanted to expand black
slavery into the West "as a means of strengthening their power
against Northern encroachments."^

Since he recognized the power

of the Northern anti-slavery crusade, Schouler stated the dilemma
of the Southern elite in 1849-50:^
was slavery's sure counterpoise?

"To free California, what
The old equilibrium of sections

was destroyed; freedom overbalanced the scales of national
influence; and at no distant day the system which they had pressed
to extend would be at the mercy of a numerical majority whose
inner wish was to eradicate it."^

He believed that President

Taylor's plan for admitting California and New Mexico as states
would have eliminated sectional tensions, and that the trend
toward disunion in the South during the latter part of 1850 was
checked by the failure of the South to unite and by the efforts of
the Georgia Triumvirate.

Moderation was thus the dominant trend

below the Mason-Dixon line in 1851 except in South Carolina.
Schouler attributed the conditional Unionism in the cotton states
to Clay's Compromise which, he believed, gave impetus to
radicalism.

This dubious proposition does not, of course, take

2 James Schouler, History of the United States Under the
Constitution 1847-1861 (New York: Oodd, Mead and Company,
1904), V, 95.
3

Ibid., 151.
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into account the depth of Southern opposition to Taylor's plan
(which Schouler praised) or the sources of extremism in the South
that were at the core of the hostility toward the North."*
During the first three decades of the twentieth century
numerous scholars developed interpretations about the conflict
between North and South.

Among them was Theodore Clarke Smith,

who authored a volume in the American Nation series entitled
Parties and Slavery (1906).

Smith believed that the sectional

problem was the direct result of conflict over the expansion of
slavery.

Political parties had to conciliate the South since

her institutions were the objects of Northern attack.

Southern

radicals were a visible part of the population, and conservatives
wanted to placate them in order to save the Union.^

Moderates

in the Deep South had to canvass vigorously against a minority of
extremists who "repudiated the compromise and refused to acquiese
without an effort to bring about secession."'7 Smith cited the
personal efforts of Unionists like Foote and Cobb, and the
g

conditional acceptance of the Compromise in states like Georgia.

5

Ibid., 151-263, passim.

6 Theodore Clarke Smith, Parties and Slavery 1850-1859
(New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1906), XVIII, XV-XVI, 1-19.
7

Ibid., 19.
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Sectional peace was a reality in the South by 1852:

"The

Southern people, deeply as they felt the loss to their section of
a share of California, and little as they trusted the goodwill
of the North, were willing to let matters rest, provided nothing
further should rise to disturb the equilibrium.

So peace

reigned once more at Washington, and among the states."

9

Smith

thus interpreted the conflict as one that involved the question
of whether slavery would expand rather than as a crisis that
touched the fundamental fears of white Southerners - abolition.
A transplanted Virginian, Woodrow Wilson, wrote a volume
entitled Division and Reunion (1910) in which he discussed
sectional problems.

Wilson described the South as extremely

aristocratic, and stressed that the Southern elite felt isolated
by the mid-nineteenth century as it tied its future to black
bondage.

He held that the struggle over the status of slavery in

the West was the first contest between two sections whose way of
life was based on quite different socio-economic s y s t e m s . T h e
question in 1850 "was not yet the existence of slavery within
the States, but the admission of slavery into the territories.
The object of the extreme Southern men was to gain territory for

9

Ibid., 27.

10 Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion 1829-1909 (New York:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1910), 117-180, passim.
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s l a v e r y . W i l s o n recounted briefly the passage of the
Compromise and stated that "habits of accommodation and the
mercantile spirit, which dreaded any disturbance of the great
prosperity which had already followed on the heels of the
discovery of gold in California, had induced compromise; but other
forces were to render it ineffectual against the coming crisis."

19

Although he noted the problems created by the Fugitive Slave Law,
Wilson did not describe the struggle to gain acceptance of the
Compromise of 1850 in the Southern states or the fundamental
problem of preserving white supremacy.
John Back McMaster, in a rambling chapter in his A History
of the People of the United States (1883-1915), dealt with many
of the conflicts between 1850-52.

He thought that the Union

was definitely threatened in 1850 and that its fate "hung on the
action of Congress.

. .

The key issues, on which all

Southerners were united, were that the North must not pass the

11

Ibid., 167.

12

Ibid., 173.
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Ibid., 173-180.

14
John Bach McMaster, A History of thePeople of the
United
States, from the Revolutionto the CivilWar 1850-1861 (NewYork:
D. Appleton Century Company, 1936), VIII, 9.

376

Wilmot Proviso, must not hinder the return of escaped slaves,
and must not interfere with the peculiar institution in the
District of Columbia, demands that were agreed upon by moderates
during early 1850.

However McMaster stressed the "radicalism"

in the South before the Nashville convention was convened.

He

overestimated the popularity of Calhoun's last speech, but
correctly stressed the divisions within the South during the
summer of 1850 between Fire-eaters and Unionists.

Southerners

reacted violently to the passage of the Compromise and demanded
secession or economic retaliation against the North.

McMaster

described the mood of resistance in the South while attributing
the Union victory in Georgia to the efforts of the Triumvirate.
Although he mentioned many ideas which were debated in the South,
his work is more an ecletic recounting of ideas which were discussed
rather than a clear analysis of the causes

of discontent or political

conservatism which emerged.^
Another early major writer was Edward Channing.

In his

A History of the United States, (1925) Channing, who was influenced
by early twentieth century racism, emphasized that slavery was
considered the normal condition for the inferior black m a n . ^

15

Ibid., 9-55, passim.

16 Edward Channing, A History of the United States: The
War for Southern Independence (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1925), VI, 1-67, passim. Channing himself felt that black people
were inferior and this fact made him more sympathetic to the South.
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Southerners were also influenced by a weak economic system
during 1848-50 that "caused them to look closely into the relative
positions of themselves and their Northern fellow-countrymen.
It

seemed to be the sad fate of the cultivator of the soil tobe

unable to match the productions
manufacturer and consumer."

17

of his fields with the demands of
The production of large crops did

not bring good prices and the general economic state of the South
did not seem promising.

Touching on the subject of racism,

Channing mentioned that the Southern Address contained a reference
to abolition, but he did not develop this point.

Enthusiasm for

Southern unity had diminished quickly in 1850 Channing thought,
using as evidence the critical contests in Georgia, Mississippi,
and South Carolina.

18

He outlined the tactics of the Fire-eaters

and the role economics played in diminishing their influence:
"This party [secessionists] was in a minority in every
Southern state except South Carolina, but it was active
and energetic and, by means of well-written pamphlets
which were everywhere in circulation, was seeking to
prove to the Southern people that the Union was an
injury to all their material interests. Fortunately the
increase, in prices, which were due largely to the dis
covery of gold in California, and the consequent
prosperity that prevailed in the South after 1850 drove
thoughts of secession away from the Southern mind. . .

17

Ibid., 67.
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He concluded that the deterioration of sectional unity might have
been prevented if the North had allowed the South concessions
which would have prevented white Southerners from thinking their
way of life was threatened.

Unfortunately Channing had failed to

recognize the potency of racism, even though he correctly saw that
love for the Union was still an important factor in the minds of
many Southerners as late as 1850-1851.^®
Avery 0. Craven, a leading Southern historian, believed
that a central cause of the conflict between the sections was
the emotionalism created by sectional politicians.

However, he

also concluded that there was tension between the forces of the
modern world represented by the urban industrial North and the
rural agrarian South.

In analyzing Calhoun's speech in the spring

of 1850, Craven stressed three features of Southern society which
were outmoded:

1) belief in a rural society; 2) belief in Negro

inferiority; and 3) belief in a confederate form of government:

21

"His [Calhoun] South and its values were out of date and he
did not know it. The industrial Revolution was in the
ascendancy. The future belonged to the city, to the
financier and the industrialist. . . . Great technical
changes in communication and production were cutting
down space, increasing interdependence and calling for
an efficiency and uniformity which only strong centralized
government and dominant nationalism could give.22

20

Ibid., 85.

21 Avery Craven, The Coming of the Civil War (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), 1-272, passim.
22

Ibid., 254.
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Therefore, this so-called "revisionist" believed that the
conflict over chattel slavery between the North and South was the
result of political maneuverings and the growth of the modern
industrial North which was outstripping the South.
Craven also provided an adequate analysis of Southern
reaction to the Compromise of 1850.

He believed that Georgia's

acceptance of the Compromise was important to the reaction of the
entire South.

Three key factors that caused Southern acceptance

of the Compromise were the national bonds of party, the prosperity
in Southern cities like Savannah, and the fact that the Southern
masses were not radical.

Although Craven mentioned the Southern

concern about abolition, he did not develop it as a central theme
in Southern history from 1850 to 1852 or show that it influenced
the political action of extremists in the South like Robert
Barnwell Rhett.

Mississippi and South Carolina, which were the

centers of Southern "ultraism," were finally defeated by the lack
of support in other Southern communities.

23

The crisis of

1850-52 was finally adjusted because there "was a compromise
0/

dealing with concrete cases, not with principles or values."
Henry Simms, writing in the early 1940's, stated that
political problems were at the core of the inter-sectional

23 Craven, The Coming of the Civil W a r , 241-71; Avery
Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism (Baton Rouge; Louisiana
State University Press, 1953), 1-114.
24

Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 115.
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struggle:

"Despite the admitted complexity of the situation, the

political factors more than any other produced that hostile feeling
which resulted in the separation of the sections."

25

Simms also

mentioned the South's belief that the two races could not live on
a basis of equality but he did not utilize this insight.

He

emphasized that the Nashville Convention's failure signalled
acceptance of adjustment in 1850 but concluded that "had South
Carolina seceded, the strong conservative sentiment in the South
in the early fifties might have found itself put to a severe test."^
Simms recognized Georgia as the key to the acceptance of the
Compromise in the South, but in his treatment there was little
discussion of the existence of prosperity or the factor of race
as motivating forces in the politics of the Deep South.
In contrast, Allan Nevins was one of the first historians
to assert that a key problem of the 1850's was racial adjustment.
In his great work on the Ordeal of the Union, Nevins did not stress
racism in his chapters on the Compromise itself, but in a separate
section he stated that Southern whites feared racial violence,
miscegenation, and black reversion to savagery if the peculiar

25 Henry H. Simms, A Decade of Sectional Controversy
1851-1861 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1942), VIII.
26

Ibid., 55.
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institution was abolished.

27

Southerners "shrank from any

solution of the terrible problem of race relations except that
offered by slavery."

28

In a later chapter entitled "Southern Acquiescence-with Conditions

", Nevins emphasized the problems for "Southern

Rights" men like Yancey who believed that "abandonment of the
Union offered the only safety" for the South.

"Closed" societies

such as South Carolina, with its aristocratic heritage and large
black population harbored noticeable disunionist sentiment.

The

race problem was mentioned in his discussion about Mississippi,
but Nevins did not integrate this factor into his political
history of the Deep South from 1850 to 1852.

Forces which Nevins

saw as critical in the Compromise's acceptance were prosperity,
the power of Whigs to prevent secession, the Southerner's sense
of being an American, and the desire for political unification.
However, he realized that the submission to the Compromise was
conditional because the Whig party began to break up in 1852,
and because there was a "continued recalcitrancy" on the part of
radical Southerners.

29

27 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union: Fruits of Manifest
Destiny 1847-1852 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947),
I, 412-544.
28
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Discussion of the Compromise in general treatments of
Southern history have provided adequate outlines of the main
issues.

One of the first scholarly syntheses of the Old South

was written by R. S. Cotterill.

Professor Cotterill interpreted

the crisis over slavery from 1849-52 as mainly the result of
planning by Democrats - including Calhoun and Foote - who wanted
the South to unite in order to stop Northern aggression.

30

This

action, which gave impetus to Southern radicalism, was opposed
by Whigs who wanted compromise because they were "so thoroughly
convinced--of Southern weakness that they were disposed to accept
practically any terms the North dictated so long as it was called
*1 1

a Compromise.

Prosperity was a key to adjustment and the

"excitement" in 1850 was largely limited to Southern politicians
rather than a prevailing feeling of the Southern people.
Radicalism was largely a bluff to obtain concessions from the
North; the Southern movement increased nationalism in the slave
states and gave the Democrats the reputation of being the chief
defenders of the South.

One gets the impression that Cotterill

30 R. S. Cotterill, The Old South: The Geographic,
Economic, Social, Political, and Cultural Expansion, Institutions,
and Nationalism of the Ante-bellum South (Glendale, California:
The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1937), 201-207.
31

Ibid., 207.
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believed the conflict was artifically created in Washington to
restrain the North and that the result - Southern radicalism was not caused by real fears in the South.^2
Francis Butler Sirakins, one of the greatest historians,
recognized that the South had begun its proslavery defense in the
1820's.

33

The section's racial theory was based on the idea that

the black man was only fit for labor, and that "white skin
protected the white man against social degradation and formed the
basis of a brotherhood of r a c e . T h e

Wilmot Proviso

precipitated a crisis over slavery expansion which led to efforts
O C

to form Southern unity.

J

Adjustment was possible because of

"the realization of a common nationality with Northerners . . . and
. . . because the economic systems of the two sections were in
many respects complementary;

. .

36

There were national

political alliances in 1850 which enabled statesmen to save the
Union by creating a "permanent accord between the sections."

32

York:

37

Ibid., 201-14.

33 Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New
Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 79-115.
34

Ibid., 109-110.

35

Ibid., 111.

36

Ibid., 112.

37

Ibid., 114.
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The most recent work on the ante-bellum South, written
by Clement Eaton, contains a cogent account of the Southern
defense of slavery.

38

Eaton, the chief exponent of the idea that

the South grew progressively more reactionary as the nineteenth
century progressed, held that Fire-eaters like William Lowndes
Yancey had played important roles in the sectional crisis from
1846 to 1852:

"It is possible that the Fire-eaters in the South

and the abolitionists in the North emotionalized sectional
controversies so greatly that they prevented the successful
application of compromise and sanity to the issues."

39

The

South as a whole, however, was concerned about the issue of slavery
expansion because of the need to maintain political equilibrium
with the North.

After the Compromise's passage, Eaton believed

that the successful creation of the Unionist movement in states
like Georgia led to the isolation of powerful radicals in the
states of Mississippi and South Carolina.

He also stressed that

prosperity - "cotton selling at 13 cents a pound" - helped
persuade the South to submit to the Compromise which was a bad
bargain for the Southern states.^®

It was only "a sectional truce

38 Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1966), 337-465, passim.
39

lbid•» 47°*

40

Ibid., 470-78.
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that permitted the Northern adversary to grow stronger
Eaton thus stressed the role of extremists and economics as the
major factors in the sectional crisis.
The major monograph on the passage of the Compromise
itself was written by Holman Hamilton in the early sixties.

In

Prologue to Conflict, Professor Hamilton critically analyzed the
political struggle over the Compromise on the national level,
but did not cover the reactions of particular sections except as
they related to the Congressional struggle.

His cogent work

included only an overview of the effects of the Compromise in
the 1850's.

Thus, his account does not treat the political events

in the Deep South from 1850-1852.^
In examining historical writings, it is obvious that the
problem of race and radicalism has not been adequately recognized
in the syntheses about Southern and American history.

Allan

Nevins in Ordea1 of the Union discussed the problem of racial
adjustment but did not develop the connections between this
factor and the political decisions made during 1850-52 in the
Deep South.

In contrast, historians from James Ford Rhodes to

Clement Eaton have correctly seen the problem of slavery as the

41

Ibid., 478.

42 Homan Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and
Compromise of 1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1964),
1-190, passim.

386

key to sectionalism in 1850 but have not developed the duality
which existed in the Southern mind between love for the Union
and fear of racial equality.

Historians have also examined the

reaction of the South at the state level in studies which vary in
quality.

One of the best was by Richard Shryock, who emphasized

that prosperity was the key factor in the Empire state's submission
to the Adjustment bills.

The detailed works on Alabama by

Clarence Denman and Lewy Dorman give a good account of the
political struggle, but they do not relate white fear of abolition
to the intra-state fight between radicals and moderates.

Two good

studies on Mississippi and South Carolina included material
on race, but their ideas did not influence major interpretive
/

works.

*3

Thus, historical treatises on the Deep South have not

provided a full picture of the interaction between party
allegiance, love of the Union, affluence and white supremacy.

43 Clarence P. Denman, The Secession Movement in
Alabama (Montgomery: Alabama State Department of Archives and
History,1933), 1-64, passim; Lewy Dorman, Party Politics in
Alabama from 1850 Through 1860 (Wetumpka: Wetumpka Printing
Company, 1935), 43-85, passim; Cleo Hearon, Mississippi and the
Compromise of 1850, Vol. XIV of the Publications of the Mississippi
State Historical Society (University, Mississippi: Mississippi
Historical Association, 1913), 1-228, passim; Philip Hamer, The
Secession Movement in South Carolina, 1847-50 (Allentown, Pa.:
H. R. Haas & Co., 1918), passim.
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The most important works on Southern history have not
taken into account modern techniques of statistical analysis.
Historians have generally used more descriptive approaches in
analyzing the effect of large concentrations of Negro slaves
in forming white opinion, or the responses of radicals or
conservatives to political challenges during the sectional crisis.
However, the statistical formulas which political scientists
like V. 0. Key have utilized for over twenty years can be applied
to historical materials.

These methods are especially valuable,

because the white Southern male demonstrated a highly critical
interest in the sectional issues by his participation in
elections during 1850-52 in which candidates or parties took more
or less definite stands.

In the gubernatorial race in Mississippi

during 1851, eighty-four percent of the white male population
went to the polls, while even in conservative Georgia fifty-nine
percent of the people voted in the gubernatorial contest.

Thus,

the white yeoman and planters of the Lower South expressed
substantial concern about the issues which were raised by the
political elite on the state and national level.^
Voting returns, which were gathered for five of the six
Deep South states, were correlated with demographic data taken

44 Mississippi House Journal (1852), 253; Milledgeville
Southern Recorder, October 14, 1851; Seventh Census of the United
States: 1850 (Washington, 1853), 354, 365, 440, 447. Hereinafter
cited as Seventh Census. Fifty-nine percent of Georgia's
electorate still voted in the gubernatorial election which was
based on the Compromise despite the fact that it had been accepted
by the state in 1850. This is a substantial voter turn out. .
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from the 1850 printed census.

This method enabled the author

to select election returns from the gubernatorial races in
Mississippi and Georgia, Congressional races in Alabama and
Florida, and the returns for the contest for seats in the proposed
Southern convention in South Carolina.

Each of these important

political contests was correlated with the following demographic
data:

1) white population, 2) slave population, 3) white

illiteracy, 4) cash values of farms, 5) cash value of farm
implements, 6) value of improved farming land, and 7) agricultural
production (cotton and rice) .

The idea was to test whether the

actual concentrations of populations had a relationship to the
voting for either Southern Rights or Unionist candidates.
Economic variables were designed to give a broad idea of a county's
total wealth and its productive capacity, which was largely in
cotton but also in rice in South Carolina.

The addition of

illiteracy rates was an effort to determine the influence of
education on the population's voting response.^

45 Thomas B. Alexander et al., "The Basis of Alabama's
Ante-Bellum Two-Party System," The Alabama Review XIX (October,
1966), 243-276, passim; Seventh Census, 334-491, passim. It should
be emphasized that the statistics in table 1 could be cited as
correlations in going Unionist merely by reversing the positive
or negative signs.
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The results of the correlations which are summarized in
the following table are striking.

There was no significant

relationship between the concentration of the white population
of the South and the Southern Rights position.

However, these

negative correlations are so low that they do not indicate any
important relationship between the Union party and the white
population either.

In fact, by examining the table one can

discover only five relationships which might be statistically
important.

It appears that there were significant invididual

relationships between the slave population, values of farms and
the Union party in Georgia.

In Mississippi, positive

correlations also existed with cotton production.

Each of these

five variables can be correlated positively with Unionist vote,
but the variables in Georgia do not really explain much of the
Unionist voting.

By applying a test of squaring the coefficient

of correlation "r", it is possible to obtain an idea of the
actual impact on the phenomena of a particular variable; for
example, only four percent of the Unionist vote in Georgia can
be accounted for by the economic factors or slave population.
In contrast, however, this same technique enables the
historian to sec that each of the variables which have statistical
value in Mississippi can account for approximately eight to
fourteen percent of the electoral results.

No important

correlations between Southern Rights or Unionist candidates or
parties can be discerned from the overall coefficients of
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TAB LI' I
SELECTED CORRELATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND VOTING DATA

IN GOING SOUTHERN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTION
White
Population

Slave
Population

Value of
farms

Value of
farm implements

ALABAMA

-.1252

+.0932

+.0328

+.1211

GEORGIA

-.1383

-.1812

-.2371

-.0599

MISSISSIPPI

-.1816

-.2979

, -.3741

-.2424

FLORIDA

-.0432

-.1729

-.1397

+.0497

Ove ra11

-.1056

-.0743

-.1588

+.0071

IN GOING SECESSIONIST IN THE ELECTION

SOUTH CAROLINA

White
Population

Slave
Population

Value o£
farms

-.3356

+.4687

+.4159

Value of
farm implements
+.3556

IN GOING SOUTHERN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTION
White
Illiteracy

Value
per acre

Cotton
Production

ALABAMA

-.2377

+.0814

+.0339

GEORGIA

-.0935

-.1148

-.1290

MISSISSIPPI

+.0748

-.1563

-.3566

FLORIDA

+.2743

+.2364

-.0662

Overall

-.0831

-.0410

-.0790

IN GOING SECESSIONIST IN THE ELECTION
White
Illiteracy
SOUTH CAROLINA

-.1791

Value
per acre
+.3670

Cotton
Production

Rice

-.0665

+.6021
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correlation for the four states (Georgia, Florida, Mississippi,
Alabama) in which Southern Rights and Unionist forces competed.
It is thus apparent that the elections in these states were
largely decided on the basis of non-rational, emotional factors
rather than socio-economics data which can be measured by the
sophisticated techniques of social science.

Measurable economic

influence in these states were therefore not the real key to the
South's reaction.

46

South Carolina was the major exception to the "rule" that
demographic factors were not related to the voting in the Deep
South.

The Palmetto state, the most radical of the Southern

states, was divided into two factions - cooperative and separate
state-secessionists who vied for support among the white male
electorate.

Even though she was largely isolated by 1851 from

most of the other Southern communities, sixty-eight percent of
her electorate turned out to vote in the mid-October elections.
Positive coefficients of correlation at significance levels above
ninety percent exist between the separate state secessionist vote

46 The results which were significant in the table are
those which met a statistical test of being at least ninety percent
certain that the relationships between variable were not mere
chance. All other variables, except ones discussed above did not
meet this criterion. Seventh Census, 334-491, passim;
Mississippi Mouse Journal (1852), 255; Dorman, Party Politics in
Alabama, 176-91; Tallahassee Florida Sentinel, November 19, 1850.
Charleston Mercury, October 29, 1851. Louisiana's vote was not
included in this analysis because there were no real contests
between opposing parties (Union and Southern Rights) and because'
the correlations based on economic data were insignificant.
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and the slave population, the cash value of farms and farm
implements, the value of land per acre, and the production of
rice.

There is thus a strong relationship between economic

factors in the Palmetto state and a high degree of radicalism in
politics.

These correlations, of course, can be explained by

the fact that the secessionists drew much of their support from
the wealthy planter counties.^
An analysis based on voting pattern would thus seem to
indicate that measurable socio-economic data did not influence
the elections.

Southerners during the first crisis of the 1850's

were more influenced by the values of their society and the
action of their political elite in each of these states.

If one

examines the beliefs which were held by individuals in the
ante-bellum South, one is confronted by a hierarchy of values
which most members of white society accepted.

Love of the Union,

however a Southerner might interpret it, was important to both
the political elite and the yeoman farmers.

In the many

editorials, petitions and memorials in which Southerners expressed
their opinions from 1850-1852 they expressed their devotion to
the Union and also their commitment to white supremacy.

These

values were intertwined with each other but were apparently

47

Charleston Mercury, October 20, 1851.
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arranged in a hierarchy held by white people.

A strong

nationalist orientation might be rather hard to modify if
reinforced by the news media or leading individuals within a
state, but it could not compete with the more basic belief in
white supremacy and the fear that the white man's domination in
the South would be ended with a b o l i t i o n . W h i t e supremacy was
learned from the individual's "social contacts and identification
with groups," and it might enter the realm of a primitive belief
which is closely tied with "personal existence and self-identity."1^^
White men by 1850 demanded sectional peace, while believing that
their way of life would be ended if abolition occurred.
In Louisiana, where the newspapers were largely conservative
and the political elite were largely economically content, the
love of the Union and its value in the public mind was constantly
reinforced.

However, in the more radical states the political

elite, led by a John Quitman or William Lowndes Yancey, drew
upon their powers of communication to touch the fundamental
feeling that the South had to remain a white man's country.

The

48 One can obtain a good understanding of this duality in
the Southern mind by examining editorials and petitions which
appeared in the following newspapers during the period September
1850 to June 1851: Jackson Flag of the Union; Montgomery Advertiser
and State Gazette; Milledgeville Federal Union; Tallahassee
Floridian and Journal.
49 David Mortensen, Communication: the Study of Human
Interaction (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), 162.
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degree to which they were successful depended upon whether
the population would turn toward the Fire-eaters who were
already concerned that white domination over the Negro was
threatened.^
The role of the Southern political elite was, therefore,
critical in determining the position that a state would adopt
in 1850-52.

If several of the other Deep South states had

joined with South Carolina, the nation might have been confronted
with a serious threat to its existence.

General prosperity,

which may have influenced conservatism, was not as important in
arousing the masses as the political skills of many Southern
politicians.

Even though there were no discernible differences

in the socio-economic background between radicals and Unionists,
it seems that the Union forces were the beneficiaries of out
standing political leadership furnished by Robert Toombs, William
R. King, Henry Stuart Foote, and others.

Such politicians had

had lengthy experience on both the state and national levels,
and were able to appeal to the latent loyalty of the people to the
Union while minimizing any possibilities of abolition in the
Adjustment bills.
The conservative elites in the Deep South were able to
draw strength from the party system.

In all of the states except

50 See chapters four through six for evidence to
substantiate these points.
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South Carolina a strong two-party system existed.

Popular

attachment to the two major political parties reduced the
likelihood that the political leadership would unite behind one
position - defense of "Southern rights" - which John Calhoun had
been trying to achieve for years.

The Southern states were not

monolithic entities, totally committed to radicalism, but
exhibited a pluralistic system in which the elites actively
competed for political advantage out of idealism or drive for
national office.

A man like Howell Cobb, representative of

many of the Southern leadership deeply loved the Union but was also
committed to the political fortunes of his wing of the Democratic
party in Georgia.

Pierre Soule of Louisiana, although strongly

opposed to the. Adjustment bills, was still willing to play a
political role in the campaign of 1852 rather than to abandon
the Democratic party as William Lowndes Yancey d i d . ^
Fire-eaters, in contrast, attempted to exploit the basic
emotion of the Southern population - white supremacy.

Although

an examination of measurable demographic data does not really
show a significant role for economics in the elections, the South

51 Howell Cobb papers, 1850-52 (University of Georgia
Libraries, Athens, Georgia); Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler,
The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American
Politics (North Scithuete, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972), 1-50,
passim; John Slidell papers, 1850-52 (Department of Archives and
Manuscripts, Louisiana State University Library, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana).
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was undoubtedly prosperous in 1850-51.

This fact, recognized by

radicals like John Anthony Quitman, helped to mute the appeals
which they made to the white lower classes on the basis of
possible racial-class strife.

Radical editors and politicians

attempted to frighten the yeoman with the possibility that the
common man of the South would be directly affected by abolition
while the affluent planters might be able to escape its dire
effects.

They stressed the features of the Compromise which

might stop the expansion of slavery and thus cause its eventual
demise below the Mason-Dixon line.

Although these arguments

were influential with part of the Southern masses, the firebrands
in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida were not able to exploit these
racial fears because they did not produce a radical leader like
Jefferson Davis around whom the deep fear of racial equality
could be used to focus discontent.

Charles McDonald was certainly

no threat to Howell Cobb's campaign in Georgia, while the
extremists in Florida and Alabama did not produce candidates who
could compete with the vacillating Henry Collier or moderate
Edward Cabell.
The truly committed secessionists like John Quitman or
William Lowndes Yancey, were also hindered by serious problems.
They had been unable to defeat the Compromise of 1850 in
Congress or achieve unity among the radical forces at the
Nashville Convention.

The death of John Calhoun, who had served

as the symbol of Southern resistance for twenty years may have
also hindered their cause.

Southern Rights men were not

committed to secession as the chief form of resistance, and they
often refused, as did John Bragg of Mobile or Jefferson Davis of
Mississippi, to consider disunion except as a final act of
resistance.

Therefore cooperationists in South Carolina were

correct in believing that the rest of the South would have to
"catch up" with the Palmetto state.
Louisiana was one of the two exceptions to any
conclusions which can be made about political reactions to the slave
crisis.

The political elite in Louisiana, of both the Democratic

and Whig parties, were willing to acquiesce in the Compromise by
1851.

The newspapers, which were largely moderate in

orientation, constantly editorialized about the benefits of the
Union, while political realists like John Slidell were concerned
with maintaining contacts with national political figures like
Buchanan rather than in defending an extreme position on
Southern rights.

The two-party system, which allowed the

Democrats to dominate the Congressional races in 1.851, resulted
in the selection of leaders committed to a path of reconcilation
with the North.

The planters, yeomen, and merchants of Louisiana

were aware of the need for a protective tariff, and were not
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willing to leave the Union to join the Fire-eating extremists
of South Carolina.^
South Carolina, which often appeared as a united
society, was still divided in 1850.

Although her leaders

generally agreed that secession was a necessity, they divided
upon the question of tactics.

No member of the state's elite,

except the small Unionist contingent led by Benjamin F. Perry,
questioned the fact that slavery and white dominance in this
aristocratic society were threatened by the Compromise of 1850.
Newspaper editorials and reports of primary meetings indicate that
a fear of abolition was foremost in the minds of both the elite
and the masses.

But significant members of this radical

society were also aware that South Carolina had been isolated
during the nullification crisis and that there was little chance
for aid from any other Southern state.

Secessionist papers

continually harped on the dangers to their white-dominated
society, but the cooperationists were able to point out the
difficulties which South Carolina would have in surviving as a
separate nation.

53

52 Baton Rouge Gazette, 1852, passim; New Orleans Daily
Picayune 1850-52; John Sildell Papers 1851-52.
53 James Henry Hammond Papers, 1850-52 (Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress); Columbia Tri-weekly South
Carolinian 1849-50;Benjamin F. Perry Papers, 1850-51 (Alabama
State Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama).
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In a final evaluation of the spirit of the South in
1851-52 two attributes were dominant.

One was manifested by

radical, George W. Towns, who called upon the state legislature
to substantially increase the strength of the state militia in
order to protect her against any internal threats or from the
North.

In contrast John D. Freeman, a Mississippi Unionist,

demanded sectional peace while stating that the peculiar
institution was beneficial to the South; Freeman also stressed
that the extremists in the North were being ignored by
conservatives above the Mason-Dixon line.

Radicals like Towns

were ready to do battle with the North while Unionists like
Freeman could be gradually moved toward secession if white
supremacy and slavery were "threatened."'*^

Southerners had

decided to accept the Compromise of 1850, but only on the basis
that the existence of white supremacy and slavery were not
seriously challenged.

54 Congressional Globe, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 339;
Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at a Biennial
Session of the General Assembly Begun and Held at Mi 1ledgevi1le
1851-52 (Macon:
Samuel J. Ray, State Printer, 1852), 32-33.
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